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CHAPTER 1 
INHIBITION AND THE STOP SIGNAL 
PARADIGM 
 
INHIBITION: A DEFINITION  
 
The ability to suppress irrelevant or interfering stimuli or impulses is a fundamental 
executive function essential for normal thinking processes and, ultimately, for 
successful living (Garavan, Ross, & Stein, 1999, p. 8301). 
 
One thing that immediately attracts attention in the above description is the 
importance of inhibitory processes. It would be hard to imagine life without 
the ability to stop walking, talking, or thinking at certain things. So–
fortunately–in the past researchers have not only focused on investigating 
how people can respond and do certain things, but also how these same 
people can avoid responding or doing things. Inhibition as a safe keeper! 
 In general, in the psychological literature, the concept ‘inhibition’ refers 
to two different constructs. Firstly, there is ‘inhibition’ in a neurological 
context or in the context of modelling cognitive processes (e.g., connectionist 
models) and inhibition refers to the function of neurons that could be 
excitatory or inhibitory in nature. In a sense, ‘inhibition’ is related here to the 
net activation of cells and how cells can activate or inhibit each other by 
means of, for example, spreading activation and lateral inhibition. The 
second meaning refers to what is described in the above quote: The ability to 
suppress thought and behaviour. In the present doctoral thesis, we will 
focus on inhibition as a set of functions that allow us to suppress for 
example unwanted thoughts, irrelevant stimulus features and inappropriate 
responses. 
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INHIBITION IN COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY: 
CONCEPTS AND THEIR RELATIONS  
 
 Although much has been said about the concept of inhibition in the 
psychological literature, one can argue that still little is known about the 
fundamental basics of the concept. An important shift that has taken place in 
the research about inhibition concerns the suggestion that the concept of 
inhibition would rather be a set of functions than of a unitary construct 
(Demptser, 1993; Nigg, 2000). Of course, this set or family of functions 
would imply that there are commonalities, but also differences between the 
different inhibitory functions.  
 Nigg (2000) proposed a taxonomy based on a reading of the literature, 
and distinguished between two main forms of inhibition: (1) effortful 
inhibition of a motor response or cognitive response and (2) automatic 
inhibition of attention. Each form of inhibition is further subdivided. In 
Table 1.1, the different inhibitory systems according to Nigg are presented 
(Nigg, 2000, p.228). A prominent form of effortful inhibition is ‘interference 
control’. Interference control refers to ‘suppressing a stimulus that pulls for a 
competing response so as to carry out a primary response, to suppressing distractors 
that might slow the primary response, or to suppressing internal stimuli that may 
interfere with the current operations of working memory’ (Nigg, 2000, p.222).  
Examples of interference control can be found in the flanker task (Eriksen & 
Eriksen, 1974) and the Stroop task (Stroop, 1934) in which the relevant 
stimulus attribute is accompanied by irrelevant distracting information. 
Later in this thesis, we will come back to these tasks. As stated by Nigg, 
‘keeping unwanted thoughts out of mind/working memory’ can also be regarded 
as some kind of interference control. To make a distinction from the 
suppression of a response or distractor, as stated above, Nigg uses the term 
‘cognitive inhibition’ to describe this kind of interference control (Nigg, 
2000, p.223). Cognitive inhibition is for example operationalized in the 
directed forgetting paradigm (Bjork, 1972) in which participants are 
instructed to forget previously learned lists. The third form of inhibition, 
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‘behavioural inhibition’, is probably also one of the most fundamental forms 
of inhibition and refers to the ‘deliberate control of a primary motor response in 
compliance with changing context cues’ (Nigg, 2000, p.223). The stop signal 
paradigm (Lappin & Eriksen, 1966; Logan & Cowan, 1984), that is the 
‘backbone’ of this doctoral thesis, operationalizes this kind of behavioural 
inhibition–although we will refer to it as response inhibition. Below, this 
paradigm will be discussed more into detail. A fourth and last form of 
effortful inhibition is ‘oculomotor inhibition’. ‘Suppressing or inhibiting 
oculomotor movements’ is regarded as a different kind of inhibition by Nigg 
(2000, p.227) because of the fact that it constitutes a field of its own in the 
literature. Later on, we will see that not everyone agreed on this latter 
suggestion. The antisaccade task (Hallet, 1978) in which participants have to 
suppress reflexive eye movements is an example of an oculomotor inhibitory 
task.  
 
Table 1.1: The taxonomy of inhibitory systems in cognitive psychology   
(Nigg, 2000, p.228) 
 
Effortful inhibition of a motor or cognitive response 
 
(1) Interference control: Prevent interference due to resource or stimulus 
competition 
 
(2) Cognitive inhibition: Suppress nonpertinent ideation to protect working 
memory/attention. Negative priming is considered as an automatic form of 
cognitive inhibition.  
 
(3) Behavioural inhibition: Suppress a prepotent–automatic or prepared 
response or suppress a cued but socially inappropriate response. 
 (4) Oculomotor inhibition: The effortful suppression of reflexive saccades. 
Automatic inhibition of attention  
 
(1) Recently inspected stimuli, suppressed for both attention and oculomotor 
saccade. 
 (2) Information at unattended locations, suppressed while attending elsewhere. 
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In regard to the two automatic forms of inhibition of attention–‘the 
suppression of recently inspected stimuli’ and ‘the suppression of 
information at unattended locations’–it suffices for the purpose of the 
present thesis to say that Nigg based his proposal on Rafal and Henik (1994). 
These latter authors suggested that in the orienting of visual attention, there 
are possibly three different attention-relevant inhibitory processes: (1) 
inhibition of orienting to unattended locations, (2) inhibition of reflexive 
orienting in the service of a goal, and (3) inhibition of return (i.e., orienting 
to a location where previously an uninformative cue was presented). 
 As mentioned above, the taxonomy of Nigg (2000) can be regarded as a 
theoretical attempt to describe the different inhibitory functions. Later on, 
Friedman and Miyake (2004) performed a latent variable analysis to reveal 
the relations between different forms of inhibition and interference control. 
Friedman and Miyake made a distinction between three different main 
forms of inhibition (see Table 1.2), more or less in accordance with the 
taxonomy of Nigg (2000).  
 
Table 1.2: Three inhibition-related functions according to Friedman and Miyake 
(2004), with each time the three tasks these authors used for each function.  
 
Prepotent Response Inhibition 
 Antisaccade task (Hallet, 1978) 
 Stop signal task (Lappin & Eriksen, 1966; Logan & Cowan,1984)  
 Stroop task (Stroop, 1935) 
Resistance to Distractor Interference 
 Eriksen flanker task (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974) 
 Word naming (Kane, Hasher, Stoltzfus, Zacks, & Connelly, 1994) 
 Shape matching (DeSchepper & Treisman, 1996) 
Resistance to Proactive Interference 
 Brown-Peterson variant (Kane & Engle, 2000) 
 AB-AC-AD (Rosen & Engle, 1998) 
 Cued recall (Tolan & Tehan, 1999) 
 
INHIBITION AND THE STOP SIGNAL PARADIGM    15 
A first form of inhibition is ‘prepotent response inhibition’, i.e., ‘the ability to 
deliberately suppress dominant, automatic, or prepotent responses’ (Friedman & 
Miyake, 2004, p.104). ‘Resistance to distractor interference’ or ‘the ability to 
resist or resolve interference from information in the external environment that is 
irrelevant to the task at hand’ (Friedman & Miyake, 2004, p. 104) is assumed to 
be a second form of inhibition. Finally, ‘the ability to resist memory intrusions 
from information that was previously relevant to the task but has since become 
irrelevant’, or ‘resistance to proactive interference’, is the third form of 
inhibition (Friedman & Miyake, 2004, p.105). The most important result of 
the latent variable analysis was that prepotent response inhibition and 
resistance to distractor interference appeared to be correlated to each other. 
On the contrary, none of these two constructs correlated to resistance to 
proactive interference.  
 In the present doctoral thesis, ‘inhibition’ is the central topic. In line 
with the proposals of Nigg (2000) and Friedman and Miyake (2004), we 
hypothesized that ‘inhibition’ can be considered as a set of functions with a 
certain overlap. We will focus on the relation between these different forms 
of inhibition, and more specifically, on the relation between response 
inhibition in the stop signal task and other kinds of inhibition in a whole 
range of other inhibitory paradigms. However, we will opt for a different 
method compared to Friedman and Miyake (2004). In the past, combining 
different inhibitory paradigms has proven to be a useful tool to investigate 
the relation between different kinds of inhibition. For example, Fuentes and 
colleagues investigated how inhibition of return (IOR) affected interference 
effects like the Stroop effect and the flanker effect (Vivas & Fuentes, 2001, 
and Fuentes, Vivas, & Humphreys, 1999, respectively). They found that IOR 
influenced those interference effects and suggested that inhibitory tagging in 
IOR also affects the processing of task irrelevant dimensions of stimuli in the 
Stroop and flanker task, resulting in less distractor interference. In another 
study, Hommel (1997) combined interference tasks such as the Simon task, 
the Stroop task and the flanker task to investigate the relative time course of 
the different congruency or interference effects.  
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 The basic idea behind combining different inhibitory paradigms is that 
interactions between tasks that are assumed to reflect some kind of 
inhibition or interference control could tell us something more about the 
processes in different tasks, and at the end, about inhibition in general. As 
will appear in the subsequent section, the stop signal paradigm provides a 
useful task to investigate the relation between response inhibition and other 
forms of inhibition. 
 
STOP SIGNAL INHIBITION: AN INTRODUCTION 
 
 In the most standard form of the stop signal task, auditory stop signals 
are occasionally presented during a choice reaction time task (i.e., the 
primary task) with visual stimuli. The stop signal informs participants that 
they are supposed to withhold their response. When the stop signal is 
presented shortly after stimulus presentation, participants can easily 
suppress their response. Alternatively, when the stop signal is presented 
near the execution of the response, participants are no longer capable of 
withholding their response. To explain these data, a horse race model was 
proposed by Logan and colleagues (Logan & Cowan, 1984; Logan, Cowan & 
Davis, 1984). 
  
THE HORSE RACE MODEL 
 
 Performance in the stop signal task is assumed to involve two processes 
that work against each other. First, there is the go process, triggered by the 
imperative stimulus of the primary task. The moment a stop signal is 
perceived by the participant, another, competing process is started: The stop 
process. These two processes race against each other–that is why we speak of 
the horse race model. Whether or not a response can be inhibited depends on 
the finishing time of the two competing processes (see Figure 1.1). When the 
stop process finishes before the go process, subjects can inhibit their 
response (Tg > Ts + td, with Tg the finishing time of the go process, Ts the 
finishing time of the stop process and td the delay between the go stimulus 
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and the stop signal). On the other hand, when the go process reaches the 
finishing line before the stop process, subjects will respond despite the stop 
signal (Tg < Ts + td ). When inhibition succeeds, we speak of ‘signal-inhibit’ 
trials, whereas failures of inhibition are typically labeled ‘signal-respond’ 
trials. Logan and Cowan (1984) were mainly interested in three different 
points: (1) measuring the difficulty of the stop signal inhibition, (2) 
measuring the latency of the stop signal inhibition, and (3) measuring the 
ballistic component1 of the process that should be inhibited.  
 
 
Figure 1.1: Diagram of the horse race model (SSD = Stop Signal Delay).  
 
The horse race model is relatively simple in nature and based on a few 
straightforward assumptions. An important and core assumption is that the 
finishing times of the RT processes and the stopping processes are 
stochastically independent. In other words, these finishing times are 
                                                          
1 Ballistic processes or the ballistic components of processes are those processes or 
components that cannot be stopped. Related to this is the ‘point of no return’ that 
refers to the point in the processing stream that divides controlled processes from 
ballistic ones (Logan, 1994). 
stop signal 
onset
go signal 
onset
primary task 
RT distribution
finishing
time
SSD SSRT
P(resp) P(inhibit)
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supposed to be uncorrelated. Besides this ‘stochastic independence’, Logan 
and Cowan also stated that the stop process and the go process should not 
influence each other. This ‘context independence’ meant that the 
performance of the primary task should be the same as in a single-task 
context without stop signal presentation, and vice versa. Based on these two 
assumptions, Logan and Cowan (1984) suggested that the stop signal task 
and the horse race model provide two useful measurements. Firstly, the 
paradigm allows the observing of the covert latency of the stopping process: 
The stop signal reaction time. Secondly, the slope of the function in which 
the probability of responding given a stop signal is plotted against the stop 
signal delay (the so-called inhibition function), gives an index of the 
variability of the stopping process.  
 Compared to the inhibition function, the Stop Signal Reaction Time or 
SSRT is more frequently used in the literature. Several methods for 
estimating the latency of the stopping process were proposed. Without 
going too much into detail, the basic idea behind the different methods is 
that the SSRT reflects the time between the start and the finishing time of the 
stop process. The start of the stop process is known, since this is the moment 
in time the stop signal is presented. The finishing time is not directly 
observed, but it can be derived from the response probability given a stop 
signal at a certain stop signal delay, and the CRT distribution of the no-
signal trials. Given the assumptions of independence of the go process and 
the stop process, it was proposed that the finishing time of the stop process 
corresponds to the upper limit of responses that escape inhibition. In Figure 
1.1, one can see that the left part of the CRT distribution corresponds to the 
trials that escape inhibition, the right part corresponds to those trials where 
responses are successfully inhibited. 
 The other measurement is the slope of the inhibition function. Logan 
and Cowan (1984) suggested that inhibition functions that could not be 
brought into alignment were assumed to reflect differences in inhibitory 
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control.2 However, recent simulations by Band, van der Molen and Logan 
(2003) suggested that the slope of the inhibition function reflected probably 
not only differences in the variability of the stopping process. These authors 
found that the slope was also influenced by the variabibility in the 
performance on the primary task, even after the appropriate corrections. 
Therefore, Band et al. (2003) concluded that the slope of the function was not 
the ideal measurement to reveal between-group and condition differences in 
stopping. 
 On the other hand, these simulations by Band et al. (2003) did 
demonstrate that under the right conditions (some useful guidelines are 
provided in their paper, see p.134 et seq.), the stop signal reaction time could 
reliably be estimated. For example, these authors found that SSRT 
estimations derived from the central part of the CRT curve were the most 
reliable. Central SSRT estimations were fairly robust against incidental 
violations of the assumptions of the horse race model. By using a tracking 
procedure based on the probability of stopping, these central estimations are 
used. Such a tracking procedure implies that the Stop Signal Delay (SSD; i.e., 
the delay between the imperative stimulus and the stop signal) is adjusted 
after each signal trial, dependent on whether or not the inhibition succeeded. 
When inhibition fails, the SSD is decreased. After successful inhibition, the 
SSD is increased. We will use this tracking procedure in the present PhD 
project. In addition, the two methods used in this PhD project for the 
estimation of SSRT that will be explained in the different chapters [i.e., (1) 
the ‘integration method’ and (2) the method proposed by Logan, Schachar 
and Tannock, 1997] provided good estimations of the true SSRT.  
 Beside these two measurements, the stop signal paradigm also offers a 
method for testing the independence assumptions of the horse race model. It 
was argued by Logan and Cowan (1984) that the stochastic independence 
assumption also had important implications for the latency of responses that 
                                                          
2 Logan and Cowan (1984) argued that when one compares inhibition functions, 
transformations that take into account differences in the mean no-signal CRT, the 
variance of mean no-signal CRT and the variance in SSRT, need to be done first.  
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escape inhibition (i.e., the signal-respond trials).  As can be seen in Figure 
1.1, signal-respond RTs are assumed to correspond to the left part of the 
CRT curve. This implies that the mean signal-respond RT should always be 
lower than the mean CRT of all no-signal trials. Second, one could predict 
the mean signal-respond RT on the basis of the CRT curve of no-signal trials. 
For example, when a participant can inhibit 60% of the responses at a certain 
delay, than it is predicted that the mean signal-respond RT corresponds to 
the mean RT of the 60% fastest no-signal trials. It was argued that the 
independence assumption of the horse race model could be tested by 
comparing the observed mean signal-respond RT to the predicted mean 
signal-respond RT, it was argued. This was done several times, with variable 
success (De Jong, Coles, Logan, & Gratton, 1990; Jennings, Brock, van der 
Molen, & Somsen, 1992; Logan & Cowan, 1984, van Boxtel, van der Molen, 
Jennings, & Brunia, 2001). For example, in the study of van Boxtel et al. 
(2001), there was a significant difference of 23 ms between the observed and 
predicted signal-respond RTs (although there was no difference between the 
event related potentials of the signal-respond trials and their corresponding 
no-signal trials). 
 In line with the findings of van Boxtel et al. (2001), the simulations by 
Band, et al. (2003) demonstrated that a mismatch between the observed and 
the predicted signal-respond RT is probably not the best way to test the 
independence assumption of the horse race model. It was found that CRT 
variability and stopping failures on short SSDs affected the difference 
between observed and predicted signal-respond RTs much more than the 
dependence between the go and stop process. Therefore, Band et al. (2003) 
argued that this measurement should no longer be used for testing the 
independence assumption of the horse race model.  
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OVERVIEW OF STOP SIGNAL TASK STUDIES 
 
 The stop signal paradigm is a very valuable and frequently used 
paradigm in both clinical and cognitive settings. In this section, I will try to 
review the most important findings of behavioural, clinical and 
neuro(psycho)logical studies.  
 
Behavioural studies 
 A vast majority of the studies that use the stop signal task are 
behavioural studies with healthy subjects. The stop signal task can be used 
for discrete hand movements, foot movements (De Jong et al., 1995) or eye 
movements (e.g., Logan & Irwin, 2000). The stop signal task is also already 
used for investigating the inhibition of continuous hand movements 
(Morein-Zamir & Meiran, 2003; Morein-Zamir, Nagelkerke, Chua, Franks, & 
Kingstone, 2004). Moreover, the stop signal paradigm is not restricted to 
movements, since it was demonstrated that it could be used to investigate 
the inhibition of simple thoughts (Logan, 1983) and more complex thoughts 
(Logan & Barber, 1985). Although it is not easy to find a line in all those 
studies, roughly spoken there are two groups: One group of studies uses the 
stop signal paradigm as a tool for investigating processes in the primary task 
and the other group focuses more on the process of response inhibition 
itself. For example, in behavioural studies that investigated the process of 
response inhibition, it was found that stopping latencies were prolonged 
when response readiness was reduced (van den Wildenberg, van der Molen, 
Logan, 2002) or related to this, when responses were more forceful (van den 
Wildenberg, van der Molen, van Boxtel, 2003).  
 The stop signal paradigm finds its basis in the research on the 
‘psychological refractory period’ (PRP), which refers to the finding that a 
response to the second of two successive stimuli is generally slower than the 
response to the first stimulus. In the study of Vince (1948), participants had 
to track a line that moved and had to make fast opposite movements when 
the direction of the line changed. In a sense, this was the first study in which 
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participants had to stop one movement and replace it by another movement 
since. The time between changes in direction was manipulated and at the 
shortest interval, there was sometimes no response to the first stimulus, 
which was actually in this case a change in direction. Although there was no 
report of response inhibition in this study, the study of Vince (1948) is 
usually considered as the precursor of the stop signal paradigm. Later on, 
Lappin and Eriksen (1966) introduced the term ‘stop signal’ within the task 
and they investigated the probability of inhibiting a visual response given 
the delay between the go signal and the stop signal. Often, this study is now 
regarded as one of the first studies that used a simple stop task.  
 The fact that the stop signal paradigm finds its origin in the PRP 
literature can still be seen when one looks at more recent papers. More 
specifically, the finding that responses can be inhibited more often when the 
delay between go stimulus and the stop stimulus is short, led authors to 
suggest that stopping a response does not suffer PRP interference, unlike 
selecting or executing a response. This finding was further supported by 
Logan and Burkell (1986), who used among other things a stop change 
paradigm. However, it was recently demonstrated by Horstmann (2003) that 
stopping an ongoing continuous action did suffer from PRP interference, 
which was not the case with stopping a not-yet-executed action.   
 We already mentioned that the stop signal paradigm is also used as a 
tool for investigating processes in the primary task. This was done for a 
further investigation of blindness effect to response-compatible stimuli 
(Caessens & Vandierendonck, 2002), the negative priming effect 
(Verbruggen, Liefooghe, & Vandierendonck, 2005a, Chapter 4 of this thesis), 
and the switch cost (Verbruggen, Liefooghe, Szmalec, & Vandierendonck, 
2005b; Verbruggen, Liefooghe, Vandierendonck, in press b; Chapter 5 of this 
thesis).These latter studies looked at the effect of stop signal inhibition on 
the subsequent trial and the common finding was that performance was 
influenced dependent on whether or not inhibition succeeded. These studies 
were also partially based on the study of Rieger and Gauggel (1999) who 
investigated the after-effects of response inhibition (i.e., slower responses 
after signal trials). 
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 Other studies used the stop signal for investigating the phantom ‘point 
of no return’. The point of no return refers to the ballistic stage in responding 
where the response can no longer be inhibited. Several studies used the stop 
paradigm to determine the ballistic stage–if it exists at all–in response 
preparation and motor programming (e.g., Osman, Kornblum, & Meyer, 
1986, 1990) and continuous tasks of skills like speaking (e.g., Ladefoged, 
Silverstein, & Papcun, 1973) and typing by experienced typists (e.g., Logan, 
1982) . In yet another study, Cavina-Pratesi, Bricolo, Pellegrini, and Marzi 
(2004) used the point of no return within the stop signal task for 
investigating at what stage the interhemispheric transfer occurred for 
manual responses to lateralized visual stimuli.  
 Besides hand and foot movements, the stop signal paradigm is also 
used to investigate the inhibition of eye movements. Although the principles 
are similar to those in a simple stop task, stopping saccades is often regarded 
as a variant of the simple stop task or even as a paradigm on its own.  
Whereas some researchers just called it a simple stop task with eye 
movements (e.g., Logan & Irwin, 2000), others referred to it as the 
‘countermanding task’ (e.g., Armstrong & Munoz, 2003; Asrress & 
Carpenter, 2001; Cabel, Armstrong, Reingold, Munoz, 2000; Hanes & 
Carpenter, 1999; Hanes & Schall, 1995; Schall, Hanes, & Taylor, 2001). 
Anyhow, the countermanding task is highly similar to a simple stop task 
with hand movements: Participants have to stop (in this case a saccadic) 
response when a stop signal is presented. Stopping latencies can be 
estimated, just like for hand responses. Several studies that used the 
countermanding task pointed out, however, that the inhibition of saccadic 
responses differs from the inhibition of responses with the hand. For 
example, Logan and Irwin (2000) demonstrated that stopping saccadic 
responses and stopping responses with the hand were differentially 
influenced by the compatibility of a stimulus, providing evidence for distinct 
inhibitory mechanisms for eye movements and hand movements. Moreover, 
it seems that other brain regions are involved in the inhibition of saccadic 
and manual responses (e.g., Stuphorn, Taylor, & Schall, 2000).  
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 A final line of behavioural studies focused on the relation between 
response inhibition and other forms of inhibition or interference control. 
Kramer, Humphrey, Larish, Logan, and Strayer (1994) found that stopping 
was more difficult on incongruent trials in a flanker task. Similar results 
were obtained in similar and other interference or conflict tasks 
(Ridderinkhof, Band & Logan, 1999; Verbruggen, Liefooghe & 
Vandierendonck, 2004, in press a). On the other hand, in a pure stimulus-
response compatibility task, the incompatibility of the stimuli did not 
influence the stopping latencies (Logan, 1981; Logan & Irwin, 2000; van den 
Wildenberg & van der Molen, 2004). Related to these interactions, Jennings 
and colleagues (Jennings, 1992; Jennings, Brock, van der Molen, & Somsen, 
1992; Jennings & van der Molen, 2002) demonstrated that motor inhibition 
influenced the regulation of the cardiac cycle in a way that successful 
inhibition slowed down heart rate. 
 
Variants of the stop signal task 
 In the most frequent form (cfr. supra), an auditory stop signal is 
presented during a choice reaction time task and all responses have to be 
suppressed when the stop signal is presented. Although it is not really a 
variant of the stop signal task, the go/no-go paradigm is probably the most 
often used alternative task. The difference between the stop signal paradigm 
and the go/no-go paradigm lies in the fact that in the latter paradigm, the 
stop signal or no-go stimulus is always presented at SOA onset 0. Since the 
go/no-go paradigm can be considered as a paradigm on itself, we will not 
discuss it here and focus on those response inhibition tasks where the stop 
signal is always presented after the stimulus of the primary task; in other 
words, after the go stimulus. The simple stop task, discussed and explained 
above, involves a rather extreme but simple form of stopping since all 
responses or processes can be cancelled. Over the years, variants of the stop 
signal paradigm have been developed in which the stopping process is more 
complicated, and we will briefly discuss some of them here.  
 A first variant of the simple stop signal task is the stop change 
paradigm. Unlike in the simple stop task, the stop signal in the stop change 
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task informs the participants that a response should be stopped and replaced 
by another response. In some studies that used a stop change task, 
participants just had to respond to the stop signal by pressing a key that was 
not used in the primary task. For example, in the study of Logan and Burkell 
(1986), participants had to respond with their right hand to the identity of a 
letter, and when a tone occurred, the right handed response had to be 
suppressed and replaced by a left handed response, regardless of the 
identity of the letter. In other studies, participants had to suppress the 
response to the go stimulus and respond to the identity of the stop signal 
(e.g., a high or a low tone; Logan, 1983). Yet another kind of stop change task 
can be found in the study of Band, Ridderinkhof and van der Molen (2003; 
see also Brown & Braver, 2005, who used a similar task in a neuroanatomical 
context), in which participants had to change the task in stead of responding 
to the stop signal. The primary task consisted of responding to the direction 
of an arrow, and when a stop signal was presented they had to respond to 
the opposite side.  
 The selective stop task is another kind of stop task. In this task 
participants do not always have to withhold their response when a stop 
signal is presented. Generally, there are two kinds of selective stop tasks: (1) 
the selective stop task at a motor level and (2) the selective stop task at a 
perceptual level. In the first variant of the selective stop task, participants 
only have to stop for example right-handed responses when a stop signal is 
presented and they can ignore the stop signal in case of a left-handed 
response (e.g., Logan, Kantowitz and Riegler, 1986; van der Veen, van der 
Molen, & Jennings, 2000; Verbruggen, Liefooghe & Vandierendonck, 2005a, 
2005b). The latter version is based on a perceptual discrimination by using 
different tones (e.g., only stop when you hear a high tone; e.g., Bedard et al., 
2002, 2003). A ‘combination’ of both variants of the selective stop task is 
found in the study of van den Wildenberg and van der Molen (2004a; see 
also van den Wildenberg & van der Molen, 2004b). These authors instructed 
their participants only to stop their response when the stop signal was 
presented on the same side of the response.   
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 Note that in regard to the stopping latencies, it is a common finding that 
making the stop task more complicated results in longer SSRTs for all the 
above mentioned variants. Actually, this led authors to suggest that there 
are different mechanisms (De Jong et al., 1995) or different modes (e.g., 
Logan, 1994; Logan, Schachar & Tannock, 1997) for response inhibition. 
 
Development and aging 
 Several studies investigated developmental trends in response 
inhibition in the stop signal task. One of the first studies that looked at age 
differences with children was the above mentioned study of Schachar and 
Logan (1990). These authors found that stopping performance was generally 
better for older children (4th and 6th grade) than for younger children (2nd 
grade), although this developmental trend did not reach significance. Other 
studies did find significant differences between age groups. Kramer et al. 
(1994) observed significant differences between younger and older adults 
(see also May & Hasher, 1998). These findings were replicated by follow-up 
studies in which a significant difference between stopping latencies of 
children and younger adults was found, and these latencies increased again 
when people grew older (e.g., Carver, Livesey & Charles, 2001; 
Ridderinkhof, Band & Logan, 1999; Williams, Ponesse, Schachar, Logan & 
Tannock, 1999). The same results were obtained with a variant of the simple 
stop task, namely the selective stop task (cfr. infra; Bedard et al., 2002; van 
den Wildenberg & van der Molen, 2004). On the other hand, Band, van der 
Molen, Overtoom and Verbaten (2001) did not find differences in stopping 
performance across different age groups. Whereas it was suggested by 
Ridderinkhof et al. (1999) that response inhibition develops during 
childhood, Band et al. (2001) argued that a nonselective mechanism of 
response inhibition seems to be fully developed during early childhood. To 
conclude, although not every study could find age differences, there is some 
evidence that there are developmental trends in response inhibition.  
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Clinical studies and differences between populations 
 The stop signal paradigm has proven to be a useful tool for 
investigating the behavioural consequences of certain brain lesions. Rieger, 
Gauggel, and Burmeister (2003) found that patients with a lesion to the basal 
ganglia due to cerebrovascular disorders or a brain tumor had slower SSRTs. 
Similar results were obtained in clinical groups with damage to the right 
inferior frontal gyrus (Aron, Fletcher, Bullmore, Sahakian & Robbins, 2003), 
although Dimitrov et al. (2003) found that stop signal inhibition was 
relatively spared in patients with frontal lobe lesion and only marginally 
impaired in patients with frontal lobe dementia. Patients suffering from 
traumatic brain injury (TBI; Rieger & Gauggel, 2002) did not perform worse 
compared to the control groups. Note that the opposite was found in 
children with TBI: Konrad, Gauggel, Manz and Scholl (2000) observed a 
deficit in behavioural inhibition, contrary to the findings with adult subjects 
that suffer from TBI. Eagle and Robbins (2003a, 2003b) ran some lesion 
experiments with rats and the stop signal task. These authors found that 
lesions to the medial prefrontal cortex or the nucleus accumbens core did not 
influence the stop signal task performance (Eagle & Robbins, 2003a). On the 
other hand, medial stratial lesions slowed down stopping latencies (Eagle & 
Robbins, 2003b). 
 In addition, the stop signal task is used in several studies with different 
clinical groups. Gauggel, Rieger, and Feghoff (2004) found that patients with 
Parkinson disease had difficulties with stop signal inhibition, compared to 
healthy control subjects. Other clinical populations that have shown to have 
difficulties with response inhibition in the stop signal task are children with 
epilepsy (Chevalier, Metz-Lutz, & Segalowitz, 2000) or with autism (Geurts, 
Verté, Oosterlaan, Roeyers & Sergant, 2004; although the opposite results 
were found by Ozonoff & Strayer, 1997), subjects with a Posttraumatic Stress 
Disorder (Casada & Roache, 2005), patients with a focal hand dystonia 
(Stinear & Byblow, 2004) or mild head injury (Stewart & Tannock, 1999). 
Badcock, Michie, Johnson, and Combrinck (2002) demonstrated that 
schizophrenic patients had difficulties with triggering the inhibitory 
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response, while an fMRI study of Rubia et al. (2001) only found abnormal 
neural network activation during normal behavioural performance in the 
stop task. Others have demonstrated that stop signal inhibition was intact in 
the early stages of the Alzheimer disease (Amieva et al., 2002). 
 But probably the most investigated clinical group with regard to 
response inhibition deficits is children with the attentional deficit disorder 
(ADHD). Schachar and Logan (1990) were one of the first to demonstrate 
that ADHD children performed worse in the stop signal task compared to 
control subjects. Later on, this finding was often replicated (mentioning all 
those studies would lead us much too far, but see Lijffijt, Kenemans, 
Verbaten & Van Engeland, 2005; Nigg, 2001; and Oosterlaan, Sergant & 
Logan, 1998, for some reviews). These observations in the stop signal 
paradigm and in other tasks that operationalize response inhibition even led 
some authors to conclude that the deficit in ADHD was primarily a response 
inhibition deficit (e.g., Barkley, 1997). 
 Personality characteristics also seem to sometimes influence the stop 
signal task performance. One personality trait that is often related to poorer 
response inhibition is impulsivity (Dougherty et al., 2003; Logan, et al., 1997; 
Marsh, Dougherty, Mathias, Moeller, & Hicks, 2002; but see Rodgriguez-
Fornells, Lorenzo-Seva & Andres-Pueyo, 2002, who did not find an effect of 
impulsivity in adult subjects). Probably related to the findings with 
impulsivity, Nederkroon, van Eijs and Jansen (2004) found that restrained 
eaters with bulimic symptoms also performed worse in the stop signal task. 
Finally, in a study where participants had to complete several personality 
tests, it was demonstrated that higher scores on the Sensitivity to Reward 
scale and lower scores on the Sensitivity to Punishment scale were 
associated with general inhibitory deficits (Avila & Parcet, 2001).  
 
Neurophysiological, -anatomical and –pharmalogical studies 
 A first and often used neurophysiological method is the measurement 
of event related potentials. De Jong, Coles, Logan and Gratton (1990) were 
the first to measure the electroencephalogram while participants performed 
the stop signal task and demonstrated that on successfully inhibited trials, 
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there was a positive deflection in the waveform of the event-related 
potential. Also, the amplitude of the lateralized readiness potential (LRP), 
reflecting motor preparation, was lower on signal-inhibit trials than on 
signal-respond trials. On the other hand, the amplitude of the LRP on 
successfully inhibited trials was still larger than the amplitude needed to 
trigger electromyographic activity in the responding muscles. Others used 
the same method for measuring electric brain activity (e.g., van Boxtel, van 
der Molen, Jennings & Brunia, 2001). However, when measuring ERPs in the 
stop signal task, the signals related to the go process and the signals related 
to the stop process are intermixed, in a way that the mean of both signals is 
captured and measured at the scalp site. Recently, Kok, Ramautar, De 
Ruiter, Band, and Ridderinkhof (2004) proposed a method to distinguish 
between the two different electrophysiological signals and found a nice 
distinction between the N2/P3 wave of successful and unsuccessful stop 
trials. One of the conclusions of that paper was that at the central electrode 
Cz the P3-component peaked earlier on successful trials, suggesting that this 
component reflects at least partially the efficiency of inhibitory control. The 
N2/P3 complex was later on further validated in a study by the same 
authors (Ramautar, Kok, Ridderinkhof, 2004). Note that the stop-P3 was also 
found in another study that used a different method, although with a more 
anterior scalp distribution (Bekker, Kenemans, Hoeksma, Talsma, & 
Verbaten, 2005). In another recent study that measured the 
electroencephalogram while participants performed the stop signal task, van 
Boxtel, van der Molen and Jennings (2005) demonstrated that after signal-
respond trials there was an error-related deflection of the ERP wave, 
probably generated by different parts of the anterior cingulated cortex. 
 Other studies used neuroimaging techniques like fMRI to reveal the 
neuroanatomical locus of response inhibition in the stop signal task. In 
different versions of the stop signal task, Rubia et al. (2001) found common 
activation in predominantly right hemispheric anterior cingulate, 
supplementary motor area, inferior prefrontal, and also in the parietal 
cortices. Furthermore, Rubia and colleagues demonstrated that the right 
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inferior cortex was (Rubia et al., 2001; Rubia, Smith, Brammer, & Taylor, 
2003) activated by response inhibition in the stop signal task.3  
 A third line of ‘neurologically’ oriented research, concerns those studies 
that investigated the effect of psychopharmaca and drugs on response 
inhibition.  One of those substances that is used in the context of the stop 
signal paradigm, is the stimulant drug d-amphetamine. It was demonstrated 
that the administration of d-amphetamine led to a better performance on the 
stop signal task (De Wit, Crean, Richards, 2000; De Wit, Enggasser, Richards, 
2002), although Fillmore, Kelly and Martin (2005) could not replicate this 
effect. Note that Eagle and Robbins (2003a) also found no effect of d-
amphetamine on stopping latencies of rats. Another substance that was 
proven to enhance stopping performance, is Modafinil (Nouraei, De 
Pennington, Jones, & Carpenter, 2003), which is a wake-promoting agent 
similar to methylphenidate. Methylphenidate itself also influences SSRTs: 
Several studies demonstrated that the response inhibition deficit observed in 
ADHD children disappeared largely when methylphenidate was 
administered (Aron, Dowson, Sahakian, & Robbins, 2003; Boonstra, Kooij, 
Oosterlaan, Sergeant, & Buitelaar, 2005; Konrad, Gunther, Hanisch, & 
Herpertz-Dahlmann, 2004; Potter, & Newhouse, 2004; Tannock, Schachar, 
Carr, Chajczyk, & Logan, 1989). Potter and Newhouse (2004) also found 
similar effects of nicotine. On the other hand, Overtoom et al. (2003) found 
that inhibition performance of ADHD children was only improved under 
desipramine (a noradrenalin re-uptake inhibitor) but not under 
methylphenidate or L-dopa (a dopamine (DA) agonist). 
 Of course, there are also substances that impair response inhibition. The 
most obvious substance is alcohol. Mulhivill, Skilling and Vogel-Sprott 
(1997) demonstrated that response inhibition in the stop signal task was 
indeed influenced by the administration of alcohol. Later on, it was 
                                                          
3 Note that the right inferior cortex is also activated in the go/no-go paradigm 
(Bunge, Dudocovic, Thomason, Vaidya, Gabrieli, 2002; Garavan, Ross, Murphy, 
Roche, & Stein, 2002; Garavan, Ross & Stein, 1999; Konishi et al., 1999), further 
demonstrating the importance of this region for response inhibition.   
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demonstrated that behavioural reinforcement, caffeine or a combination of 
caffeine and reinforcement, counteracted the impairment induced by alcohol 
(Fillmore, & Vogel-Sprott, 1999) and that alcohol expectancies also 
influenced the effect of alcohol on stopping latencies (Fillmore & Blackburn, 
2002). Other substances that have shown to prolong stopping latencies are 
cocaine (Fillmore & Rush, 2002; Fillmore, Rush, & Hays, 2002) or the 
sedative-hypnotic drug triazolam (Fillmore, Rush, Kelly, & Hays, 2001).  
 So far, we have mentioned different neurophysiological, -anatomical 
and -pharmalogical studies. These studies contributed largely to a better 
understanding of underlying processes in the stop signal task, leading 
authors to start hypothesizing about the nature of response inhibition in the 
stop signal task. Among other things the finding that the amplitude of the 
LRP on successfully inhibited trials was still larger than the amplitude 
needed to trigger electromyographic activity in the responding muscles, led 
De Jong and colleagues to suggest that two different mechanisms were 
involved in response inhibition: A central mechanism that allows the 
selective inhibition of the required response, and a peripheral one that 
inhibits all responses (De Jong et al., 1990; De Jong, Coles & Logan, 1995).  
 However, not everyone agreed on this distinction between two different 
mechanisms in the brain, responsible for different kinds of inhibition. Band 
and van der Molen (1999) argued that a peripheral mechanism of inhibition 
was incorrectly inferred from electrophysiological measures like the LRP 
(lateralized event related potential) and EMG data (electromyogram). These 
authors suggested that inhibitory processes always involve the cortex, and 
that inhibitory effects are exerted upstream from the primary motor cortex. 
Furthermore, they made a distinction between possible agents of response 
inhibition–like the prefrontal cortex and basal ganglia–and the possible sites 
of inhibition, like the thalamus and motor cortex. Because the basal ganglia 
are assumed to be part of the medial loop responsible for motor behaviour 
(cfr. Brunia, 1997), it was hypothesized that cortical and subcortical 
structures conjointly accomplish response inhibition, with the cortical 
structures, like the inferior frontal cortex, in charge. Note that several studies 
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reviewed above are in favour of the proposal of Band and van der Molen 
(1999).  
 A final remark that we want to make in regard to the neurological locus 
of response inhibition in the stop signal task, concerns the role of the right 
inferior cortex. It seems that the right inferior cortex plays an important role 
in response inhibition in the stop signal task and different variants of this 
task. Interestingly, this region also becomes activated in other tasks that are 
assumed to require different kinds of inhibitory control, like interference 
tasks such as the flanker task (e.g., Bunge et al., 2002; Hazeltine, Poldrack, & 
Gabrieli, 2000) and the Stroop and Simon task (e.g., Peterson et al., 2002). 
This led Aron, Robbins and Poldrack (2004) to suggest that the right inferior 
frontal cortex plays an important role in inhibition. It is hypothesized to be 
part of a broader network of other regions like the dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex (DLPC) and the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), helping to resolve 
different kinds of cognitive ‘problems’. 
 
THE RELATION BETWEEN STOP SIGNAL INHIBITION AND OTHER 
FORMS OF INHIBITION: A SEARCH FOR COMMON MECHANISMS 
 
 In the present doctoral thesis, we will explore more into detail the 
relation between stop signal inhibition and other forms of inhibition. This 
will be done by combining the stop signal paradigm with other inhibitory 
paradigms. In the concrete, the primary task in the stop signal paradigm will 
no longer be a simple visual primary choice reaction time task but a task that 
is assumed to require some kind of inhibition. We argue that investigating 
the effect of the inhibitory primary task and the stop signal performance or 
inhibition, provides a useful tool for investigating the relation between stop 
signal inhibition and the particular type of inhibition that is operationalized 
in that particular task. 
 There are four empirical chapters. Each chapter consists of one or more 
empirical studies. The rationale of each study will be explained at the 
beginning of the chapters, so here we will describe only very briefly the 
content of each chapter. In Chapter 2, the focus is on the suppression of 
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irrelevant stimulus features in interference tasks. In Chapter 3, the results of 
Chapter 2 are linked to the suppression of irrelevant responses in similar 
interference tasks and we will try to explain why differences are found 
between different interference tasks. In other words, when we link these two 
first chapters to Nigg’s taxonomy, both Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 investigate 
the relation between stop signal inhibition or response inhibition, and 
another form of effortful inhibition, namely interference control. In Chapter 
4, the link with negative priming is investigated, and in Chapter 5, the same 
is done for task switching. Thus, related to the taxonomy of Nigg (2000), 
these two chapters enclose studies that focus more on the relation between 
the effortful stop signal inhibition and more ‘automatic’ forms of inhibition. 
Another way to put it would be that in Chapters 2 and 3 we look at the effect 
of conflict or interference and in Chapters 4 and 5 at the after-effects of 
conflict or interference. We will come back to this issue.  
 

 
CHAPTER 2 
THE INFLUENCE OF STIMULUS 
INTERFERENCE ON STOP SIGNAL 
INHIBITION 
 
 In this chapter, the effect of stimulus interference or stimulus conflict on 
response inhibition is investigated. Ridderinkhof, Band and Logan (1999) 
found when they combined an arrow version of the Eriksen flanker task, 
that it was harder to inhibit motor responses on incongruent flanker trials. 
Based on this finding, they suggested that this was due to the fact that stop 
signal inhibition and selective suppression of the incongruent response in 
the flanker task interfered with each other.  
 The congruency effect is commonly observed in the literature about 
attention and refers to the finding that a response to the relevant stimulus 
feature is slowed down when this relevant stimulus feature is accompanied 
by irrelevant and distracting information. For example, in the Eriksen 
flanker task (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974; Eriksen & Schultz, 1979), participants 
have to respond to a centrally presented target in the presence of distracting 
flankers. When these flankers are incongruent with the target, responses are 
slowed down. This so-called congruency effect in tasks like the flanker task 
is typically explained by means of a dual-route model (e.g., De Jong, Liang, 
& Lauber, 1994; Kornblum, Hasbroucq & Osman, 1990; Ridderinkhof, van 
der Molen, Bashore, 1995). Generally, in a dual-route model, the distinction 
is made between a direct and a controlled route. The relevant stimulus 
information is assumed to be processed via the controlled route, which is 
relatively slow since responses are assigned via an arbitrary response 
mapping. Irrelevant information on the other hand, is processed in a fast 
and automatic way via the direct route, based on existing stimulus-response 
links. As a result, two responses become activated and in case of an 
incongruent trial, this will lead to a conflict. To resolve this conflict, an active 
inhibition mechanism that would suppress the incorrect response was 
proposed (Eriksen & Schultz, 1979; Ridderinkhof et al., 1999).  
 This suggestion of an active inhibitory mechanism was also made more 
explicit by Ridderinkhof when he proposed the activation-suppression 
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hypothesis (Ridderinkhof, 2002a). The activation-suppression hypothesis 
holds that the response associated with the irrelevant stimulus feature 
becomes activated along the direct route and that this response becomes 
subsequently suppressed by a central and selective response suppression 
mechanism. This inhibitory mechanism is characterized by the facts that it is 
(a) active and non-automatic and (b) externally imposed, presumably 
originating from the prefrontal cortex (Ridderinkhof, 2002a). In Figure 2.1, a 
schematic presentation of the dual-route model with the selective 
suppression mechanism is presented. 
 Thus, Ridderinkhof et al. (1999) suggested that this selective 
suppression mechanism interferes with motor inhibition in the stop signal 
task, explaining why stopping responses was disrupted on incongruent 
trials. Moreover, according to Ridderinkhof et al. (1999), this interaction 
between both types of inhibition results from the fact that there are probably 
common mechanisms needed for both types of inhibition (i.e., motor 
inhibition and selective suppression).  
 
 
Figure 2.1: The extended dual-route model of Ridderinkhof, 2002a (p. 501). 
  
In the three studies of the present chapter, we started from the ‘common 
mechanism hypothesis’ of Ridderinkhof et al. (1999) and the activation-
suppression hypothesis of Ridderinkhof (2002). Our first research question 
was whether this selective suppression mechanism can only operate at a 
response related processing stage. Related to this issue, we wanted to look 
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whether the activation of incorrect responses in the flanker task is necessary 
to find an interaction with the stop signal task and the flanker task. In other 
words, investigating the interaction between selective suppression at 
different processing levels and stop signal inhibition could tell us something 
more about (a) the nature of selective suppression in different conflict tasks 
and (b) the relation between selective suppression and stop signal inhibition.  
 In the first study, distractors that were categorically related to the 
targets but that were not part of the response set were introduced. In the 
absence of a response conflict, we assumed that the conflict was situated at a 
central processing stage. In the second study, we looked at the effect on 
irrelevant stimulus features, causing interference at an early processing 
level, on response inhibition. In the last study of this chapter, we performed 
a single experiment without the stop signal task in order to find behavioural 
evidence from another research line or perspective, i.e., the conflict 
monitoring literature, for the assumption that active selective suppression 
can occur at different processing levels. The research logic is that when 
similar intratrial adjustments are made for conflict at different processing 
levels, such as selective suppression of irrelevant stimulus features, we 
should also find similar intertrial adjustments. 
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THE INTERACTION BETWEEN STOP SIGNAL 
INHIBITION AND DISTRACTOR INTERFERENCE  
IN THE FLANKER AND STROOP TASK4,5 
 
In the present study, two experiments were conducted to investigate the interaction 
between the behavioural inhibition, measured by the stop signal task, and distractor 
interference, measured by the flanker task and the Stroop task. In the first 
experiment, the stop signal task was combined with a flanker task. Analysis revealed 
that participants responded faster when the distractors were congruent to the target. 
Also, the data suggest that it is more difficult to suppress a motor response when the 
distractors were incongruent. Whether the incongruent distractor was part of the 
response set (i.e., the distractor could also be a target) or not, had no influence on 
stopping reactions. In the second experiment, the stop signal task was combined with 
a manual version of the Stroop task and the degree of compatibility was varied. Even 
though in the second experiment of the present study interference control is 
differently operationalized, similar results as in the first experiment were found, 
indicating that inhibition of motor responses is influenced by the presentation of 
distracting information that is not part of the response set.  
 
                                                          
4 Verbruggen, F., Liefooghe, B., & Vandierendonck, A. (2004). The interaction 
between stop signal inhibition and distractor interference. Acta Psychologica, 116, 21-
37. 
5 We would like to thank Wery van den Wildenberg, Hartmut Leuthold and 
Bernhard Hommel for their helpful comments on a previous version of the 
manuscript. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 Inhibition has always been a very popular concept in psychology. 
Nevertheless, the relation between different kinds of inhibition is still poorly 
understood. In fact, inhibition used to be conceptualized as a unitary 
concept, but behavioural, neuropsychological and neurophysiological 
evidence suggests that a differentiation is more appropriate (e.g., 
Harnishfeger, 1995). In Nigg’s (2000, p. 228) taxonomy for inhibitory systems 
in cognitive psychology there is a distinction between effortful and 
automatic inhibition, and both types are further subdivided into different 
inhibitory functions. In the present research, we will focus on the interaction 
between different forms of ‘effortful inhibition’ and more specifically 
between (1) behavioural inhibition, measured by the stop signal task, and (2) 
interference control, measured by both a flanker task and a manual version 
of the Stroop task. Such an interaction could indicate that different forms of 
inhibition rely on a common mechanism.  
 The stop signal paradigm (Lappin & Eriksen, 1966; Logan, 1994; Logan 
& Cowan, 1984) provides a useful measurement of behavioural inhibition. In 
this task, participants have to execute a speeded choice reaction time (CRT) 
task. Infrequently (usually on 25% of the trials), a stop signal is presented. 
The stop signal tells the participants to suppress their response. On short 
stop signal delays (SSD; the interval between the presentation of the go 
signal and the stop signal), participants can easily suppress their response. 
By contrast, when the stop signal delay is long enough, participants will 
nearly always execute the response. Logan and Cowan (1984) and Logan, 
Cowan, and Davis (1984) explained those results by a race between two 
processes: A go process and a stop process. According to their horse-race 
model, if the stop process is completed before the go process, participants 
will inhibit their response (signal-inhibit trials). When the go process on the 
contrary finishes before the stop-process, participants will respond (signal-
respond trials). Based on the assumptions of the horse-race model, it is 
possible to estimate the covert latency of stopping: The stop signal reaction 
time (SSRT; for reviews see Logan, 1994, and Band, van der Molen, & Logan, 
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2003). The stop signal paradigm has already been used with various 
responses such as manual responses (see Logan, 1994, for a review), foot 
movements (De Jong, Coles, & Logan, 1995) and eye movements (Logan & 
Irwin, 2000). Several authors found age-related differences (e.g., Kramer, 
Humphrey, Larish, Logan, & Strayer, 1994; Ridderinkhof, Band, & Logan, 
1999) and differences in clinical populations such as attention deficit 
hyperactivity disorder (ADHD; e.g., Jennings, van der Molen, Pelham, 
Brock, & Hoza, 1997; for a review see Nigg, 2001). Also the simulations by 
Band et al. (2003) have shown that this estimation can be used to 
discriminate between groups and conditions.  
 Until now, few have investigated the relations between the stop signal 
task and other inhibitory functions or tasks. Only three interactions have 
been investigated. Firstly, Jennings and colleagues (Jennings, van der Molen, 
Brock, & Somsen, 1992) found that successful inhibition of motor responses 
slowed heart rate. The authors concluded that stop signal inhibition and 
cardiac inhibition may appeal on the same midbrain structures. Second, in 
several studies no difference between the inhibition of spatially compatible 
responses vs. spatially incompatible responses has been found (e.g., Logan, 
1981). It has been argued that resolving interference of spatially 
incompatible responses and stopping of behaviour do not interact 
(Kornblum, Hasbroucq, & Osman, 1990). Logan and Irwin (2000) replicated 
the null effect for inhibiting manual responses to spatial compatible and 
incompatible stimuli. However, they did find an interaction between the 
speed of inhibiting saccadic responses and spatial S-R compatibility, 
suggesting that eye and hand movements are inhibited by separate 
processes. Third, two studies found an interaction between the Eriksen 
flanker task (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974; Eriksen & Schultz, 1979) and the stop 
signal task using different visual stimuli in the flanker task (Kramer et al., 
1994; Ridderinkhof et al., 1999).  
 In the Eriksen flanker task, participants perform a speeded CRT task to 
target stimuli (usually letters) which are flanked by distractors. The 
distractors can be congruent (indicating the same response as the target), 
neutral (no response assignment) or incongruent (the target requires another 
response than the distractors). The common finding is that CRTs are larger 
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when the flankers are incongruent. When flankers are neutral, CRTs may be 
larger than when flankers are congruent; this is usually interpreted as a 
facilitation effect. Several models have been proposed to explain such 
findings (e.g., Eriksen & Schultz, 1979; Miller, 1988; Ridderinkhof, 1997; 
Ridderinkhof, van der Molen, & Bashore, 1995). The general idea behind 
these models is that both flankers and target are processed. For example, 
Ridderinkhof (Ridderinkhof, 1997; Ridderinkhof et al., 1995) proposed that 
on the one hand the targets are processed via an attentive processing route 
with a target selection and stimulus-response translation. The flankers on 
the other hand are processed via a direct priming route: The congruent 
flankers activate the correct response and incongruent flankers prime an 
incorrect response. On condition that there is a close temporal overlap 
between the activation caused by the incongruent flankers and the response 
evoked by the target, responses are slowed down. Flowers (1990) 
manipulated the stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) between flankers and 
target. With a simultaneous presentation he hardly found a facilitation effect 
of congruent flankers, whereas incongruent flankers interfered with the 
targets. However, when flankers are presented 200 ms earlier, targets with 
congruent flankers are processed faster and the effect of incongruent 
flankers disappeared.  
 Interestingly, results of Kramer et al. (1994) and Ridderinkhof et al. 
(1999) indicate that the SSRT is affected in the same way as the CRT: 
Stopping is slowed down when flankers are incongruent. In spite of the 
similarity of the results in both studies, the authors interpreted their results 
slightly differently. Kramer et al. (1994) stressed the number of responses 
activated and suggested that it is harder to suppress two responses, in case 
of incongruent flankers, than one response in case of congruent or neutral 
flankers. Ridderinkhof et al. (1999) interpreted their data more in terms of an 
interaction between inhibiting an incorrect response in the flanker task and 
the suppression of a motor response in the stop signal task. A similar 
interpretation for the data of Kramer et al. (1994) was provided by Logan 
(1994), stressing the interaction between the two types of inhibition. Also, 
Logan, Kantowitz, and Riegler (1986; cited in Logan, 1994) found that the 
number of responses in the go task had not much influence on the SSRTs of 
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simple stopping, indicating that the interaction hypothesis of Ridderinkhof 
et al. (1999) may be more appropriate.  
 In the present study, it was our purpose to investigate whether the 
activation of incorrect responses is crucial for the findings in the latter 
studies by presenting distracting information that did not evoke responses. 
After all, notwithstanding differences in the interpretations of Kramer et al. 
(1994) and Ridderinkhof et al. (1999), both groups of authors stressed the fact 
that the observed interactions occur at the level of response sets.  
 
EXPERIMENT 1 
 
 In the present experiment, we presented the participants five arrows 
and they had to respond to the direction of the central arrow (left or right). 
There were three types of flankers: Congruent (e.g., both target and flankers 
pointing to the right) and incongruent flankers that were part of the 
response set (incongruent RS; e.g., flankers pointing to the right when the 
target is pointing to the left), like in most studies. In addition, targets could 
be flanked by arrows with a direction not in the response set (incongruent 
NRS; arrows pointing up or down). Studies of Shor (1970, 1971) have shown 
that different directions interfere with each other. Shor embedded the words 
up, down, left and right in arrows. Participants had to define the direction of 
the arrows, which was different from the direction indicated by the words. 
Just like in the original Stroop task, Shor found the typical interference 
effect, although smaller in magnitude. These findings showed that directions 
interfere with each other and also suggest that directions are categorically 
related. Therefore, directions could be used to manipulate the degree of 
incongruence in a flanker task. After all, besides the effect of response 
compatibility in the flanker task, as described in the introduction, a few 
studies (e.g., Flowers & Wilcox, 1982) have found that semantic categorical 
congruity between flankers and targets has an influence on stimulus 
classification, whereas both effects are relatively independent. In the present 
experiment, by introducing flankers that are categorically related to the 
targets but are not part of the response set, the hypotheses of Kramer et al. 
(1994) and Ridderinkhof et al. (1999) are both tested. If being part of the 
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response set is crucial for the interaction between the flanker task and the 
stop signal task, one would not expect an effect of incongruent flankers that 
are not in the response set on stopping.  
 
METHOD 
 
Participants 
 Thirty first-year psychology students (24 females and 6 males) of Ghent 
University (Belgium) participated for course requirements and credit. All 
participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, were right-handed, 
and all were naive as to the purpose of the experiment. One participant was 
excluded from further data-analysis because of waiting strategies (based on 
SSDs, probabilities of responding and SSRTs).  
 
Apparatus and signals 
 The experiment was run on a Pentium III PC. Stimuli were presented on 
a 17-inch monitor, placed at 50 cm distance in front of the participants. Each 
stimulus was composed of five arrows, placed next to each other. The target 
arrow pointed always to the left or the right. The direction of the flankers 
could be left, right, up or down. There were three flanker conditions: 
Congruent, NRS Incongruent (flankers that are not part of the response set) 
and RS Incongruent (flankers that are part of the response set). In order to 
keep the materials as close as possible to those of Ridderinkhof et al. (1999), 
the visual angle subtended by the flankers we used, approximated 1° x 1°. 
The target arrow was a little bit smaller: 0.80° x 0.80°. The five arrows 
subtended together horizontally a visual angle of 5.6°. The solid filled white 
arrows (equilateral triangles) were presented at central location on a black 
background in a rectangle (7.5° x 2.5°). The rectangle served as fixation area 
and remained on the screen during the blocks. The arrows were presented 
during 500 ms and required a response within 1,500 ms after its onset. The 
next trial was presented 1,500 ms after the response. Responses were 
collected with a response box connected to the game port of the PC. All 
participants placed their index fingers from their left- and right hand on the 
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left and the right buttons of the response box, respectively. Occasionally 
loud and clear auditory stop signal (750 Hz, 70 dB, 50 ms) was presented 
shortly after the stimulus onset in the visual primary task.  
 
Tasks and procedure 
 Participants performed their task in a dimly lit, sound attenuated room. 
The primary task was to react to the direction of the central arrow. 
Participants were instructed to respond as quickly and accurately as 
possible. The three types of stimuli appeared with equal probability. The 
order of the trials was randomized with the restriction that the target was 
not identical to the incongruent distractors of the preceding trial. When the 
flankers were NRS incongruent, the direction (up or down) was randomly 
chosen with at the end of the experiment approximately as many arrows 
pointing up as arrows pointing down.  
 The experiment consisted of two parts, one with stop signals and one 
without stop signals. In both parts there was a practice phase and an 
experimental phase. The order of the parts was counterbalanced across 
participants. Instructions appeared on the screen and participants were 
informed about the order. For the part without stop signals, the number of 
practice blocks depended on the order of the parts. When participants 
started with the part without stop-signals, there were two practice blocks of 
48 trials each. When they had already performed the task with stop signals, 
there was still one ‘practice’ block of 48 trials to avoid a carry-over of the 
presentation of stop signals in the previous block on the first trials of the first 
experimental block. After the practice phase, there were two experimental 
blocks of 98 trials whereby the first two trials were warm-up trials, excluded 
from data-analysis. The part with stop signals consisted of two practice 
blocks of 48 trials each, regardless of the order of the task, and six 
experimental blocks of 98 trials each with the first two trials as warm-up 
trials. On a random selection of 25% of the trials, a stop signal was 
presented. This resulted in 48 stop trials for each flanker condition. The stop 
signal delay was initially set at 250 ms and was continuously adjusted 
according to a staircase tracking algorithm (Levitt, 1970) for each type of trial 
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to obtain a probability of stopping of 50%. This method provides SSRT 
estimations that are derived from the central part of the no-signal RT curve, 
with important advantages. Logan, Schachar, and Tannock (1997; see also 
Band et al., 2003) demonstrated that ‘central’ estimates are relatively 
insensitive to violations of the horse-race model and therefore most reliable. 
For obtaining an approximate probability of 50%, each time the subject 
responded to the stimulus in the presence of a stop signal, the stop signal 
delay decreased with 50 ms. On the other hand, after successful inhibition, 
the delay increased with 50 ms.  
 In order to avoid ‘waiting’ strategies, participants were informed about 
the tracking procedure and that the probability of stopping will approximate 
50%, irrespective of whether they were postponing their response or not. 
Moreover, we adopted the feedback system, used by Ridderinkhof et al. 
(1999). After each trial, feedback in the form of a digit was presented during 
500 ms. The faster participants reacted correctly on no-signal trials, relative 
to their mean CRT, the more points they earned (ranging from 2 to 5). 
Incorrect responses only received 1 point, regardless of the speed of 
responding and non-responding resulted in zero points. On signal trials, 
participants received 5 points after successful inhibition and 1 point when 
inhibition failed. At the end of each block, feedback about their mean 
performance was presented: The mean CRT of no-signal trials and the total 
of points earned on no-signal trials. The points were only used to inform the 
subjects and had no further consequences.  
 
Stop latency estimation 
 SSRTs were estimated as proposed by Logan and Cowan (1984), based 
on the horse-race model. According to this model, after rank ordering the 
CRTs of no-signal trials, the left, fast part of this CRT-distribution is 
assumed to correspond to the distribution of CRTs of signal trials on which 
inhibition failed. Doing so, the finishing time of the stop process can be 
derived. The finishing time of the stop process corresponds to the nth CRT 
of the no-signal trials, where n is the result of multiplying the total number 
of no-signal trials by the probability of responding when a signal is 
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presented, given a certain SSD. Since the start of the inhibition process 
(mean SSD) and the finishing time are known, the SSRT can be estimated. 
The SSRT is the result of the subtraction finishing time minus start or ‘nth 
CRT minus SSD’ (see Band et al., 2003; Logan, 1994). Besides the estimation 
of SSRT, mean CRTs of signal-respond trials can be predicted also. This is 
done by calculating the mean of the n-fastest no-signal trials or the left, fast 
part of the no-signal curve, used to estimate the SSRT. A large discrepancy 
between observed and predicted RT was usually taken as an index of poor 
fit of the horse-race model (De Jong, Coles, Logan, & Gratton, 1990; Jennings 
et al., 1992). However, Band and colleagues (2003) demonstrated that 
observed RT-predicted RT should not be used as an index of fit since they 
found that the discrepancy was primarily affected by variability in primary 
task RT and stop signal task RT.  
 
RESULTS  
 
 CRT and error data were subjected to a within-participant trimming 
procedure. Mean CRTs of correct trials and error percentages were 
calculated after removal of outlying CRTs; i.e., CRTs longer than 2.5 
standard deviations above the mean were discarded from data analysis. This 
resulted in a data reduction of 2.3%. All reported analyses are repeated 
measures ANOVAs. We tested for sphericity, and since the sphericity 
assumptions were satisfied we did not use any correction (most critical p-
value = 0.07). First, we report the results obtained on the no-signal trials in 
both parts (with and without stop signals). Next, we report the analysis of 
the signal trials.  
 
No-signal trials 
 The CRTs and error percentages of no-signal trials in the block with and 
without stop signals are presented in Table 2.1. We conducted a 2 x 3 
repeated measures ANOVA, with part and flankers as within-subjects 
variables. As can be seen in Table 2.1, the stop signal generally slowed down 
the responses, F(1, 28) = 18.99, p < 0.001. The analysis yielded a main effect of 
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flanker type, F(2,56) = 294.80, p < 0.001. There was no interaction between 
both main effects, F(2,56) = 1.52, p = 0.23. Planned comparisons were 
conducted for both parts separately. In the part with stop signals, all 
conditions differed from each other. CRTs of trials with congruent flankers 
were faster than trials with NRS incongruent flankers and than trials with RS 
incongruent flankers, F(1,28)= 72.08, p < 0.001 and F(1,28)= 233.32, p < 0.001, 
respectively. There was also an effect of response set; i.e., NRS incongruent 
trials were faster than RS incongruent trials, F(1,28)= 59.48, p < 0.001. We 
found the same results for the part without stop signals. Participants 
responded faster on trials with congruent flankers than on trials with NRS 
incongruent flankers, F(1,28)= 83.73, p < 0.001, and RS incongruent flankers, 
F(1,28)= 367.16, p < 0.001. The effect of response set was also significant, 
F(1,28)= 170.04, p < 0.001.  
 A similar set of analysis was conducted for error percentages. The error 
analysis showed that participants made more errors in the part without stop 
signals, F(1,28)= 26.54, p < 0.001 (7.1% vs. 4.3%). Further, there was a main 
effect of condition, F(2, 56) = 68.88, p < 0.001. There was also interaction 
between both main effects, F(2,56) = 8.98, p < 0.001. We compared the 
conditions for both parts separately. In the part with stop signals, 
participants made less errors in the congruent condition in comparison to 
the NRS incongruent condition and the RS incongruent condition, F(1,28)= 
18.40, p < 0.01, and F(1,28)= 35.09, p < 0.001, respectively. An effect of 
response set was found also, F(1, 28) = 30.66, p < 0.001. In the part without 
stop signals, less errors were made with congruent flankers, compared to 
NRS incongruent flankers, F(1,28)= 23.16, p < 0.001, and RS incongruent 
flankers, F(1,28)= 117.23, p < 0.001. The difference between NRS and RS 
incongruent trials was also significant, F(1,28)= 63.89, p < 0.001. In the parts 
with and without stop signals, none of the correlations between CRT effects 
and error effects reached significance, indicating that there was no speed 
accuracy trade-off.  
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Table 2.1: Reaction times and error percentages (SDs in parentheses) for both parts 
without and with the presentation of stop signals (S-S) in Experiment 1 (NRS and 
RS stand for not part of the response set, and part of the response set, 
respectively). 
 
 Trial type 
 Congruent Incongruent NRS Incongruent RS 
 M Errors M Errors M Errors 
Without S-S 340 (33) 2.1 (2.1) 361 (33) 4.7 (3.6) 402 (37) 14.6 (7.2) 
With S-S 380 (56) 0.8 (0.9) 404 (62) 2.7 (2.6) 437 (50) 9.4 (7.1) 
 
Signal-trials 
 Stopping data are presented in Table 2.2. First of all, the tracking 
procedure worked very well. Probability to respond given a stop signal was 
0.51 for neutral, 0.50 for NRS incongruent and 0.49 for RS incongruent trials 
(though very small, this effect is significant; F(2, 56) = 4.14, p < 0.05). SSRTs 
were estimated as briefly described in the method section. There was a main 
effect of flanker type for SSRTs, F(2,56) = 6.35, p < 0.01. Planned comparisons 
revealed a significant difference between congruent and NRS incongruent 
trials, F(1,28)= 6.74, p < 0.05. The difference between congruent and RS 
incongruent was also significant, F(1,28)= 9.51, p < 0.05. There was no effect 
of response set for SSRTs, F(1, 28) = 1.83, p = 0.19. For signal trials, not only 
the SSRT but also the mean CRTs of signal-respond trials were analyzed, by 
comparing observed vs. predicted signal-respond RTs, as described in the 
method section. This was done by means of 2 (Observed vs. Predicted) x 3 
(Flanker Conditions) repeated measures ANOVA. We found main effects of 
both variables, F(1,28)= 186.94, p < 0.001, and F(2,56) = 128.40, p < 0.001. 
Unlike Ridderinkhof et al. (1999), we found no interaction between both 
variables, F(2,56) = 1.51, p = 0.22.  
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Table 2.2: SSRTs, probabilities of responding given a stop signal, observed and 
predicted signal-respond RTs (SRT) in Experiment 1 (NRS and RS stand for not 
part of the response set, and part of the response set, respectively). 
 
 Trial type 
 Congruent Incongruent NRS Incongruent RS 
 M SD M SD M SD 
Stop signal RT 175 46 186 46 193 41 
Response ratio (%) 50.7 3.1 49.9 3.4 49.2 2.4 
SRT observed 370 39 386 46 414 45 
SRT predicted 328 35 348 39 370 39 
 
DISCUSSION  
 
 With a modified flanker task, we replicated and extended the 
compatibility effect, observed by Kramer et al. (1994) and Ridderinkhof et al. 
(1999), for both CRTs and SSRTs. Analysis of CRTs of no-signal trials 
revealed clear effects of congruence and response set (all planned 
comparisons were significant). A similar pattern was found for error 
percentages. Next, like Ridderinkhof et al. (1999) and Kramer et al. (1994), 
we found that stopping was slowed down when flankers were incongruent. 
The differences between SSRTs of congruent and both types of incongruent 
trials were significant but there was no additional effect of response set. 
These results suggest that distracting information influences the stopping of 
behaviour and that being part of the response set is less important.  
 Another possible explanation for the difference between congruent and 
NRS incongruent, is the orthogonal stimulus-response compatibility effect. 
According to this effect an overall advantage for the up-right/down-left 
mapping is found (see Cho & Proctor, 2003). Applied to the present findings 
this would mean that the NRS flanker arrows are associated with left 
(pointing down) or right (pointing up). These flankers would not be NRS 
incongruent, but would be just a mix of congruent and RS incongruent 
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flankers which could explain why we found a CRT difference. This 
hypothesis was tested in an extra analysis on CRTs of NRS incongruent 
trials. In a 2 x 2 repeated measures ANOVA an interaction of the target 
direction (left-right) and the flanker direction (up-down) would be expected. 
We found a main effect of target direction. Right was processed 22 ms faster 
than left [F(1,28)= 29.4, p < 0.001]. This is not surprising since all the 
participants were right-handed. But more importantly, the flanker direction 
(up or down) did not interact with the effect of target direction (F < 1). This 
suggests that the effect of NRS incongruent flankers is not modulated by an 
association up-right/down-left. This analysis confirms that the effect of 
categorically related incongruent NRS flankers is not response related. 
 However, Experiment 1 does not allow us to discriminate between a 
possible perceptual conflict and a categorically related conflict, since our 
baseline condition was one with congruent flankers. There is evidence from 
electrophysiological studies that generally, a part of the distractor effect is 
due to a perceptual conflict (e.g., Gratton, Coles, Sirevaag, Eriksen, & 
Donchin, 1988). Therefore, it is possible that the influence of incongruent 
NRS flankers is due to a perceptual conflict and not due to the categorical 
information of the flankers. In the second experiment, we will go more 
deeply into it and further investigate the possible effect of categorically 
related information, while minimizing the importance of perceptual 
conflicts.  
 
EXPERIMENT 2 
 
 In the second experiment, we wanted to further investigate the findings 
of Experiment 1 with another task that is assumed to require inhibition: The 
Stroop task (Stroop, 1935). Nowadays, there are many versions of the Stroop 
task. It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss them all (but see 
MacLeod, 1991, for an extensive review of more than 50 years Stroop task). 
In the standard Stroop Color-Word Test, participants have to name the 
colors of incompatible color words (e.g., BLUE written in green; the correct 
answer is green) and neutral words (e.g., STAGE written in green) or 
repeating letter strings. Naming the color of incongruent words is 
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consistently slower, apparently due to the fact that the printed word is 
automatically processed, causing interference.  
 Models of the Stroop effect (e.g., the information accumulating model of 
Logan, 1980; Logan & Zbrodoff, 1979; and the parallel distributed-processing 
model of Cohen, Dunbar, & McClelland, 1990), explain these findings in 
terms of response nodes, whereas on congruent trials both the color and the 
color word activate the same response node. On incongruent trials, the color 
and the color word activate different response nodes, causing interference. 
For example, in the model of Logan and Zbrodoff (1979), activation of the 
word in the color naming task happens via an automatic connection, 
representing the automatic reading tendency in the Stroop task. This 
connection is also stronger than the connection between colors and 
responses. This difference between the strength of connections could explain 
why an asymmetrical incongruence effect is found (i.e., the color of the word 
has no effect in a word reading task, even with color words). Similar to the 
models in the flanker task, the fact that two responses are activated is 
stressed. However, just as in the flanker task, there are effects of words that 
are not in the response set. Klein (1964) demonstrated that the semantic 
meaning of a word influenced the interference effect. The more meaningful 
the word, the more interference it caused. Color words of the response set 
caused the most interference. But importantly, color words that are not in 
the response set also cause interference. Even semantically associated words 
(e.g., GRASS) may cause interference. These findings suggest that also in the 
Stroop task the incongruence can be manipulated and the more the words 
are semantically or categorically related to the color, the more interference 
they cause.  
 In the present experiment, we opted for a manual version of the Stroop 
task. The common finding with manual versions of the Stroop task is that 
the typical interference effect is still present although smaller with manual 
responses compared to the standard vocal responses (e.g., MacLeod, 1991; 
Virzi & Egeth, 1985). Sharma and McKenna (1998) further investigated the 
differences between the manual and vocal response and looked among other 
effects for the influence of response mode on the effect of response set. They 
found a semantic categorically related effect of color words that are not in 
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the response set, independent of the response mode.6 Color words that are 
part of the response set caused the most interference. In this experiment we 
used three types of the words: Neutral words, color words not in the 
response set, and color words in the response set. Participants had to react to 
the color of the written words, unless a stop signal was presented.  
 
METHOD 
 
Participants 
 Twenty first-year psychology students (10 females and 10 males) of 
Ghent University (Belgium) participated for course requirements and credit. 
None of them participated in the first experiment. All participants had 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision, were right-handed, and all were naive 
as to the purpose of the experiment. One participant was excluded from 
further data-analysis because of an error percentage of 28% (more than 3 
standard deviations above the group mean).  
 
Apparatus and signals 
 Apparatus and signals were the same as in the first experiment of the 
present study. Only the changes in comparison with the first experiment will 
be described. There were four ink colors (i.e., the response set: Red, yellow, 
green and blue) and three types of words: (a) incongruent Dutch color 
words from the response set (the RS color words ‘rood’, ‘geel’, ‘groen’, and 
‘blauw’, meaning red, yellow, green and blue respectively); (b) incongruent 
Dutch color words, different from those of the response set (the NRS color 
words ‘zwart’, ‘paars’, ‘oker’, and ‘bruin’, meaning black, purple, ochre and 
                                                          
6 Sharma and McKenna (1998) found a marginally significant difference between 
color words not in response set and neutral words when the response mode was 
manual. However, Brown and Besner (2001) reanalyzed the data of Sharma and 
McKenna. Unlike the original analysis, Brown and Besner did find a significant effect 
of color words that were not in the response set for the manual response mode, using 
Bonferroni instead of Tucker HSD.  
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brown respectively); (c) neutral words, matched with RS color words for 
word frequency and word length (the abstract Dutch words ‘doel’, ‘norm’, 
‘niets’, and ‘stand’, meaning goal, standard, nothing, and posture 
respectively). The words were presented at the centre of the screen on a 
black background, in the gap of an interrupted central vertical white line. 
This line served as fixation sign and appeared 500 ms before stimulus onset. 
The maximum visual angle subtended by the words was approximately 
2.30° x 0.60° (2.30° with fixation lines). The words were presented during 750 
ms and required a response within 1,500 ms after onset. The next word was 
presented 1,500 ms after the response on the previous word. Responses were 
collected with a response box connected to the game port of the PC. The four 
black buttons of the box were labeled with one of the four color words 
written in black ink. All participants placed their index and middle fingers 
from their left- and right hand on one of the buttons.  
 
Tasks, procedure and stop latency estimation 
 With the exception of the stimuli, nothing changed in comparison with 
Experiment 1. The presentation of the three types of words was mixed and 
with equal probability. The order of the words was randomized with the 
restriction that no color was the same as the ignored word of the preceding 
trial (e.g., a word written in red when the preceding trial was ‘rood’ written 
in blue) and that no response or word type appeared more than three times 
in a row. This resulted in 2 experimental blocks without stop signal of 98 
trials and 6 experimental blocks with stop signals, also with 98 trials each. 
Probability of stop signal was 25% (48 stop trials for each word type). Stop 
latency was estimated according to the same procedures.  
 
RESULTS  
 
 CRT and error data were subjected to the same within-participant 
trimming procedure as in Experiment 1. This resulted in a data reduction of 
2.3%. The analyses were also the same as in Experiment 1.  
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No-signal trials 
 Results of no-signal trials of both parts with and without stop signals 
are presented in Table 2.3. We conducted a 2 (stop signal) x 3 (word type) 
repeated measures ANOVA. As can be seen in Table 2.3 and as commonly 
observed, introducing the stop signal, slightly slowed the CRTs; mean CRTs 
for both parts are 554 vs. 588 ms, F(1,18) = 6.35, p < 0.05. We found a main 
effect of word type, F(2,36)= 17.31, p < 0.001. The interaction between stop 
signal and word type was not significant (F < 1), indicating that the Stroop 
effect was not influenced by the occasional presentation of stop signals.  
 
Table 2.3: Reaction times and error percentages (SDs in parentheses) for both parts 
without and with the presentation of stop signals (S-S) in Experiment 2 (NRS and 
RS stand for not part of the response set, and part of the response set, 
respectively). 
 
 Trial type 
 Neutral Incongruent NRS Incongruent RS 
 CRT Errors CRT Errors CRT Errors 
Without S-S 540 (56) 10.5 (5.3) 553 (75) 9.3 (5.0) 568 (86) 10.3 (4.7) 
With S-S 569 (68) 9.1 (5.4) 588 (71) 9.1 (5.1) 607 (78) 8.6 (5.5) 
 
Planned comparisons were conducted for both parts separately. For the part 
with stop signals, planned comparisons revealed that CRTs for colors of 
neutral words were faster than CRTs of NRS color words, F(1,18) = 14.76, p < 
0.01, and CRTs of RS color words, F(1,18) = 26.90, p < 0.001. There was also 
an effect of response set: NRS and RS color words differed significantly from 
each other, F(1,18) = 18.22, p < 0.001. The same results were found for the 
part without stop signals. CRTs for neutral words were lower than the CRTs 
for NRS color words and CRTs of RS color words, F(1,18) = 3.89, p = 0.06, 
and F(1,18) = 9.21, p < 0.01, respectively. The effect of response set in this 
part was significant, F(1,18) = 4.83, p < 0.05. Unlike the CRT analyses, the 
error analyses revealed no differences at all (all Fs are smaller than 1.19), 
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indicating that there was no speed-accuracy trade-off. This was confirmed 
by further analysis. None of the correlations between CRT effects and error 
effects was significant.  
 
Signal-trials 
 The staircase tracking procedure worked very well in the present 
experiment. The probability of responding given a stop signal approximated 
0.50 (0.49, 0.48 and 0.49; F < 1). Stopping data are presented in Table 2.4. 
Analysis of the signal trials showed a significant main effect of word type on 
SSRTs, F(2,36)= 3.78, p < 0.05. The difference between SSRT of neutral trials 
and SSRT of NRS color words was marginally significant, F(1,18) = 3.47, p = 
0.07. The difference between neutral words and RS color words was 
significant, F(1,18) = 6.86, p < 0.05. Finally, there was no effect of response set 
(F < 1). Besides SSRT data, we also analyzed CRTs for signal-respond trials. 
Analysis showed main effects of predicted vs. observed RTs (means: 470 vs. 
522 ms respectively), F(1, 18) = 46.91, p < 0.001, and of word type, F(2,36) = 
5,97, p < 0.01. Like in the first experiment, we found no interaction (F < 1).  
 
Table 2.4: SSRTs, probabilities of responding given a stop signal, observed and 
predicted signal-respond RTs (SRT) in Experiment 2 (NRS and RS stand for not 
part of the response set, and part of the response set, respectively). 
 
 Trial type 
 Neutral Incongruent NRS Incongruent RS 
 M SD M SD M SD 
Stop signal RT 223 99 239 103 245 102 
Response ratio (%) 49.1 2.9 48.0 3.0 48.8 3.2 
SRT observed 511 48 523 63 533 67 
SRT predicted 462 49 469 48 479 58 
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DISCUSSION  
 
 In this experiment, we found results that are analogous to the results of 
the first experiment of the present study, even though in both experiments 
different inhibitory tasks are used. In general, the results of this experiment 
also replicate and extend on the findings of Klein (1964) and Sharma and 
McKenna (1998). Firstly, for no-signal trials we found the traditional 
difference between neutral words and incongruent RS words. Furthermore, 
there was also an effect of response set, although in the part without stop 
signals it was only marginally significant. That does not alter the fact that we 
replicated the Stroop effect with a manual version of this task. Like other 
studies using a manual version of the Stroop task, the effect was rather 
small, but statistically reliable (see MacLeod, 1991, for a review). Secondly, 
we found that stopping in the stop signal task is influenced by distracting 
information of the Stroop task. These findings are quite similar to those of 
Kramer et al. (1994) and Ridderinkhof et al. (1999) with the flanker task. As 
in Experiment 1, SSRTs were not influenced by word type the same way 
CRTs were influenced. We found that stopping was easier for neutral words 
than for other words. However, in contrast to CRTs no difference between 
SSRTs of both types of incongruent words was found. Since we used in this 
experiment a neutral baseline condition where the degree of perceptual 
conflict is similar for all three conditions, the findings of this experiment 
cannot be related to perceptual factors. These findings suggest that 
categorically related distracting information suffices to cause more 
difficulties in the stopping of behaviour.  
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
 In this study, we investigated the relation between different forms of 
inhibition. We combined the stop signal task with a slightly modified 
version of the Eriksen flanker task (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974) in the first 
experiment and with a manual version of the Stroop task (e.g., Sharma & 
McKenna, 1998) in the second experiment. In both experiments we observed 
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the expected congruency effects for no-signal trials in both the part with and 
the part without the occasional presentation of stop signals.  
 Moreover, the results of the experiments suggest that behavioural 
inhibition in the stop signal task interacts with interference control in the 
Eriksen flanker task and the Stroop task. These findings are a replication and 
extension of the studies of Kramer et al. (1994) and Ridderinkhof et al. 
(1999). In the latter studies, the flanker task and the stop signal task were 
combined and a flanker effect for SSRTs was found. The flanker task used in 
the present study differed however from those used in both studies 
mentioned. In the study of Kramer et al. (1994), neutral flankers were 
included besides congruent and incongruent flankers (the RS incongruent 
trials in our experiments). SSRTs of incongruent trials differed from SSRTs of 
the other types of trials, but there was no difference between the SSRTs of 
congruent and neutral flankers. Ridderinkhof et al. (1999), used arrows like 
in the present research, but only congruent and incongruent arrows (again 
corresponding to our RS incongruent trials) were included. In the present 
study NRS incongruent trials were introduced. Therefore, we could 
investigate whether the interaction between two inhibitory tasks, as 
suggested by Logan (1994) and Ridderinkhof et al. (1999), is situated at a 
response level since incongruent NRS distractors induce a conflict which is 
not situated at the response level. After all, the stop signal task requires the 
suppression of responses. However, the results of both experiments of the 
present study do not fully support the response level interpretation. Our 
results suggest that resolving a conflict induced by categorically related 
distracting information and stop signal inhibition compete for execution. An 
additional effect at response level cannot be fully excluded though, but the 
results of the second experiment seem to suggest that such an additional 
effect for SSRTs is not present.  
 In the present research, we opted for a method of investigation based on 
Kramer et al. (1994) and Ridderinkhof et al. (1999), introducing two 
inhibitory tasks that are more or less ‘engrafted’. Doing so, the interaction is 
investigated on a trial-by-trial basis. Results of our second experiment prove 
the value of this technique. For instance, Pennington (1997; in Nigg, 2000) 
found that the Stroop task and the stop signal task did not highly correlate 
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and suggested that they operationalize different forms of inhibition. 
Nonetheless, our results suggest that a certain overlap exists. The fact that 
we found similar interactions in both experiments could only validate this 
overlap hypothesis. In light of these results, the similarity between the 
Stroop and flanker task is of importance. Both tasks are usually considered 
as measures of interference control (e.g., Nigg, 2000). The flanker task is 
often described as a variant of the Stroop task (e.g., MacLeod, 1991), with as 
most important difference that in the flanker task the competing stimulus 
information is spatially adjacent to the target in contrast to the Stroop where 
distracting information is integrated. However, we argue that there may be 
some other important differences, despite the fact that in both tasks 
congruency effects occur. The cause of the interference in the Stroop task 
and the flanker task differs. In the Stroop task, the more dominant reading of 
the word occurs faster than the naming of the ink color (MacLeod, 1991). In 
other words, participants have to suppress a prepotent response (i.e., the 
automatic reading tendency) in the Stroop task in contrast to the flanker 
task. That is why some authors consider the Stroop task as operationalizing 
inhibition of prepotent responses (e.g., Miyake et al., 2000). On this view, the 
interaction between the stop signal task and Stroop effect can be explained 
as an interaction between two forms of inhibition of prepotent responses or 
as an interaction between interference control and behavioural inhibition. 
The effect of color words that are not in the response set in the second 
experiment, support the second interpretation, without excluding the 
prepotent response hypothesis. Therefore, further research is needed here.  
 A major concern with respect to the present results is in the ambiguity 
of the concept of inhibition. Behavioural studies like the present one and the 
ones of Kramer et al. (1994) and Ridderinkhof et al. (1999) may help to better 
understand the concept of inhibition. Such results can contribute to a better 
definition of inhibition in general and more specifically of the different 
inhibitory functions. When we consider the three tasks used in the present 
study (i.e., stop signal task, flanker task and Stroop task), they are all 
examples of what is labeled ‘effortful inhibition’ in Nigg’s taxonomy. Data 
from this and other studies suggest that there is an overlap between 
different forms of ‘effortful inhibition’. In addition to the interaction of the 
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Stroop task and the flanker task with the stop signal task, Logan and Irwin 
(2000) found a similar interaction with the antisaccade task. In another line 
of research, Miyake et al. (2000) used the Stroop task, antisaccade task and 
stop signal task in a latent variable analysis to explore executive functions, 
and found a common underlying executive inhibitory function for these 
three tasks. Altogether, results from behavioural, neuropsychological and 
neurophysiological studies suggest a differentiation between different forms 
of inhibition. However, this differentiation does not imply a complete 
independence between different forms as indicated by the studies with the 
stop signal task as the present one, for instance. Further research has to 
explore those relations more in detail in order to model and fully 
understand inhibition.  
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THE EFFECT OF INTERFERENCE IN THE EARLY 
PROCESSING STAGES ON RESPONSE INHIBITION IN 
THE STOP SIGNAL TASK7,8 
 
In the study of this chapter, the relation between interference at the early processing 
stages and response inhibition was investigated. In previous studies, response 
stopping appeared to be slowed down when irrelevant distracting information was 
presented. The purpose of the present study was to further explore the relationship 
between interference control and response inhibition. In Experiment 1, a stop signal 
paradigm was combined with a global/local task. The typical global-to-local 
interference effect is generally attributed to early processing stages, such as stimulus 
perception and identification. Results of this experiment demonstrated a congruency 
effect for both reaction time data and stopping performance. In Experiment 2, these 
results were replicated with a flanker task that used stimulus incongruent but 
response congruent flankers. Results of both experiments suggest that response 
inhibition and interference at the early processing stages interact.  
 
                                                          
7 Verbruggen, F., Liefooghe, B., & Vandierendonck, A. (in press). The effect of 
interference in the early processing stages on response inhibition in the stop signal 
task. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology. 
8 We would like to thank three anonymous reviewers, Guido Band and Gordon 
Logan for their helpful comments on a previous version this manuscript. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 During the last few years, the relation between different kinds of 
inhibition and interference control has become a hot topic. Inhibition has 
always been a fuzzy concept, and in the past it was usually described as a 
unitary function. However, recently both theoretical and experimental 
studies pointed out that there are commonalities but also important 
differences between different inhibitory functions (e.g., Dempster, 1993; 
Nigg, 2000). An example of a theoretical study that described the relation 
between different inhibitory functions, is the taxonomy proposed by Nigg 
(Nigg, 2000). Nigg suggested that there are two main forms of inhibition: An 
effortful, controlled form and a more automatic form. Both kinds of 
inhibition are further subdivided. Examples of effortful inhibition are 
behavioural inhibition, defined as the suppression of prepotent or prepared 
responses, and interference control which prevents interference due to 
resource or stimulus competition (Nigg, 2000). 
 An empirical way of clarifying the relationship between different 
inhibitory functions is by combining different inhibitory paradigms. For 
example, Fuentes and colleagues investigated how inhibition of return (IOR) 
affected interference effects like the Stroop effect and the flanker effect 
(Vivas & Fuentes, 2001, and Fuentes, Vivas, & Humphreys, 1999, 
respectively). They found that IOR influenced those interference effects and 
suggested that inhibitory tagging in IOR affects also the processing of task-
irrelevant dimensions of stimuli in the Stroop and flanker task, resulting in 
less distractor interference. Another method was proposed by Friedman and 
Miyake (2004). They used a latent variable analysis to compare different 
inhibitory tasks. Friedman and Miyake found that Prepotent Response 
Inhibition (i.e., the ability to deliberately suppress dominant, automatic, or 
prepotent responses; Friedman & Miyake, 2004, p.104) correlated with 
Resistance to Distractor Interference (i.e., the ability to resist or resolve 
interference from information in the external environment that is irrelevant to the 
task; Friedman & Miyake, 2004, p.104). On the other hand, none of these two 
constructs was related to Resistance to Proactive Interference (i.e., the ability 
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to resist memory intrusions from information that was previously relevant to the 
task but has since become irrelevant; Friedman & Miyake, 2004, p.105). Results 
of the above mentioned studies suggest that unlike the differences in tasks 
involving inhibition, these inhibitory tasks are also closely related to each 
other. Therefore, combining paradigms and other techniques results not 
only in a better understanding of the specific paradigms but tells us also 
something about inhibition in general.  
 A paradigm that is most suitable to be combined with other paradigms, 
is the stop signal paradigm (Logan & Cowan, 1984; Logan, 1994). In this 
paradigm, participants usually perform a choice reaction task. On a random 
selection of the trials, a stop signal instructs participants to withhold their 
responses. On short stop signal delays (SSD; the interval between 
presentation of the stimulus and the presentation of the stop signal), 
participants can easily suppress their responses. On the other hand, when 
the delay is long enough, participants will nearly always execute the 
response. A horse race model was proposed by Logan and Cowan (1984) to 
explain these results. They assume that there are two processes of which the 
finishing times are stochastically independent: A go process and a stop 
process. When the stop process finishes before the go process, the inhibition 
will succeed and participants will suppress their response (signal-inhibit 
trials). On the other hand, when the go process finishes first, participants 
will execute their response (signal-respond trials). The horse race model 
does not only describe the processes in the stop signal task, it also allows an 
estimation of the covert latency of stopping: The Stop Signal Reaction Time 
(SSRT), a measurement that has frequently proved its usefulness (see Band, 
van der Molen, & Logan, 2003; Logan, 1994). The usefulness of the stop 
signal paradigm is also evident from the widespread usage. It has already 
been used with different response modalities, like hand and foot movements 
(De Jong, Coles, & Logan, 1995), eye movements (Hanes & Carpenter, 1999; 
Logan & Irwin, 2000), and in different populations such as children with 
attention deficit and hyperactivity disorder (ADHD; e.g., Schachar & Logan, 
1990; Jennings, van der Molen, Pelham, Debski, & Hoza, 1997) and younger 
and older adults (e.g., Kramer, Humphrey, Larish, Logan, & Strayer, 1994; 
Williams, Ponesse, Schachar, Logan, & Tannock, 1999). 
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 The stop signal task has also been combined with several other 
paradigms that are assumed to require some kind of inhibition. Logan (1981) 
found no difference between inhibiting spatial compatible vs. spatial 
incompatible responses. Logan and Irwin (2000) replicated this null effect. 
However, when the participants had to make saccadic responses instead of 
manual responses, an interaction was found. In an antisaccade task (‘look in 
the opposite direction’), inhibiting the antisaccadic movement appeared to 
be slower in comparison with the inhibition of prosaccadic movements. 
These authors suggested that eye and hand movements are inhibited by 
separate anatomical structures, causing this discrepancy. This lack of 
interaction with stop signal inhibition is not restricted to the inhibition of 
spatially incompatible responses. Verbruggen, Liefooghe, and 
Vandierendonck (2005) investigated the relation between negative priming 
and response inhibition. In a negative priming paradigm, the response to the 
target is delayed because the target was previously suppressed. These 
authors found that response stopping was not influenced by negative 
priming.  
 However, there are also studies where an interaction was actually 
observed between the stop signal paradigm and other inhibitory paradigms. 
First, Taylor and Ivanoff (2003) found that the presentation of a stop signal 
increased the magnitude of inhibition of return and suggested that there are 
components in inhibition of return that are similar to those processes used in 
the stop signal paradigm to suppress responses. Secondly, stopping 
appeared also to be influenced by distractors in tasks like the flanker task 
and the Stroop task. Kramer and colleagues (Kramer et al., 1994) found in a 
flanker task with letters that stopping was more difficult in incongruent 
trials compared to congruent and neutral trials. Later on, Ridderinkhof, 
Band and Logan (1999) replicated this finding and interpreted this finding in 
terms of an interaction between the suppression of incorrect responses in the 
flanker task and the inhibition of a motor response in the stop signal task. 
Logan (1994) also provided an explanation similar to the response 
suppression hypothesis of Ridderinkhof et al. (1999) for the data of Kramer 
et al. (1994). 
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 Verbruggen, Liefooghe and Vandierendonck (2004) further investigated 
the response suppression hypothesis of Ridderinkhof et al. (1999). They 
introduced distractors that were not part of the response set. In a flanker 
task, similar to the one used by Ridderinkhof et al. (1999), arrows pointing 
up or down were the distractors that were not part of the response set, since 
the target arrow always pointed to the left or the right. In a manual version 
of the Stroop task, color words referring to other colors than the possible ink 
colors were used as incongruent distractors that were not part of the 
response set. The results of both experiments demonstrated that response 
stopping was also influenced by incongruent distractors that were not part 
of the response set. The authors concluded that being part of the response 
set was not the crucial factor for the interaction between congruency tasks – 
like the flanker task and the Stroop task – and the stop signal paradigm. In 
other words, the results of Verbruggen et al. (2004) suggested that the 
interaction between the flanker task and the stop signal task was not just an 
interaction between response suppression in the flanker task (i.e., the 
incorrect response) and response inhibition in the stop signal task (i.e., the 
motor response). The finding that categorically related distracting 
information slowed down the response inhibition suggests that interference 
control at different processing levels could also interact with the stop signal 
task. In the study of Ridderinkhof et al. (1999), interference was situated at a 
response stage which is a late processing stage. The use of categorically 
distracting information in the study of Verbruggen et al. (2004) induced a 
conflict at a more intermediate processing stage, concerning an abstract 
attribute of the stimulus (e.g., semantic category), that is different from the 
response stage.  
 In the present study, we wanted to further investigate the hypothesis 
that interference at processing stages other than the response stage, interacts 
with response inhibition. For this purpose, we will induce interference at the 
early processing levels, such as stimulus perception and stimulus 
identification. A frequently used task that is assumed to reflect interference 
at the early processing stages, is the global/local task (Navon, 1977). In this 
task, compound stimuli (usually letters) are presented and participants are 
asked to respond to either the global or the local pattern. An example of a 
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compound stimulus could be a large S (=global pattern) composed of small 
S’s (=local pattern), as illustrated in Figure 2.2. When participants had to 
respond to the local pattern, responses were slowed down when the global 
pattern was different (= incongruent stimuli) from the local pattern (the 
global-to-local interference effect; Navon, 1977). However, responses to the 
global pattern were not influenced by the identity of the local pattern. 
Therefore, we will mainly focus on this global-to-local interference effect. 
After all, several studies that used event-related-potentials (ERPs) clearly 
demonstrated a primarily perceptual locus of this global-to-local interference 
effect (Han et al., 2003; Han, Fan, Chen, & Zhuo, 1997; Proverbio, Minniti, & 
Zani, 1998; Ridderinkhof & van der Molen, 1995). Based on analysis of 
event-related brain potentials (such as the P3 component and the lateralized 
readiness potential) and of the electromyogram, Ridderinkhof and van der 
Molen (1995) suggested that incongruent stimuli induced a perceptual 
conflict but no response competition (but see also Miller & Navon, 2002). 
Furthermore, Han et al. (2003) found that the global-to-local interference 
effect was mainly characterized by negative deflections over the lateral 
occipital-temporal cortex at 200 ms after the stimulus presentation. These 
findings suggest that the interference is situated at the level of stimulus 
perception and recognition (Han et al., 2003, p.1863).  
 In Experiment 1, the stop signal task was combined with the 
global/local task, in order to investigate the relation between response 
inhibition and interference control in the global/local task. The main 
question was whether response stopping was slowed down when the global 
and local patterns were incongruent. This would suggest that motor 
inhibition in the stop signal task is influenced by interference at the early 
processing stages. Another implication would be that the results of 
Verbruggen et al. (2004) could be generalized to yet another conflict task 
where the conflict is not situated at the response level.  
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EXPERIMENT 1 
 
METHOD 
 
Participants 
 Twenty first-year psychology students (18 females and 2 males) at 
Ghent University (Belgium) participated for course requirements and credit. 
All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and all were naive 
as to the purpose of the experiment. 
 
Apparatus and signals  
 The experiment was run on a Toshiba notebook computer running 
Tscope (Stevens, Lammertyn, Verbruggen, & Vandierendonck, in press). 
Stimuli were presented on an external 17-inch monitor, placed at a distance 
of 60 cm in front of the participants. The stimuli were white compound 
letters. There were two possible letters: ‘H’ and ‘S’ (Figure 2.2). There were 
two types of stimuli: Congruent (global and local shapes were the same) and 
Incongruent (global and local shapes were different). The global shape 
subtended approximately 2° of visual angle horizontally and 3° vertically. 
The local shapes subtended approximately 0.25° x 0.4°. The stimuli were 
presented in central location on a black background. In order to avoid that 
participants fixated at the centre of the screen to favor the processing of the 
local shapes, the vertical position of the global shape could vary across trials 
(maximum 1.5° above and below the vertical centre of the screen). Responses 
were collected with a response box connected to the parallel port of the 
notebook computer. All participants placed the index fingers of their left and 
right hands on the left and right buttons of the response box, respectively. 
Occasionally, a loud and clear auditory stop signal (750Hz, 50 dB, 50 ms) 
was presented through headphones shortly after the stimulus onset in the 
visual primary task.  
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congruent incongruent
 
Figure 2.2: Examples of the stimuli used in Experiment 1. 
 
Tasks and Procedure 
 Participants performed their task in a dimly lit, sound attenuated room. 
The primary task was to react to the local shape. If the target letter was an 
‘H’, a left response was required, and the letter ‘S’ required a right response. 
Participants were instructed to respond as quickly and accurately as 
possible. The two types of stimuli (congruent and incongruent) occurred 
with equal probability and were randomized, with the restriction that no 
response or stimulus type appeared more than three times in a row. Each 
trial started with the presentation of a white fixation cross (1.2° x 1.2°) that 
served as fixation point, for 500 ms. The stimuli were presented for 100 ms 
and required a response within 1,500 ms. The next trial was presented 1,250 
ms after the response. 
 The experiment consisted of two parts, one with stop signals and one 
without. Each part started with a practice phase, followed by the 
experimental phase. The order of the parts was counterbalanced across 
participants. Participants were orally instructed and informed about the 
order. During the practice phase, they also received immediate feedback. 
The screen colored red for 100 ms when they made an error and colored 
orange when they responded when a stop signal was presented. In the part 
without stop signals, there was one practice block of 20 trials and two 
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experimental blocks of 120 trials. The part with stop signals consisted of one 
practice block of 40 trials and three experimental blocks of 120 trials. On a 
random selection of 30% of the trials, a stop signal was presented. This 
resulted in 54 stop trials for both congruent and incongruent stimuli. The 
stop signal delay was initially set at 250 ms and continuously adjusted 
according to separately staircase tracking procedures (Levitt, 1970) for each 
type of stimulus to obtain a probability of stopping of .50. This method 
provides SSRT estimations that are derived from the central part of the no-
signal CRT curve and these SSRT estimates are the most reliable (Logan, 
Schachar, & Tannock, 1997; Band et al., 2003). Each time a participant 
responded to the stimulus in the presence of a stop signal, the stop signal 
delay decreased with 50 ms. On the other hand, when inhibition succeeded, 
the stop signal delay increased with 50 ms. To avoid waiting strategies, 
participants were informed about the tracking procedure and told that the 
probability of stopping would approximate .50, irrespective of whether or 
not they were postponing their response. At the end of each block, feedback 
about their performance was presented: The number of errors made during 
the block and the mean CRT. In the part with stop signals, the mean 
probability of stopping was also presented. 
 
Stop latency estimation 
 SSRTs were estimated as proposed by Logan and Cowan (1984), based 
on the horse-race model. According to this model, after rank ordering the 
CRTs of no-signal trials, the left, fast part of this CRT-distribution is 
assumed to correspond to the distribution of CRTs of signal trials on which 
inhibition failed. Doing so, the finishing time of the stop process can be 
derived. The finishing time of the stop process corresponds to the nth CRT 
of the no-signal trials, where n is the result of multiplying the total number 
of no-signal trials by the probability of responding when a signal is 
presented, given a particular SSD. Since the start of the inhibition process 
(mean SSD) and the finishing time are known, the SSRT can be estimated. 
The SSRT is obtained by subtracting the start time from the finishing time or 
‘nth CRT minus SSD’.  
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RESULTS 
 
 CRT and error data were subjected to a within-participant trimming 
procedure. Mean CRTs of correct trials and error percentages were 
calculated after removal of outlying CRTs; i.e., CRTs longer than 2.5 
standard deviations above the mean were discarded from data analysis. This 
resulted in a data reduction of 2.1%. Since we predicted a global-to-local 
interference effect, all post hoc tests were one-tailed t-tests. 
 
No-signal trials 
 First of all, CRT data of the no-signal trials were analyzed by means of a 
2 (block type: Blocks with vs. without occasional stop signal presentation) by 
2 (congruency) repeated measures ANOVA. We found main effects for both 
factors. As can be seen in Table 2.5, participants responded faster when no 
signals were presented, F(1,19) = 31.18, p < .001. When global and local 
pattern were identical, responses were also faster, F(1,19) = 11.04, p < .01, 
relative to when global and local letters were incongruent. The interaction 
between these two main effects was not significant, F(1,19) = 1.67, p = .21, 
indicating the presentation of stop signals did not affect the global-to-local 
interference. One-tailed t-tests revealed a difference between congruent and 
incongruent trials in both conditions, t(19) = -3.11, p < .01, and t(19) = -2.94, p 
< .01, for the blocks with and without stop signals respectively. 
 
Table 2.5: Reaction times and error percentages (SDs in parentheses) for both parts 
without and with the presentation of stop signals (S-S) in Experiment 1. 
 Trial type 
 Congruent Incongruent  
 CRT Errors (%) CRT Errors (%) 
Without S-S 381 (31) 3.3 (1.9) 391 (39) 4.3 (2.7) 
With S-S 463 (80) 2.5 (2.4) 477 (81) 3.0 (3.0) 
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Secondly, error percentages were also analyzed by means of a 2 x 2 repeated 
measures ANOVA. The effect of condition was marginally significant, 
F(1,19) = 3.82, p = .07, indicating that participants tended to make less errors 
in the condition with stop signals. There was no effect of congruency, F(1,19) 
= 1.87, p = .19. The interaction was also not significant, F(1,19) = 1.28, p = .27.  
 
Signal-trials 
 Stopping data are presented in Table 2.6. The probability of stopping 
came very close to the intended .50. There was no effect of congruency, 
F(1,19) < 1. The SSDs did also not differ from each other, F(1,19) < 1. 
However, the difference between SSRTs was significant, F(1,19) = 4.65, p < 
.05, indicating that stopping was 14 ms longer in incongruent trials than in 
congruent trials.9 Finally, no congruency effect was observed for signal-
respond trials, F < 1.  
 
Table 2.6: SSRTs, probabilities of responding given a stop signal, stop signal delay 
(SSD) signal-respond RTs (SRT) in Experiment 1.  
 
 
                                                          
9 Similar results were obtained using the ‘mean method’ for calculating the SSRT. 
Using this method, the SSRT is the result of the subtraction ‘mean RT minus mean 
SSD’ (see Logan & Cowan, 1984; Band et al, 2003, for a detailed description of the 
method). This procedure resulted in SSRTs of 158ms and 173ms for congruent and 
incongruent trials respectively, F(1,19) = 4.81, p < .05. 
 Trial type 
 Congruent Incongruent  
 M SD M SD 
Stop signal RT  153 44 167 45 
Response ratio (%) 50.0 3.5 50.3 2.5 
SSD 304 108 303 91 
SRT 435 57 431 58 
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DISCUSSION 
 
 In this experiment, a global/local task was combined with the stop 
signal task in order to investigate the relation between interference in the 
early stages of processing on the one hand, and response inhibition on the 
other hand. The stop signal task was already shown to interact with 
congruency tasks like the flanker task and the Stroop task, where the 
interference was most likely situated at intermediate and late processing 
stages (Ridderinkhof et al., 1999; Verbruggen et al., 2004). The purpose of the 
present study was to further generalize these findings to interference control 
at the early processing stages. If interference control at these stages interacts 
with the stop signal task, then response stopping should be prolonged in 
incongruent trials in comparison with congruent trials in the global/local 
task. 
 The results of Experiment 1 are twofold. First, the analysis of CRT data 
of no-signal trials showed a small but significant global-to-local interference 
effect, indicating that participants responded faster when the global and 
local patterns were identical. Moreover, the global-to-local interference effect 
was not influenced by the occasional presentation of stop signal trials. As 
previously observed, participants did respond faster in the part without stop 
signals (Logan, 1994), but this had no effect on the global-to-local 
interference effect since no interaction between presentation of signals and 
interference effect was found. 
 Secondly, the probability of stopping and stop signal delay were not 
influenced by the identity of the global pattern, and the global-to-local 
interference was not significant either. The latter finding contrasts with the 
finding in the no-signal data. Maybe, this is due to the fact that the signal-
respond data correspond to the faster trials, resulting in comparatively 
speaking smaller interference effects. Moreover, the effects found in the 
present experiment are generally quite small and therefore possibly not 
strong enough to emerge in a stop condition. However –and most 
importantly– a global-to-local interference effect was found for SSRTs. 
Response stopping appeared to be more difficult when the stimulus was 
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incongruent. This prolongation of SSRTs demonstrates that response 
inhibition is interacts with interference control situated at the early 
processing stages. Therefore, the results of Experiment 1 seem to extend the 
findings of previous studies that combined interference tasks with the stop 
signal task.  
 However, contrary to Ridderinkhof et al. (1995) who found no response 
competition in the global-local task, Miller and Navon (2002) found that 
global shapes activated responses on no-go trials and suggested that part of 
the congruency effect is due to response processes. Therefore, although 
findings of Ridderinkhof et al. (1995) and Han et al. (2003) suggest that the 
interference is mostly situated at the level of stimulus perception and 
identification, it cannot fully be excluded that an additional response 
competition contributed to the interaction found in Experiment 1.  
 
EXPERIMENT 2 
 
 In Experiment 1, we found that stopping in incongruent trials was 
slower than in congruent trials. In Experiment 2, the hypothesis that 
stopping is influenced by interference in the early processes will be further 
investigated with a modified version of the Eriksen flanker task (Eriksen & 
Eriksen, 1974). Most of the studies that used a flanker task situated the 
congruency effect at the response-selection stage. This is also the case in 
models proposed to explain the flanker effect. For example, in the dual-route 
model proposed by Ridderinkhof (Ridderinkhof, 1997; Ridderinkhof, van 
der Molen, & Bashore, 1995), both distractor and target are processed: The 
distractor via an automatic route and the target via a controlled route. In 
case of an incongruent flanker, a mismatch arises between the response 
associated with the target and the response associated with the distractor. 
This response conflict needs to be resolved and delays responding 
(Ridderinkhof, 1997).  
 However, there is also evidence from both behavioural (e.g., Eriksen & 
Eriksen, 1979; Cohen & Shoup, 1997) and neurophysiological (e.g., Coles, 
Gratton, Bashore, Eriksen, & Donchin, 1985) studies that under certain 
conditions at least part of the flanker effect is due to a conflict in at the level 
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of stimulus identification, which is an early processing stage compared to 
the response stage. For example, Cohen and Shoup (1997) used colored lines 
as stimuli and they found in their Experiment 3 that the congruency effect 
tended to be larger when the congruent stimuli were identical to the target 
in comparison with stimuli that were physically dissimilar but that belonged 
to the same response set. In view of the absence of a conflict at a response 
stage since both stimuli were associated with the same response, this effect is 
assumed to be situated at a more early processing level. However, in other 
studies that used more complex stimuli, such as letters, a difference was not 
always found between identical flankers and physically dissimilar but 
response congruent flankers (for example, Flowers, 1990). This suggests that 
the nature of the stimuli may be of utmost importance to find differences 
due to perceptual conflict at the early processing levels (Cohen & Shoup, 
1997).  
 In order to investigate whether such a conflict in the flanker task 
influences the inhibition of responses, we used stimuli similar to those used 
in the study of Cohen and Shoup (1997). The crucial question now is 
whether stopping is more difficult when target and flankers are physically 
dissimilar but response congruent, which can be expected based on the 
results of Experiment 1. 
 
METHOD 
 
Participants 
 Twenty-one paid volunteers participated in this experiment (15 females 
and 6 males; ranging in age from 18-48 years). None of the participants 
participated in Experiment 1. All participants had normal or corrected-to-
normal vision and all were naive as to the purpose of the experiment. One 
participant was replaced due to negative SSRTs. 
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Apparatus and signals 
 Apparatus was the same as in Experiment 1. Only the changes in signals 
in comparison with Experiment 1 will be discussed. The stimuli were three 
colored parallel lines (see Figure 2.3). There were four colors: Red (RGB: 255, 
0, 0), yellow (RGB: 255, 255, 153), orange (RGB: 255, 153, 0), and green (RGB: 
153, 204, 0). Participants had to respond to the color of the middle line. Red 
and yellow were mapped on the left hand, orange and green on the right 
hand. This resulted in three stimulus types: Congruent (flankers and target 
were identical), Stimulus Incongruent (flankers and target are physically 
dissimilar but mapped on the same response; for example yellow flankers 
and a red target) and Response Incongruent (flankers and target are mapped 
on different responses). The total visual angle subtended by the three lines 
was approximately 1° by 1°. In order to avoid focusing strategies, the 
orientation of the lines within one trial was always the same, but was 
randomly varied across trials. The colored lines were presented at central 
location on a black background in a rectangle (2° x 2°). The rectangle served 
as a fixation area and remained on the screen during the blocks. 
 
Task, procedure and stop latency estimation 
 With exception of the stimuli, there were no major changes in 
comparison to Experiment 1. The presentation of the three types of stimuli 
was as in Experiment 1 pseudo-randomly mixed. The stimuli remained on 
screen until a response was given with a maximal RT of 1,500 ms. The next 
stimulus was presented 1,250 ms after the response of the previous trial. 
There were two parts: A part without stop signals, with a practice phase of 
30 trials and two experimental blocks of 120 trials, and a part with stop 
signals, with a practice phase of 60 trials and five experimental blocks of 120 
trials. Probability of the stop signal was 30% (60 stop trials for each stimulus 
type). Stop latency was estimated according to the same procedures. 
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Figure 2.3: Examples of the three types of stimuli used in Experiment 2. 
 
RESULTS 
 
 CRT and error data were subjected to the same trimming procedure as 
in Experiment 1. This resulted in a data loss of 2.8%. All analyses were 
repeated measures ANOVAs (lowest p-value of the sphericity test was .10).  
 
No-signal trials 
 CRT and error data of the no-signal trials are presented in Table 2.7. A 2 
(block type: Blocks with vs. without occasional presentation of stop signals) 
x 3 (flankers: Congruent, stimulus incongruent, response incongruent) 
repeated measures ANOVA revealed a main effect for flanker type, F(2,40) = 
54.30, p < .001. The difference between the two parts with and without stop 
signal was not significant, F(1,20) = 1.85, p < .18. The interaction was also not 
significant, F(2,40) < 1, indicating that the occasional presentation of stop 
signals did not influence the flanker effect. One-tailed t-tests were performed 
on the means of the part with and the part without stop signals. Congruent 
flankers resulted in faster responses (619 ms) in comparison with stimulus 
= red 
= yellow 
= green 
congruent stimulus  
incongruent 
response  
incongruent 
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incongruent (647 ms) and response incongruent flankers (668 ms), t(20) = -
5.88, p < .001 and t(20) = -11.23, p < .001 respectively. The difference between 
these two types of incongruent flankers was also significant, t(20) = -4.21, p < 
.001. Analyses of the error data revealed a main effect of trial type, F(2,40) = 
7.25, p < .01. There was no difference between the two parts, F(1,20) = 1.99, p 
> .17, and the interaction was also not significant, F < 1. No further analyses 
were performed. 
 
Table 2.7: Reaction times and error percentages (SDs in parentheses) for both parts 
without and with the presentation of stop signals (S-S) in Experiment 2. 
 
Signal-trials 
 Stopping data are presented in Table 2.8. The probability of responding 
approximated .50. There was no effect of congruency, F(2,40) = 1.22, p = .30. 
On the other hand, the differences between flanker types for both SSDs and 
SSRTs were significant, F(2,40) = 8.11, p < .01, and F(2,40) = 5.5, p < .01 
respectively.10 Post-hoc t-tests for SSRTs indicated that response stopping for 
both stimulus incongruent, t(20) = -2.16, p < .05, and response incongruent 
trials, t(20) = -3.75, p < .001, was prolonged in comparison to identical trials. 
The difference between stimulus incongruent and response incongruent 
trials was not significant, t(20) = -0.70, p > .50. Finally, there was also a 
congruency effect for signal-respond trials, F(2,40) = 15.55, p < .001. 
                                                          
10 As in Experiment 1, using the ‘mean method’ yielded similar results. The SSRTs 
were 169ms, 185ms and 190ms for respectively congruent, stimulus incongruent and 
response incongruent trials, F(2,40) = 2.73, p = .07. 
 Trial type 
 Congruent 
Stimulus 
incongruent 
Response 
incongruent 
 CRT Errors CRT Errors CRT Errors 
Without S-S 607 (75) 6.2 (4.3) 633 (84) 6.4 (4.8) 657 (69) 7.9 (4.7) 
With S-S 630 (61) 4.3 (2.7) 660 (65) 5.2 (4.0) 680 (69) 6.7 (4.0) 
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Congruent trials were faster than both stimulus incongruent, t(20) = -1.81, p 
< .05, and response incongruent trials, t(20) = -5.02, p < .001. The difference 
between both types of incongruent trials was also significant, t(20) = -3.61, p 
< .01. 
 
Table 2.8: SSRTs, probabilities of responding given a stop signal, stop signal delay 
(SSD) and observed signal-respond RTs (SRT) in Experiment 2. 
 
 Trial type 
 Congruent 
Stimulus 
incongruent 
Response 
incongruent 
 M SD M SD M SD 
Stop signal RT  144 45 167 49 172 43 
Response ratio (%) 50.2 3.4 49.7 3.2 49.4 2.9 
SSD 461 75 475 83 490 82 
SRT 569 54 584 56 622 55 
 
In sum, in Experiment 2, the results of Experiment 1 are replicated. Like in 
the study of Cohen and Shoup (1997), responses to stimulus incongruent 
trials were slower in comparison to stimuli where the flankers were 
congruent. Besides this effect of stimulus congruency, there was also an 
additional effect of response congruency, most likely situated at a late 
processing stage, and which is indicated by the finding that responses to the 
response incongruent stimuli were the slowest. The stop signal data yielded 
a similar pattern. The probability of stopping was not influenced by 
congruency. On the other hand, main effects were found for both SSDs and 
SSRTs. A post hoc t-test revealed that response stopping was more difficult 
when the flankers were different but mapped on the same response to the 
target. An additional effect of response congruency on response inhibition 
(i.e., response incongruent trials are to some extend also stimulus 
incongruent trials) cannot be excluded, but the post-hoc test between SSRTs 
of stimulus incongruent and response incongruent trials did not reach 
significance.  
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GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
 In the present study, the relationship between response inhibition, as 
operationalized in the stop signal paradigm, and interference in the early 
processing stages in a global/local task and a flanker task, was investigated. 
Results of both experiments suggest that response stopping is prolonged 
when irrelevant stimuli are presented. 
 Ridderinkhof et al. (1999) found that when they combined the stop 
signal task with a flanker task, response stopping on incongruent stimuli 
was more difficult in comparison to congruent stimuli. From this finding, 
the authors concluded that the suppression of incorrect responses in the 
flanker task and the inhibition of motor responses in the stop signal task 
interacted. According to Ridderinkhof et al. (1999), this suggested that in 
both tasks a common inhibitory mechanism was present, or, alternatively, 
that two separate response suppression mechanisms compete for the same 
resources. In other words, they argued that although the loci of the 
inhibitory functions may be different, resolving the conflict in the flanker 
task and the suppression the motor response in the stop signal task are not 
functionally independent from each other. Furthermore, Ridderinkhof et al. 
(1999) argued that these results were in line with a prefrontal executive 
mechanism that supports different inhibitory processes, resulting in 
adaptive and controlled behaviour.  
 In a follow-up study, Verbruggen et al. (2004) investigated whether 
there was still an interaction when the interference was situated at other 
processing stages than the response stage. For this purpose, these authors 
introduced distractors that were categorically related to the targets but that 
were not part of the response set in both a flanker task and a Stroop task. 
They found that with this type of distractors, response stopping was also 
more difficult in comparison to the congruent stimuli in the flanker task and 
the neutral stimuli in the Stroop task. These authors concluded that 
categorically related distracting information, causing interference at a 
probably more intermediate processing stage concerning abstract attributes 
of the stimulus, was sufficient to cause an interaction with the stop signal 
STIMULUS INTERFERENCE AND RESPONSE INHIBITION      79 
paradigm. Therefore, the interaction between interference control and 
response inhibition does not necessarily have to be situated at the response 
level (Verbruggen et al., 2004). 
 The results of the present study offer further support for the hypothesis 
that the activation of incorrect responses in congruency tasks is not 
necessary to influence the stop performance. In Experiment 1 a global/local 
task is combined with the stop signal paradigm. In addition to the typical 
global-to-local interference effects for CRT data, response stopping, as 
indicated by longer SSRTs, was also more difficult on incongruent stimuli. 
This suggests that response inhibition is influenced by interference at an 
early level of processing. This finding was replicated in Experiment 2. In this 
experiment, participants performed a flanker task. The crucial comparison 
was the difference between congruent flankers and stimulus incongruent 
flankers that evoke the same response as the target. The difference between 
those two conditions involves a conflict in an early processing stage (similar 
to the global-to-local interference of Experiment 1), and an absence of a 
response conflict because both targets and distractors are associated with the 
same response. As predicted, response stopping was influenced by such a 
conflict in the flanker task. Taken together, the results of both experiments of 
the present study suggest that response stopping is influenced by 
interference in the early processing stages. Hence, the present study is in the 
first place an extension of the study of Ridderinkhof et al. (1999) and 
Verbruggen et al. (2004) where also an interaction between interference 
control in congruency tasks and response inhibition is found.  
 The results of the present study shed a new light on the relationship 
between congruency tasks and the stop signal task. All three types of 
congruency tasks that were shown to influence the stop performance in both 
the present study and previous ones (i.e., the flanker task, a manual version 
of the Stroop task and the global/local task), have in common that irrelevant 
aspects of the stimulus affect the performance on the relevant aspects 
(stimulus-stimulus congruency or S-S congruency; Kornblum, Hasbroucq, & 
Osman, 1990). Although there are some differences between these tasks, 
they all appear to influence stop performance in a similar way. When there 
are irrelevant stimulus features that are incongruent with the relevant 
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stimulus features, stopping is slowed down. These findings of both 
experiments demonstrate that interference control and response inhibition 
interact, and therefore, that these inhibitory processes are not functionally 
independent from each other. Based on the additive factors logic (Sternberg, 
1969), this could also suggest that there may be a common inhibitory 
mechanism in both tasks. Moreover, it seems that the interaction does not 
necessarily have to be situated in a late stage of response production or any 
other response related process. Results of the present study and the study by 
Verbruggen et al. (2004) indicate that interference control in different stages 
of the stimulus-processing chain and response inhibition as operationalized 
in the stop signal task, interact.  
 Recently, several authors suggested that in congruency tasks like the 
flanker task, there are at least two general processes: A monitoring process 
and subsequently, a control process (e.g., Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & 
Cohen, 2001; Ridderinkhof, 2002a). The monitoring system is assumed to 
detect the conflict, indicating the need for control, and engages a controller 
which can actually 'deal' with this conflict. For example, Ridderinkhof 
(2002a, 2002b), suggested that in conflict tasks where a response conflict is 
detected, performance can be adjusted trial-by-trial in order to deal 
effectively with the conflict situation. Although this account focuses 
primarily on trial-by-trial adjustments, there is also evidence that similar 
control processes occur within trials (see Ridderinkhof, Ullsperger, Crone, & 
Nieuwenhuis, 2004). There is also evidence from studies that used tasks 
similar to the ones used in the present study, that top-down mechanisms are 
engaged when no response conflict is present (Milham et al., 2001; Van 
Veen, Cohen, Botvinick, Stenger, & Carter, 2001). Within the two-process 
framework, interference in the early stages of processing also engages both a 
monitoring system and a subsequent controller. In the light of the present 
results, the question remains in which stage(s) the interaction with the stop 
signal occurs. It is possible that either the monitoring or the act of control, 
i.e., the suppression of the stimulus incongruent flankers, interact with the 
processes in the stop signal paradigm. However, the paradigm used in the 
present study does not allow a finer time-analysis with the purpose of 
investigating in which stage the interaction occurs. Moreover, it is possible 
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that both processes overlap in time (Ridderinkhof, Ullsperger, et al., 2004). 
New research may be useful here. 
 The results of the present study are also consistent with another 
conceptualization of the processing stream, namely the executive act of 
control model proposed by Logan and Cowan (1984). In this model, Logan 
and Cowan tried to integrate the concepts of motor control and cognitive 
control. They suggested that both motor control and cognitive control are 
best viewed as an interaction between an executive system that forms the 
intentions and keeps track of the changing goals and a subordinate system 
that receives the commands and actually performs the required operations. 
In case of the stop signal paradigm, the executive system could serve as the 
mechanism for response inhibition. When a stop signal is presented, the 
goals are changed and responses should be suppressed. This could be done 
by canceling the support for the processes. Since Logan and Cowan (1984) 
proposed that the control mechanism they suggested could operate at any 
point from stimulus perception to response, it seems also reasonable to 
assume that conflict monitoring or interference control also rely on the 
executive system. This implies that response stopping and interference 
control should compete for the same resources when they are combined. 
This should result in longer stop latencies for conflicting trials, which is 
actually observed in previous studies (Kramer et al., 1994; Ridderinkhof et 
al., 1999; Verbruggen et al., 2004) and the present one. Thus, a control system 
supporting inhibition could possibly explain the interactions between 
different inhibitory tasks. Note that Ridderinkhof et al. (1999) also suggested 
that their results were in line with the concept of a prefrontal executive 
system that supports interference control and response inhibition at different 
loci (or processing stages). Similar conclusions about common mechanisms 
in interference control and response inhibition were drawn by for example 
Friedman and Miyake (2004) and Dempster (1993). Friedman and Miyake 
also found in their latent variable analyses that although there are some 
differences in the tasks or inhibitory functions that these tasks are assumed 
to operationalize, they rely on similar mechanisms. Likewise, Dempster 
(1993) suggested that notwithstanding differences between interference 
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control and inhibition, they may be similar in nature, controlled by similar 
neuronal mechanisms. 
 To summarize, in the present study the relation between response 
inhibition and interference in the early processing stages was investigated. 
Both experiments demonstrated that response stopping was slowed down 
due to interference in early stages of processing of the primary task. This is 
further evidence for the hypothesis that interference control at different 
processing stages and response inhibition are not functionally independent, 
suggesting a possible common underlying mechanism in different inhibitory 
tasks. 
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STIMULUS AND RESPONSE CONFLICT-INDUCED 
COGNITIVE CONTROL IN THE FLANKER TASK11,12 
 
Recently, several studies investigated the top-down adjustments made after 
incongruent trials during conflict tasks. The present study investigated conflict-
monitoring with different types of conflict. In a modified version of the flanker task, a 
distinction was made between stimulus-stimulus conflict and stimulus-response 
conflict. Six colours were mapped on three responses in order to exclude all 
sequences where a relevant or irrelevant stimulus- or response-related feature was 
repeated from trial n-1 to trial n. Analyses as a function of the congruency of the 
previous trial demonstrated that conflict adaptation was present. The stimulus 
congruency effect was reduced after both a stimulus incongruent trial and after a 
response incongruent trial. The mere response congruency effect did not vary as a 
function of previous congruency. These findings are discussed in relation to the 
distinction between conflict detection and conflict regulation. 
 
                                                          
11 Verbruggen, F., Notebaert, N., Liefooghe, B., & Vandierendonck, A. (in press). 
Stimulus and response conflict-induced cognitive control in the flanker task. 
Psychonomic Bulletin and Review. 
12 We would like to thank two anonymous reviewers, Ulrich Mayr and Trammel Neil 
for their useful comments on a previous version of this manuscript. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 According to the leading theories about cognitive control in conflict 
tasks, performance is adjusted after a conflict situation. Most studies focused 
on the contribution of the anterior cingulated cortex (ACC), and suggested 
that an evaluation device, the ACC, detects the conflict which is 
subsequently a signal for an adjustment in cognitive control via a regulative 
device: The dorsolateral prefrontal cortex In behavioural studies concerning 
conflict monitoring, the research focused on the effect of congruency of the 
previous trial on the congruency effect in the current trial. Gratton, Coles, 
and Donchin (1992) demonstrated that in a flanker task, the effect of 
incongruent distracting flankers decreased when the previous trial was also 
incongruent (i.e., the so-called Gratton-effect). Later on, this finding was 
replicated in the flanker task (e.g., Botvinick, Nystrom, Fissell, Carter, & 
Cohen, 1999; see also Botvinick et al., 2001), and other conflict tasks such as 
the Simon task (e.g., Stürmer, Leuthold, Soetens, Schröter, & Sommer, 2002) 
and the Stroop task (Kerns et al., 2004). These authors suggested that the 
modulation of the congruency effect by the sequence of congruency is a 
behavioural consequence of conflict detection by the ACC and the 
subsequent adjustments in cognitive control (Gratton et al., 1992; Botvinick 
et al., 1999). 
 Until now, most studies focused on conflict-adaptation in terms of 
response conflict in conflict tasks. Several studies demonstrated that the 
ACC is only activated when a response conflict is present. Van Veen, Cohen, 
Botvinick, Stenger, and Carter (2001) used a flanker task with three 
conditions: (1) Congruent trials (CO; i.e., target and flankers were identical), 
(2) Stimulus Incongruent or stimulus-stimulus conflict trials (SI; i.e., target 
and flankers were non-identical but led to the same response), and (3) 
Response Incongruent or stimulus-response conflict trials (RI, target and 
flankers were mapped on different responses). Van Veen et al. found that, 
although SI trials were slower than CO trials, there was no ACC activation 
in SI trials. This was replicated in the Stroop task. Milham et al. (2001) found 
that categorically related stimuli that were not associated with a response 
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(i.e., colour words that were not part of the response set) did not activate the 
ACC. Taken together, these results suggest that the ACC is indeed only 
activated when a response conflict, due to the common activation of two 
different responses, is detected.  
 However, several neuroimaging studies found that certain regions that 
ought to be responsible for top-down modulations in case of a response 
conflict were also active in SI trials. For example, Milham et al. (2001) 
observed that the DLPC was activated in both SI and RI trials in comparison 
with CO trials and suggested that the DLPC was involved in attentional 
control, biasing the selection of information in the task-relevant processing 
stream. Liu, Banich, Jacobson, and Tanabe (2004) found similar results with a 
combined spatial Stroop/Simon task. These authors also demonstrated that 
the DLPC was active for both stimulus-stimulus and stimulus-response 
conflict. Thus, based on the conflict monitoring theory in which the DLPC is 
assumed to be the regulative device (Botvinick et al., 2001), it was proposed 
that top-down adjustments were also made after SI trials (Liu et al., 2004). 
 Yet, not all studies agreed with the notion of an active form of conflict 
adaptation in interference tasks (e.g., Hommel, Proctor & Vu, 2004; Mayr, 
Awh, & Laurey, 2003; Notebaert, Soetens, & Melis, 2001). Hommel et al. 
(2004) argued that the conflict adaptation pattern in the Simon task is due to 
the sequence of specific stimulus-response features, without the need for 
active top-down adjustments. Similarly, Mayr et al. (2003) suggested that the 
adaptation pattern could be due to stimulus-response repetitions since they 
found that the pattern was not present when only target-response changes 
were included in the analyses. However, Kerns et al. (2004) and Notebaert, 
Gevers, Verbruggen and Liefooghe (in press) demonstrated that this conflict 
adaptation was still present in a Stroop task, even when target and distractor 
repetitions were excluded. Similar results were obtained in an arrow version 
of the flanker task by Ullsperger, Bylsma, and Botvinick (in press). These 
authors found the conflict adaptation pattern after eliminating stimulus 
repetitions. Finally, when sequential effects of congruency are carefully 
balanced against repetition effects, the conflict monitoring pattern was still 
found (Wühr, in press). Based on these results, it seems that at least to some 
extent, behavioural adaptations are made after conflict situations.  
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 In the present study, we used a flanker task with three types of stimuli 
(CO, SI & RI trials) with 6 stimuli mapped onto 3 responses. Since we were 
interested in top-down effects in the flanker task, we wanted to exclude all 
possible repetitions of stimulus- and response-related features. However, for 
certain transitions (SI-RI & RI-SI transitions) this is not possible with the 
often used 4-to-2 mapping. Therefore, we opted for a 6-to-3 mapping (see 
the Appendix for an elaboration of this issue). Our purpose was threefold. 
First, we wanted to replicate the conflict adaptation pattern in a flanker task 
by means of sequential analyses when stimulus- and response-related 
repetitions were excluded. Secondly, it was our purpose to find behavioural 
evidence for top-down conflict adaptations following stimulus-stimulus 
interference. The question is whether the conflict monitoring pattern is 
restricted to response conflict. Until now, there is no direct behavioural 
evidence for these adjustments and it is rather speculative that the activation 
of the prefrontal regions like the DLPC will actually lead to behavioural 
adaptations after SI trials. Thirdly, we wanted to investigate to which end 
conflict monitoring is specific. Is there a generalization from stimulus-
stimulus conflict to stimulus-response conflict and vice-versa?  
 
EXPERIMENT 
 
METHOD 
 
Participants 
 Twenty-six paid volunteers (10 females; mean age: 20.3 years, SD: 2.59) 
participated. All had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and all were 
naive as to the purpose of the experiment. 
 
Apparatus and signals 
 The experiment was run on a Pentium 4 PC running Tscope (Stevens, 
Lammertyn, Verbruggen, & Vandierendonck, in press). Stimuli were 
presented on a 17-inch monitor placed at a distance of 60 cm in front of the 
participants. Participants were tested in groups of three or four. The stimuli 
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consisted of three coloured parallel lines. The compound stimuli were 30 x 
50 pixels (width x length) large. There were six different colours: Red (RGB: 
255, 0, 0), green (RGB: 0, 255, 0), blue (RGB: 0, 0, 255), orange (RGB: 255, 157, 
0), yellow (RGB: 255, 255, 0), and violet (RGB: 255, 0, 255). The stimuli were 
presented at the centre of the screen in a grey square (60 x 60 pixels; RGB: 
119, 119, 199) that remained on the screen during the whole experiment. To 
avoid that participants can keep focusing on one part of the display, the 
orientation of the stimuli within one trial was always the same but could 
vary across trials. Responses were collected via a QWERTY keyboard (keys 
'V', 'B' and 'N) and participants had to respond with the index- middle and 
ring finger of their dominant hand. 
 
Tasks and Procedure 
 The task was to react to the colour of the middle line and ignore the two 
flanking lines. We used six different colours and three different responses. 
Red and green targets were mapped on the index finger ('V'), blue and 
orange targets on middle finger (key 'B') and yellow and violet were 
mapped on the ringer finger (key 'N'). There were the three types of stimuli: 
Congruent (CO), Stimulus incongruent (SI), and Response incongruent (RI). 
With regard to the sequence of trials, there were nine transition types 
('congruency trial n-1' x 'congruency trial n') that occurred with equal 
probability. This resulted in 1/3 CO trials, 1/3 SI trials and 1/3 RI trials. 
Trial type and responses were also crossed and for RI trials, the 4 possible 
distractor colours were equated. Each trial started with the presentation of a 
white fixation cross (10 x 10 pixels) in the centre of the screen for 500 ms. 
During the experimental blocks, the stimuli required a response within 1,500 
ms. The next trial was presented 750 ms after the response. 
 Instructions were presented on the screen. Both accuracy and response 
speed were emphasized. The experiment started with two practice blocks of 
30 trials. In the first practice block, there was no speed pressure. In the 
second practice block, the stimuli required a response within 1,500 ms. In 
both practice blocks, response mappings were presented at the top and the 
bottom of the screen by means of three groups of little coloured squares. 
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This information was no longer present during the experimental blocks. The 
experiment consisted of 14 blocks of 82 trials. The first trial of each block was 
not analyzed. This resulted in 378 trials for each type of congruency. When 
the congruency of the previous trial is also taken into account, there were 
nine transition types and 126 trials for each type of transition.  
 During the whole experiment, participants received immediate 
feedback for 200 ms during the intertrial interval. The word 'fout' (Dutch for 
'wrong') appeared when participants made an error and the words 'reageer 
sneller' (Dutch for 'respond faster') were presented when they did not 
respond in time (this information could of course not appear during the first 
practice block). At the end of each block, the number of errors made during 
the block and the mean RT were displayed and participants were allowed to 
pause.  
 
RESULTS 
 
 Only those trials were none of the stimulus-related or response-related 
features was repeated, are included in the data-analysis. RT data were 
subjected to a within-participant trimming procedure. Mean RTs of correct 
trials were calculated after removal of outlying RTs for each type of 
transition (i.e., RTs longer than 2.5 standard deviations above the mean). 
Also, trials that followed an error were not further analyzed. On average, 
this procedure resulted in a total data reduction of 59.2% [exclusion of all 
kinds of repetition effects resulted in a total data reduction of 53.2%, of 
which 12.2% was due to repetitions of response-related but not stimulus-
related features; when errors and trials that were preceded by errors were 
excluded, there was an additional data reduction of 4.7%, and finally, the 
outlier analyses resulted in an extra reduction of 1.4%]. All reported F-values 
are approximations to Wilks' lambda.  
 
Combined analyses  
 The RT-data were analyzed by means of a 3 (congruency trial n-1) by 3 
(congruency trial n) repeated measures MANOVA. The data are presented 
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in Figure 2.4. Performance on trial n was influenced by the congruency of 
trial n itself, F(2,18) =55.66, p < .001. The effect of the congruency of trial n-1 
and the interaction between both main effects were both marginally 
significant, F(2,18) =3.25, p = .06 and F(4,16) = 2.80, p = .06, respectively. This 
suggests that participants make top-down adjustments after incongruent 
trials and that these adjustments influence the congruency effect on the 
current trial. Error data were also analyzed by means of a 3x3 repeated 
measures MANOVA. Participants made slightly more errors on RI trials, 
compared to CO trials and SI trials. This difference did not reach 
significance, F(2,18) = 2.91, p = .08. There was also no effect of the previous 
trial, F(2,18) < 1, nor an interaction, F(4,16) < 1. 
 
Table 2.9: Error percentages (SDs in parentheses) for the different types of stimuli 
on trial n as a function of the congruency of trial n-1 (congruent, CO; stimulus 
incongruent, SI; response incongruent, RI). 
 
In the subsequent analyses of RT data, a distinction was made as a function 
of the type of congruency in the current trials. Different analyses were 
performed for the effect of stimulus-congruency (i.e., by comparing CO and 
SI trials), and response-congruency (i.e., by comparing SI and RI trials).  
 
Stimulus congruency  
 The effects of congruency of trial n and trial n-1 were tested by means of 
a 2 (trial n: CO vs. SI) x 3 (trial n-1: CO vs. SI vs. RI) repeated measures 
MANOVA. There was no main effect of congruency on trial n, F(1,19) < 1. 
The effect of the congruency of trial n-1 did not reach significance, F(2,18) = 
2.68, p = .09, but more importantly, the interaction was significant, F(2,18) 
 Trial n 
Trial n-1 CO SI RI 
CO 5.1 (2.9) 4.5 (2.4) 6.1 (5.6) 
SI 4.7 (3.1) 4.5 (4.6) 5.8 (4.4) 
RI 4.6 (5.1) 3.7 (3.3) 6.4 (7.8) 
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=4.02, p < .05, indicating that the stimulus congruency effect was influenced 
by the congruency of the previous trial. Different 2 (trial n) x 2 (trial n-1) 
ANOVAs indicated that the stimulus congruency effect (CO-SI) depends on 
the congruency of the previous trial. Compared to trials that followed CO 
trials, the stimulus congruency effect became smaller after a SI trial, F(1,19) = 
4.12, p = .06 and after a RI trial, F(1,19) = 4.18, p = .05, although both 
interactions were only marginally significant. Stimulus conflict and response 
conflict in the previous trial had the same effect on the stimulus congruency 
effect on the current trial, F(1,19) < 1. As can be seen in Figure 2.4, when the 
previous trial was congruent, there was a significant stimulus-congruency 
effect, t(19) = -3.21, p < .01. This difference between CO and SI trials 
disappeared after an SI trial, t(19) < 1 and after an RI trial, t(19) < 1.  
 
Response congruency  
 In most studies using the flanker task, effects of response congruency 
are investigated by comparing CO trials with RI trials. Doing so, we clearly 
find a conflict adaptation pattern. The 2 (trial n: CO vs. RI) x 3 (trial n-1: CO 
vs. SI vs. RI) interaction was significant, F(2,18) = 5.17, p < .01, indicating that 
the difference between CO and RI trials was smaller after incongruent trials. 
The response congruency effect became smaller after SI trials, F(1,19) = 6.26, 
p < .05, and after RI trials, F(1,19) = 6.52, p < .05. Whether the previous trial 
was SI or RI did not matter, F(1,19) < 1. However, the difference between CO 
and RI is a combined effect of stimulus and response conflict. The mere 
response conflict is the difference between SI and RI. Therefore, we 
performed another 2 (trial n: SI vs. RI) x 3 (trial n-1: CO vs. SI vs. RI) 
repeated measures MANOVA. There was a main effect of congruency on 
trial n, F(1,19) = 99.82, p < .001, and also a main effect of the congruency of 
the previous trial, F(1,18) = 5.07, p < .05. Most importantly, the interaction 
was not significant, F(2,18) < 1, indicating that the mere response conflict 
was not influenced by the congruency of the previous trial. 
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Figure 2.4: Reaction times for the different types of stimuli on trial n as a function 
of the congruency of trial n-1 (congruent, CO; stimulus incongruent, SI; response 
incongruent, RI). 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
 The present study investigated whether conflict adaptations in terms of 
smaller congruency effects after incongruent trials can be found for complete 
alternations of all stimulus- and response-related features and whether these 
adjustments are restricted to stimulus-response conflict. Most studies 
focused on response conflict and results of these studies are generally 
twofold. First of all, neuroimaging data suggested the existence of conflict 
monitoring with a distinction between an evaluation device, the ACC, and a 
regulative device, the DLPC. When a response conflict is detected via the 
ACC, top-down adjustments are made. Secondly, these top-down 
adjustments are observed in behavioural data. After a response incongruent 
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trial, the response congruency effect decreases or even disappears (e.g., 
Gratton et al., 1992; Botvinick et al., 1999). This sequential effect is assumed 
to be evidence for the conflict monitoring theory. 
 Although the ACC is only activated when a response conflict is present, 
several studies demonstrated that the DLPC was also active in case of a 
stimulus-stimulus conflict (e.g., Milham et al., 2001; Liu et al., 2004). Based 
on this activation in prefrontal regions, it was hypothesized that top-down 
adjustments were made after a stimulus conflict, resulting in a smaller 
stimulus congruency effect on the next trial, similarly to the top-down 
adjustments made after an RI trial. In order to find direct behavioural 
evidence for this hypothesis, both stimulus-stimulus and stimulus-response 
conflict were included in the present study. Moreover, by using a 6-to-3 
mapping, we were able to exclude all possible repetitions of stimulus- and 
response-related features, since it was argued by e.g., Mayr et al. (2003), that 
the conflict monitoring pattern is mainly due to stimulus-response 
repetitions. By excluding all kind of repetitions, this possible confound is 
avoided and any adaptations found in the present study are likely to be top-
down adjustments. The question was whether there was an effect of the 
congruency of trial on the congruency effect in the current trial and whether 
this effect was conflict specific or not. 
 The results of the present study are threefold. First and most 
importantly, we observed the conflict adaptation pattern or the so-called 
Gratton-effect when all kinds of stimulus- and response related repetitions 
were excluded, which contradicts the results of Mayr et al. (2003). Secondly, 
the sequential analyses revealed conflict monitoring for stimulus 
congruency. After an SI trial, the stimulus congruency effect disappeared 
completely, providing direct behavioural evidence for conflict monitoring 
after SI trials. This is consistent with the finding that prefrontal regions 
associated with top-down adjustments after response conflict, such as the 
DLPC, are also activated in SI trials. Since one has always to be careful in 
drawing conclusions from overlapping brain areas in different tasks or 
different types of trials, the present study provides further evidence for the 
notion of cognitive control in different conflict situations.  
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 A third finding of the present study concerns the reduction of stimulus 
interference after both SI and RI trials. This is actually not very surprising 
since RI trials are also stimulus incongruent. A bit more puzzling is the 
observation that the mere response conflict (SI-RI) does not change after an 
RI trial. When one compares RI trials with CO trials - which is typically done 
when conflict adaptations in the flanker task are investigated - the overall 
response congruency effect decreases after both SI and RI trials. But when 
the overall response conflict is divided into stimulus and response conflict, 
our data suggest that there was no extra adaptation for the mere response 
congruency effect after RI trials, contrary to the stimulus conflict that was 
absent after SI and RI trials.  
 This finding may seem quite odd because in previous studies response 
incongruent trials did lead to conflict monitoring, resulting in a smaller 
response congruency on the next trial (e.g., Kerns et al., 2004). However, a 
possible explanation is that in the present study, two different types of 
conflict were intermixed. This has two important consequences. First, SI 
trials would not benefit of adjustments made after an RI if these adjustments 
were made as a function of the response conflict. Secondly, in our study the 
probability that an RI trial is followed by another RI trial is only 1/3, 
whereas in other studies, this probability is usually 1/2. But the probability 
that an incongruent trial (SI or RI) is followed by another incongruent trial is 
2/3. Therefore, it seems beneficial to make after both types of conflict the 
same top-down adaptations as a function of the common feature of different 
co-occurring types of conflict and this could explain why no difference was 
found between SI and RI trials. Another possibility might be that in the 
present study, arbitrary response mappings were used. Most of the previous 
studies that investigated conflict monitoring used overlearned stimulus-
response mappings (e.g., responding to the direction of an arrow). By using 
more complex stimulus-response mappings, like in the present study, it 
could be the case that participants deal at a different way with the response 
conflict by focussing more on the stimulus processing. Future research is 
needed here.  
 This hypothesis of similar adjustments for different -but intermixed- 
types of conflict is in line with the proposal of Milham et al. (2001). They 
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argued that after the detection of a conflict, attention is drawn to the 
processing of task-relevant information. In a flanker task, this implies that 
the processing of the target should be improved. Since both stimulus and 
response congruency occur during - although at different stages - processing 
of the target, behavioural adjustments are possibly to be similar after the two 
types of conflict. Again, if it is the case that the same adjustments are made 
after SI trials and RI trials, one expects no interaction between the 
congruency of trial n-1 and the congruency of trial n when one compares SI 
and RI trials. Note that we do not argue it is not possible that adjustments 
are made as a function of response congruency in other designs. However, 
the data of the present study suggest that when different types of conflict are 
combined in a flanker task and by using an arbitrary stimulus-response 
mapping, this was not the case. 
 Thus, in the present study, we found a conflict monitoring pattern for 
incongruent trials. All types of stimulus- and response-related repetitions 
were excluded and therefore, it seems less likely that the pattern is induced 
by bottom-up repetition effects. Although we must keep in mind that some 
effects may be task-specific, we demonstrated that at least under certain 
conditions, top-down behavioural adjustments are made after incongruent 
trials, resulting in a smaller congruency effect on the next trial. Secondly, the 
present study demonstrates that conflict monitoring is not restricted to 
conflict at a response level. Although it is still not clear from neuroimaging 
studies which specific regions are associated with conflict detection in an SI 
trial, both behavioural studies, like the present one, and imaging data 
support the hypothesis that after a stimulus-stimulus conflict behavioural 
adaptations are made, resulting in an adaptation of the stimulus congruency 
effect. A final important observation is the fact that only the stimulus conflict 
is reduced whereas the mere response conflict does not decrease after 
incongruent trials, probably due to the co-occurrence of different types of 
conflict.   
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APPENDIX 
 
 When one wants to investigate the amount of cognitive control in the 
flanker task, one has to take into account that lower-level repetition effects 
can explain at least part of the conflict-monitoring pattern (see e.g., Mayr et 
al., 2003). The most obvious solution for this problem is the elimination of all 
possible repetitions of stimulus features. Therefore, in the present study all 
target, distractor and response repetitions will be excluded; the distractor of 
trial n-1 may not be the target of trial n, the target of trial n-1 may also not 
become the distractor on trial n and finally, the response associated with the 
distractor of train n-1 may not be the response on trial n.  
 With regard to the effects of stimulus congruency, this will lead to some 
problems in a typical 4-to-2 design with 4 stimuli (e.g., L1, L2, R1, and R2) 
and 2 responses (e.g., Left & Right). However, in a sequential design there 
are two transitions that do not allow the exclusion of all kind of repetitions 
effects. First, after an SI trial, it is not possible to have an RI trial. For 
example, after the SI trial 'L1 L2 L1', all RI trials are excluded because at least 
one stimulus feature will be repeated ('R1 L1 R1'; 'R1 L2 R1'; 'R2 L1 R2'; 'R2 
L2 R2'; 'L1 R1 L1'; 'L2 R1 L2'; 'L1 R2 L1'; 'L2 R2 L2'). The same holds for RI 
trials followed by SI trials.  
 This problem is avoided when one uses 6 stimuli (L1, L2, M1, M2, R1, 
and R2) and 3 responses (e.g., Left, Middle, and Right). With such a design, 
it is possible to have RI trials without any repetitions after an SI trial and 
reversely, to have SI trials after an RI trial (e.g., 'M1 R1 M1' vs. 'L1 L2 L1').  
  
 

 
CHAPTER 3  
THE INFLUENCE OF DIFFERENT TYPES  
OF COMPATIBILITY  
ON STOP SIGNAL INHIBITION 
 
 In the previous chapter, we argued that selective suppression can occur 
at different processing stages, dependent on the type of conflict. Moreover, 
we found that the selective suppression of irrelevant stimulus features at 
different processing stages interacts with response inhibition in the stop 
signal task. The implications are twofold. First, these results provide further 
behavioural evidence for common mechanisms in different inhibitory tasks. 
Secondly, we suggest that the activation-suppression hypothesis needs to be 
adjusted, since Ridderinkhof (Ridderinkhof, Band, & Logan, 1999; 
Ridderinkhof, 2002a) explicitly stressed the fact that an incorrect response 
becomes inhibited, whereas our results demonstrated that irrelevant 
stimulus features that are not response related can also become inhibited. 
However, there remains one important unsolved problem before we can 
accept the hypothesis that selective suppression, as conceptualized within 
the activation-suppression hypothesis, interferes with stop signal inhibition. 
 As explained before in Chapter 2, the activation-suppression hypothesis 
is clearly based on the dual-route model, and it assumes that an incorrect 
response becomes inhibited. So far, we used different interference tasks 
where the conflict is due to the presentation of irrelevant distractors. These 
tasks are often labeled as stimulus congruency tasks. But another task that is 
also often used in the context of the dual-route model is the Simon task (cfr. 
infra for a more detailed description of the task). This task is assumed to be 
an example of a stimulus-compatibility task, and the major difference with 
tasks like the flanker task is that there is no presentation of a distractor. On 
the contrary, the conflict is due to the location of the relevant stimulus, 
resulting in an overlap with the response set and the stimulus location.  
 So far we demonstrated that in stimulus congruency tasks like the 
flanker task, selective suppression and response inhibition interact. Of 
course, if the interaction is indeed due to the fact that there is an active 
mechanism that suppresses the irrelevant stimulus features at different 
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processing stages and in different conflict tasks, then we should be able to 
demonstrate that stopping responses should take longer in incompatible 
Simon trials, compared to compatible Simon trials. 
 In other words, where we wanted to demonstrate in Chapter 2 that the 
conflict did not need to be situated at a response related processing stage, 
we will use the reverse logic in the present chapter. By demonstrating that 
there is also an interaction between selective suppression of an incorrect 
response in stimulus-response compatibility and stop signal inhibition, we 
can provide further evidence for common mechanisms in different 
inhibitory tasks. By using the Simon task, we can also try to tackle another 
problem or at least another gap in the research about the relation between 
stop signal inhibition and other forms of inhibition. Several researchers 
found no effect of a pure stimulus-response compatibility task –in which the 
conflict is presumably also situated at a response stage– (cfr. infra) on stop 
signal inhibition (Logan, 1981; Logan & Irwin, 2000; van den Wildenberg & 
van der Molen, 2004). Given the findings with for example the flanker task, 
this may seem quite odd and we will try to offer an explanation for the 
different results. 
 To summarize, in next study the crucial question will be whether 
stimulus-response compatibility in the Simon task can have an effect on stop 
signal inhibition. If this is not the case, we will probably need to reject or at 
least re-interpret our assumption that selective suppression in conflict or 
interference tasks interact with stop signal inhibition. 
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EFFECTS OF STIMULUS-STIMULUS COMPATIBILITY 
AND STIMULUS-RESPONSE COMPATIBILITY  
ON RESPONSE INHIBITION13,14 
 
Previous studies demonstrated that interference control in stimulus-stimulus 
compatibility tasks slowed down stopping in the stop signal task (e.g., Kramer, 
Humphrey, Larish, Logan and Strayer, 1994). In the present study, the impact of 
stimulus-stimulus compatibility and stimulus-response compatibility on response 
inhibition is further investigated. In Experiment 1, the stop signal task was combined 
with a traditional horizontal Simon task and with a vertical variant. For both 
dimensions, stopping responses was prolonged in incompatible trials, but only when 
the previous trial was compatible. In Experiment 2, the Simon task was combined 
with a spatial Stroop task in order to compare the effects of stimulus-stimulus and 
stimulus-response compatibility. The results demonstrated that both types of 
compatibility influenced stopping in a similar way. These findings are in favor of the 
hypothesis that response inhibition in the stop signal task and interference control in 
conflict tasks rely on similar mechanisms. 
 
                                                          
13 Verbruggen, F., Liefooghe, B., Notebaert, W., & Vandierendonck, A. (in press). The 
effects of stimulus-stimulus compatibility and stimulus-response compatibility on 
response inhibition. Acta Psychologica.  
14 We would like to thank Wery van den Wildenberg and Richard Ridderinkhof for 
their useful comments on a previous version of this manuscript. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 In the study of selective attention, conflict tasks have always proven to 
be useful instruments. In a typical conflict task, like the Stroop, flanker and 
Simon task, the relevant stimulus feature is accompanied with irrelevant 
distracting information. In general, these conflict tasks do not only show that 
people are capable of dealing with the interference at different stages of 
processing caused by the distracting information, but also that this 
interference is associated with a cost, as measured by reaction time (RT) 
differences. Numerous studies already focused on a better understanding of 
how this interference arises and what the consequences are for behaviour. In 
this introduction, we will focus on two frequently used conflict tasks: The 
Eriksen flanker task (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974) and the Simon task (Craft & 
Simon, 1970). In a flanker task, the target stimulus (e.g., the letter 'K') is 
flanked by distractors (e.g., the letter 'H'). The difference between 
compatible and incompatible trials15 in the flanker task is generally 
attributed to interference at (at least) two different processing stages. First, 
even though physically different targets and distractors were mapped onto 
the same response alternative, an RT difference is often found (e.g., Eriksen 
& Eriksen, 1979; Verbruggen, Liefooghe, & Vandierendonck, in press a). 
Secondly, besides this effect of stimulus compatibility (in the literature, this 
effect is called stimulus-stimulus congruency or SSC), an additional effect of 
response compatibility is observed. Physically different distractors that lead 
to a different response cause more interference compared to dissimilar 
flankers that are associated with the same response as the target.  
 Alternatively, in the Simon task, the conflict is not induced by the 
presentation of irrelevant distractors. In a traditional Simon task (e.g., Craft 
& Simon, 1970), participants have to respond to a relevant stimulus-feature 
(e.g., the color or the shape of the stimulus) and the position of the stimulus 
                                                          
15 For the ease of use, we will also use the terms ‘compatible’ and ‘incompatible’ 
(instead of congruent and incongruent) for the description of the interference effect 
in the flanker task. 
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is always irrelevant. Thus, there is an overlap between the irrelevant 
stimulus feature - the position of the stimulus - and the response set. When 
the stimulus position corresponds with the response side (e.g., left key press 
to a stimulus that is presented on the left of the screen), responses are 
typically faster compared to trials where there is a mismatch between 
stimulus position and response side.  
 These compatibility effects in the flanker task and Simon task can easily 
be interpreted in terms of a dual-route hypothesis (De Jong, Liang, & 
Lauber, 1994; Kornblum, Hasbroucq, & Osman, 1990; Ridderinkhof, 1997; 
Ridderinkhof, van der Molen, & Bashore, 1995). Generally, in a dual-route 
model, the distinction is made between a direct and a controlled route. The 
relevant stimulus information is assumed to be processed via the controlled 
route, which is relatively slow since responses are assigned via an arbitrary 
response mapping. Irrelevant information on the other hand, is processed in 
a fast and automatic way via the direct route, based on existing stimulus-
response links. This implies that response codes are pre-activated first via 
the direct route. When this response code corresponds to the required 
response (i.e., compatible trials), responses to the stimulus will be faster 
compared to trials where a different response code is pre-activated.  
 For example, for an arrow version of the flanker task, it is assumed that 
the relevant target arrow is processed via a controlled route and activates 
the response according to the mapping rule (Ridderinkhof et al., 1995). Via 
an automatic route, the flanking arrows activate a second response. In case 
of incompatible flankers, this second response will be different from the 
response to the target. In other words, there will be a conflict between those 
two responses at the response-production stage. This response conflict needs 
to be resolved and delays responding. The same principle holds for the 
stimulus-response compatibility (SRC) effect in the Simon task. The relevant 
stimulus feature (e.g., color of the stimulus) in the Simon task is processed 
via a controlled route and activates the correct response. Via the automatic 
route, a second response code is activated, due to the position of the 
stimulus. Again, this pre-activation of a response code will lead to faster 
responses in case of compatible trials, compared to incompatible trials. Thus, 
in both tasks, there is a conflict due to the activation of incorrect responses. 
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This conflict needs to be resolved and Ridderinkhof (2002) proposed the 
activation-suppression hypothesis, suggesting that the automatic activation 
of the incorrect response is selectively suppressed by a central inhibitory 
mechanism. Whereas the irrelevant response code is the result of an 
automatic activation, the suppression of this response is assumed to be an 
externally imposed active process. This active process takes time and this 
can explain why participants respond slower on incompatible trials. 
Ridderinkhof (2002) found support for this suppression mechanism in the 
observation that the Simon effect was strongest for fast responses. He 
assumed that these responses occurred before the suppression occurred.  
 Besides models and studies that focused on the in-depth investigation 
of separate conflict tasks, other studies combined inhibitory paradigms in 
order to understand interference (e.g., Hommel, 1997; Vivas & Fuentes, 
2001). The idea is that interactions between tasks that are assumed to reflect 
some kind of inhibition or interference control, could tell us something more 
about the processes in different tasks. In line with this kind of studies, in the 
present study we investigate the relation between interference control in 
different congruency tasks on the one hand, and stopping responses on the 
other hand. 
 A widely used paradigm to investigate response inhibition is the stop 
signal paradigm (Lappin & Eriksen, 1966; Logan & Cowan, 1984). In its most 
frequent form, auditory stop signals are occasionally presented during a 
choice reaction time (CRT) task with visual stimuli. The stop signal informs 
participants that they have to withhold their response. When the stop signal 
is presented shortly after stimulus presentation, participants can easily 
suppress their response (i.e., signal-inhibit trials). Alternatively, when the 
stop signal is presented near the execution of the response, participants are 
no longer capable of withholding their response (i.e., signal-respond trials). 
To explain these data, a horse race model was proposed with two processes: 
A go process and a stop process (Logan et al., 1984). The finishing times of 
both processes are assumed to be stochastically independent. Based on the 
assumptions of the horse race model, one can estimate the latency of the 
covert stopping process: The stop signal reaction time (SSRT). This 
measurement has proven its usefulness by the widespread use of the 
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paradigm (for a review, see Logan, 1994). Also, simulations by Band, van der 
Molen and Logan (2003) showed that the SSRT can be reliably estimated 
under specified experimental and theoretical conditions. 
 Interestingly, several authors demonstrated that response inhibition in 
the stop signal task is influenced by interference control at different stages of 
processing in different versions of the Eriksen flanker task. Kramer, 
Humphrey, Larish, Logan, and Strayer (1994) and Ridderinkhof, Band and 
Logan (1999), who used the arrow version of the flanker task that was 
described above, found that SSRTs were longer for incompatible than for 
compatible trials. Whereas Kramer et al. (1994) suggested that stopping 
more than one response in case of an incompatible trial caused this SSRT 
increase, Ridderinkhof et al. (1999) attributed this delay in stopping to the 
interference control in the flanker task. The latter authors suggested that in 
case of an incompatible trial, the incorrect response should be suppressed 
and that this response suppression interacted with the response inhibition in 
the stop signal task. In other words, the active suppression mechanism, as 
suggested by Ridderinkhof (2002), and the stopping of responses, may rely 
on a common mechanism or at least common resources and for that reason 
they interact in behaviour (Ridderinkhof et al., 1999).  
 In two follow-up studies, Verbruggen, Liefooghe and Vandierendonck 
(2004; in press a) investigated whether incorrect response activation was a 
necessary factor for the interaction between the flanker task and the stop 
signal task. It was demonstrated that stimulus-stimulus interference at more 
central processing stages in both flanker and Stroop task (i.e., interference 
caused by categorically related information) interacts with the stopping of 
responses in the stop signal task (Verbruggen et al., 2004). Moreover, 
interference at early processing stages in a flanker task (i.e., interference 
caused by a non-identical stimulus mapped on the same response) also 
resulted in longer SSRTs (Verbruggen et al., in press a). These findings 
suggest that interference control at different processing stages interacts with 
stopping, even without the activation of an incorrect response. In other 
words, the suppression of irrelevant stimulus information interacts with 
stopping responses, irrespective whether this irrelevant information is 
response related or not.  
104      CHAPTER 3 
 In the present paper, the interaction between compatibility tasks and the 
stop signal task will be further investigated by means of the Simon task. It 
was suggested that in the Simon task, active suppression is needed to 
resolve the conflict (Ridderinkhof, 2002a; see also Burle, Possamaï, Vidal, 
Bonnet & Hasbroucq, 2002). Given the similarities with the flanker task, it 
seems reasonable to assume that in a Simon task stopping would also be 
prolonged when the location of the stimulus is incompatible with the 
response side. However, contrary to the findings with the flanker tasks 
(Kramer et al., 1994; Ridderinkhof et al., 1999; Verbruggen et al., 2004, in 
press a), response inhibition in the stop signal task does not seem to interact 
with a pure stimulus-response compatibility (SRC) task. In a pure SRC task 
(e.g., press left when the arrow is pointing to the right), participants have to 
suppress overlearned responses to the stimuli. The compatibility effect - or 
the SRC effect proper - is due to an overlap between the relevant stimulus 
feature (i.e., the direction of the arrow) and the response set (e.g., left- and 
right-handed responses). Although van den Wildenberg and van der Molen 
(2004) found a compatibility effect on the CRTs on no-signal trials, this effect 
was not reflected in the SSRTs. Logan and Irwin (2000) also found no 
prolongation of the SSRTs with an incompatible response mapping. In 
addition, their data lacked a compatibility effect for responses to centrally 
presented arrows. In the light of the findings with the flanker task, this 
seems quite odd and the question will be whether the same null-results are 
found with the Simon task.  
 In sum, in the Simon task, the same inhibitory mechanism as in the 
arrow version of the flanker task is suggested (Ridderinkhof, 2002a). 
Therefore, if the suppression mechanism is indeed the same in both types of 
tasks, one would expect an interaction between the stop signal task and 
active suppression in the Simon task. On the other hand, the Simon task is 
an example of an SRC task and results with the pure SRC tasks, suggests 
that there is no interaction between SRC effects and stopping responses. In 
Experiment 1, the traditional horizontal Simon task was used (e.g., Craft & 
Simon, 1970), together with its vertical alternative in a between-subjects 
design. This extra vertical dimension was incorporated to provide an 
immediate extension of the findings with the traditional horizontal Simon 
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task. The main question was whether response stopping on incompatible 
trials was prolonged compared to compatible trials. Furthermore, it will 
provide a basis to compare the effects of stimulus and response 
compatibility on stopping responses in Experiment 2.  
 
EXPERIMENT 1 
 
METHOD 
 
Participants  
 Forty-eight first-year psychology students at Ghent University 
(Belgium) participated for course requirements and credits. All participants 
had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and all were naive as to the 
purpose of the experiment. Twenty-four participants (21 females and 3 
males) did the experiment with a horizontal Simon task and twenty-four 
participants (18 females and 6 males) did the experiment with a vertical 
Simon task. One participant who participated in the experiment with the 
vertical Simon task was excluded from further data-analysis because of 
negative SSRTs. 
 
Apparatus and signals  
 The experiment was run on a Pentium 4 PC running Tscope (Stevens, 
Lammertyn, Verbruggen, & Vandierendonck, in press). Stimuli were 
presented on a 17-inch monitor placed at a distance of 60 cm in front of the 
participants. The stimuli were a red or green filled circle with a radius of 
0.5°. In the horizontal Simon task, the stimuli were presented at the left or 
the right of the centre of the screen with a distance of approximately 2.5°. In 
the vertical Simon task, the colored circles were presented above or below 
the centre of the screen, also with a distance of 2.5°. Responses were 
collected via a response box connected to the parallel port of the PC. There 
was a distance of 15 cm between the two buttons. In the vertical Simon task, 
the response boxes were turned 90 degrees. Doing so, the left and right 
response button became the upper and lower button and participants were 
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instructed to place their dominant hand above their non-dominant hand. 
Occasionally, a loud and clear auditory stop signal (750Hz, 50 dB, 75 ms) 
was presented through closed headphones (Sennheiser HD 265-1) shortly 
after the stimulus onset in the CRT task.  
 
Tasks and Procedure  
 The CRT task was to react to the color of the stimulus. In the horizontal 
Simon task, the color was mapped on the index finger of the left- and right 
hand. In the vertical variant, the color was mapped on the index finger of the 
upper- and lower hand (e.g., for a red circle, press the upper button). In both 
variants of the Simon task, the mapping was counterbalanced across 
participants. Trials belonged to two different conditions: Stimulus-Response 
Compatible (SRC; when the position of the stimulus corresponds to the side 
of the response) and Stimulus-Response Incompatible (SRI; when there is a 
mismatch between the response side and the position of the stimulus). The 
two types of stimuli occurred with equal probability. Each trial started with 
the presentation of a white fixation cross (1.5° x 1.5°) in the centre of the 
screen, for 500 ms. The stimuli were presented for 150 ms and required a 
response within 1,500 ms. When the stop signal inhibition succeeded, the 
trial also ended after 1,500 ms. The next trial was presented 1,000 ms after 
the response. 
 The experiment consisted of two parts, one with and one without 
occasional presentation of stop signals. Each part started with a practice 
phase, followed by the experimental phase. The order of the parts was 
counterbalanced across participants. Participants received oral instructions. 
During the practice phase, participants also received immediate feedback. 
The screen colored red for 100 ms after an error and colored orange when 
participants responded after a stop signal was presented. During the 
experiment, participants received feedback at the end of each block only: 
The number of errors made during the block and the mean CRT. In the 
condition with stop signals, the mean probability of stopping was also 
presented. 
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 In the part without stop signals, there was one practice block of 20 trials 
and two experimental blocks of 80 trials. The part with stop signals consisted 
of one practice block of 40 trials and eight experimental blocks of 80 trials. 
On a random selection of 30% of the trials, a stop signal was presented 
(signal trials). This resulted in 96 stop trials for the two types of stimuli. The 
stop signal delay was initially set at 250 ms and continuously adjusted 
according to separate staircase tracking procedures (Levitt, 1970) for each 
type of stimulus to obtain a probability of stopping of .50. Each time a 
participant responded to the stimulus in presence of a stop signal, the stop 
signal delay (SSD) decreased with 50 ms. On the other hand, when inhibition 
succeeded, the SSD increased with 50 ms. Based on the assumptions of the 
horse-race model, SSRT can now be calculated by simply subtracting 'mean 
SSD' from the untrimmed 'mean CRT' (Logan, 1994; Logan, Schachar & 
Tannock, 1997). The instructions emphasized both speed and accuracy. 
Furthermore, to avoid waiting strategies, participants were informed about 
the tracking procedure and they were told that the probability of stopping 
would approximate .50, irrespective of whether they were postponing their 
response or not. The duration of the whole experiment approximated 45 
minutes. 
 
RESULTS & DISCUSSION 
 
 CRT data of trials without stop signal presentation (no-signal trials) 
were subjected to a separate within-participant trimming procedure for each 
type of stimulus. Mean CRTs of correct trials were calculated after removal 
of outlying CRTs; i.e., CRTs longer than 2.5 standard deviations above the 
mean were discarded from data analysis. This resulted in a data reduction of 
2.2%. Mean error percentage was 2.8%. The error data were not further 
analyzed. 
 
No-signal trials 
 The no-signal data are presented in Table 3.1. CRTs were analyzed by 
means of an ANOVA with one between-subjects variable (dimension: 
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Horizontal vs. vertical) and two within-subjects variables: (1) block type 
(blocks with vs. blocks without occasional presentation of stop signals) and 
(2) compatibility (SRC vs. SRI). Main effects were found for both the block 
type and the compatibility. Participants were faster when no stop signals 
could occur during the block, F(1,45) = 76.75, p < .001, and when the trials 
were stimulus-response compatible, F(1,45) = 78.56, p < .001. The interaction 
between both main effects was also significant, F(1,45) = 27.82, p < .001, 
indicating that the compatibility effect was bigger in the blocks without stop 
signals. Besides these effects of the within-subjects variables, there was also a 
main effect of the dimension. Participants were generally faster in the 
horizontal Simon task, F(1,45) = 4.39, p < .05. This effect interacted also 
significantly with the effect of compatibility, F(1,45) = 5.04, p < .05, 
suggesting that the compatibility effect was more pronounced on the vertical 
dimension (33 ms vs. 20 ms). The type of task did not interact with the effect 
of block type, F(1,45) < 1. The three-way interaction was also not significant. 
Finally, post-hoc two tailed t-tests revealed that in the horizontal Simon task, 
the compatibility effect was present in both conditions, t(23) = -2.63, p < .05 
with, and t(23) = -4.98, p < .001, without stop signals. Similar results were 
found in the vertical variant. The Simon effect was present in both the blocks 
with, t(22) = -6.04, p < .001, and without stop signal, t(22) = -8.45, p < .001. 
  
Table 3.1: Reaction times (SDs in parentheses) of compatible (SRC) and 
incompatible (SRI) trials for both blocks with and without stop signals (S-S) in 
Experiment 1. 
 
 Horizontal Simon task Vertical Simon task 
 SRC SRI SRC SRI 
Without S-S 355 (33) 383 (28) 380 (59) 421 (56) 
With S-S 459 (70) 471 (66) 483 (89) 508 (83) 
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Signal trials 
 Signal data were analyzed by means of a repeated measures ANOVA 
with compatibility as within-subjects variable and dimension of the Simon 
task as between-subjects variable. The results are presented in Table 3.2. 
First, for signal-respond trials a compatibility effect was found, F(1,45) = 
86.25, p < .001. There was no main effect of the dimension, F(1,45) < 1, nor an 
interaction between the dimension and the Simon effect, F(1,45) = 1.70, p = 
.19. Secondly, the probability of responding given a stop signal did not differ 
between compatible and incompatible trials, F(1,45) < 1. The probability of 
responding was a bit higher in the horizontal task, F(1,45) = 5.42, p < .05, but 
this effect of dimension did not interact with the Simon effect, F(1,45) < 1. 
Third, there was a significant effect of compatibility on SSDs, F(1,45) = 10.95, 
p < .01. SSDs were not influenced by dimension, F(1,45) = 1.69, p = .20. The 
interaction was also not significant, F(1,45) = 1.20, p = .28. Finally, the SSRTs 
were analyzed. There were no effects of compatibility or the dimension, both 
F-values < 1. There was also no interaction, F(1,45) < 1.  
 
Table 3.2: Mean stop signal reaction times (SSRTall), stop signal reaction times 
after compatible trials (SSRTSRC), stop signal reaction times after incompatible 
trials (SSRTSRI), mean probabilities of responding given a stop signal (P|resp), 
mean stop signal delay (SSD), and mean observed signal-respond RTs (SRT) in 
Experiment 1 for compatible (SRC) and incompatible (SRI) trials. 
 
 Horizontal Simon task Vertical Simon task 
 SRC SRI SRC SRI 
SRT 407 (58) 432 (55) 418 (78) 451 (71) 
SSRTall 180 (54) 181 (62) 164 (39) 169 (47) 
SSRTSRC 174 (51) 185 (60) 157 (40) 171 (47) 
SSRTSRI 185 (58) 175 (67) 169 (42) 167 (50) 
P|resp (%) 51 (3.2) 51 (4.7) 49 (1.7) 49 (1.5) 
SSD 287 (105) 296 (107) 322 (111) 341 (95) 
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Discussion 
 On no-signal trials, a compatibility effect was found for both 
dimensions of the Simon task. Also, this compatibility effect was bigger in 
the blocks were no stop signals could occur. This is probably due to the fact 
that in the no-stop signal condition responses were faster. After all, 
participants tend to slow down their responses when stop signals could 
occur (Logan, 1994) and it is a common finding in the literature about the 
Simon task that with increasing RT, the Simon effect decreases (e.g., 
Hommel, 1993; Simon, Acosta, Mewaldt, & Speidel, 1976) This interaction 
between block type and the Simon effect was not influenced by the 
dimension. Furthermore, participants were faster in the horizontal Simon 
task (417ms vs. 448 ms), but on the other hand, the Simon effect was smaller 
with this dimension in comparison with the vertical dimension. This 
interaction seems to suggest that the vertical variant of the Simon task is not 
just a slower version of the traditional horizontal version of the task. 
Moreover, the horizontal compatibility effect is usually stronger compared 
to the vertical effect when the stimulus location could vary across the 
vertical and horizontal dimension (see e.g., Hommel, 1996; Rubichi, 
Nicoletti, & Umilta, 2005; Proctor & Vu, 2002). Thus, the data of the 
Experiment 1 seem to suggest that this stronger horizontal Simon effect only 
holds when both dimension are combined together.  
 On signal trials, there was a Simon effect when participants responded 
in spite of the presentation of a stop signal. This is not surprising, since it 
was suggested that these signal-respond trials generally correspond to the 
faster part of the no-signal CRT curve (Logan, 1994). A similar compatibility 
effect was found for SSDs. But most importantly, there was generally no 
influence of compatibility on response inhibition, indicated by comparable 
SSRTs for compatible and incompatible trials. However, as will be 
demonstrated in the next paragraphs, it may be that this lack of interaction is 
influenced by the trial sequence in the Simon task. 
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SEQUENTIAL ANALYSIS 
 
 In Experiment 1, stopping performance was not influenced by the 
compatibility of the trial. Given the findings in the flanker task, this may 
seem quite odd. However, the trial sequence may have influenced this 
interaction. After all, in conflict tasks, such as the flanker task and the Simon 
task, it is a common finding that the compatibility effect is smaller or even 
absent after an incompatible trial (e.g., Gratton, Coles, & Donchin, 1992). 
There are two main explanations for the sequential effect. First, it was 
suggested that this finding is evidence for top-down conflict monitoring. 
After an incompatible trial, performance would be adjusted in order to 
overcome the compatibility effect on the next trial (e.g., Gratton et al., 1992; 
Botvinick, Nystrom, Fissell, Carter, & Cohen, 1999; Stürmer, Leuthold, 
Soetens, Schröter, & Sommer, 2002). On the other hand, a bottom-up 
explanation was suggested by several authors (Hommel, Proctor & Vu, 2004; 
Mayr, Awh, & Laurey, 2003; Notebaert, Soetens & Melis, 2001). For example, 
Hommel et al. (2004) argued that conflict adaptation pattern in the Simon 
task is due to the sequence of specific stimulus-response features, without 
the need for active top-down adjustments.  
 For the purpose of the present paper, the finding that there is no Simon 
effect after an incompatible trial may have important implications. 
Therefore, in order to investigate whether the compatibility of the previous 
trial could have influenced the interaction between stopping responses and 
the compatibility of the current trial, we will perform sequential analyses for 
both no-signal data and signal data. For CRT data, presented in Table 3.3, a 
repeated measures ANOVA was performed with one between variable 
(dimension) and three within-subjects variables: (1) compatibility of the trial 
n, (2) compatibility of trial n-1, and (3) the block type (i.e., blocks with vs. 
blocks without occasional stop signal presentation). The reported analyses 
are restricted to the effects related to the compatibility of the previous trial. 
First, we found a trend for the effect of trial n-1, F(1,45) = 3.19, p = .08. This 
effect of compatibility of trial n-1 interacted with the Simon effect on trial n, 
F(1,45) = 110.42, p < .001, suggesting that the Simon effect was more 
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pronounced after a compatible trial. The three-way interaction with block 
type was also significant, F(1,45) = 14.74, p < .01, indicating that the 
sequential modulation was stronger in the blocks with stop signals. None of 
these effects on stop signal inhibition was influenced significantly by the 
dimension of the Simon task (all F-values were smaller than F(1,45) = 1.09, p 
= .30).  
 In order to investigate the sequential modulation of the Simon effect in 
SSRTs, mean CRTs of no-signal trials and mean SSDs were calculated for 
trials following compatible and incompatible trials separately.16 
Interestingly, for SSRTs the same interaction between compatibility of trial n 
and trial n-1 as in no-signal data was found, F(1,45) = 12.06, p < .01. None of 
the analyses concerning the effect of dimension reached significance, all F-
values < 1. Therefore, both dimensions were combined for subsequent 
analyses. After an incompatible trial, there was no effect of SRC on SSRT 
[177 ms vs. 171 ms, t(47) = 1.24, p = .22]. However, after a compatible trial, a 
significant Simon effect was found, [166 ms vs. 178 ms, t(47) = -3.00, p = .01].  
 This suggests that active suppression of the incorrect response and stop 
signal inhibition interact in the Simon task, but only when the previous trial 
was stimulus-response compatible. In other words, the results of the 
sequential analysis demonstrated that not only the CRTs are influenced by 
the compatibility of the previous trial, but that also the SSRTs are influenced, 
indicating that stopping responses on an incompatible trial is only 
prolonged when the previous trial was compatible. This is probably due to 
the fact that on the one hand, after an incompatible trial, there is no 
difference between compatible and incompatible trials, as demonstrated by 
the serial analyses for CRTs. On the other hand, after a compatible trial, 
incompatible trials are slower than compatible trials, due to the interference. 
                                                          
16 Probability of stopping was still .51 after both types of trials. Moreover, there were 
approximately 48 stop signal trials for both compatible and incompatible stimuli 
when the compatibility of the previous trial was taken into account (96 stop trials for 
both types, divided by 2 since there was a chance of .50 that the previous trial was for 
example compatible). Therefore, SSRTmean could still be estimated reliably. 
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Based on the activation-suppression hypothesis of Ridderinkhof (2002), this 
interference or conflict calls for a suppression of the irrelevant response, and 
it is this active suppression that interacts with the stopping of responses in 
the stop signal task.  
 
Table 3.3: Reaction times (SDs in parentheses) of compatible and incompatible 
trials in function of the compatibility of the previous trial for both blocks with and 
without stop signals (S-S) in Experiment 1 (C-C: compatible-compatible; C-IC: 
compatible-incompatible; IC-C: incompatible-compatible; IC-IC: incompatible-
incompatible; C-CE: compatibility effect for trials following compatible trials; IC-
CE: compatibility effect for trials following incompatible trials).  
 
EXPERIMENT 2 
 
 In Experiment 1, an interaction between the Simon task and response 
inhibition in the stop signal task was found for both the horizontal and 
vertical dimension, similar to the interaction between response inhibition 
and congruency tasks like the flanker task. In both types of tasks, irrelevant 
stimulus information is present. When the irrelevant stimulus information is 
incompatible with the relevant information, interference arises. This 
interference needs to be resolved, and subsequently, it is found that this 
interference control in both the flanker task and the Simon task interacts 
with stopping in the stop signal task. In Experiment 2, this interaction with 
the stop signal task is directly compared for both types of compatibility 
 Horizontal Simon task Vertical Simon task 
 Without S-S With S-S Without S-S With S-S 
C-C 349 (36) 453 (71) 367 (51) 496 (120) 
C-IC 395 (28) 475 (64) 432 (52) 532 (108) 
IC-C 369 (35) 468 (68) 392 (62) 507 (118) 
IC-IC 380 (31) 469 (71) 413 (52) 520 (112) 
C-CE 46 22 65 36 
IC-CE 11 1 21 13 
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tasks. In Experiment 2 the spatial Stroop effect and the Simon effect were 
combined independently on a trial-by-trial basis.  
 In another study designed to compare the spatial Stroop effect and the 
Simon effect, Liu, Banich, Jacobson, and Tanabe (2004) used an integrated 
Simon and spatial Stroop task. In the spatial Stroop task, compatibility 
results from an overlap between the irrelevant stimulus (location) and the 
relevant stimulus dimension (up- or downward pointing arrow, mapped on 
left or right response key). In S-S compatible trials, an upward pointing 
arrow is shown above the fixation cross, whereas in S-S incompatible trials 
an upward arrow is presented below fixation cross. The Simon effect results 
from an overlap between the irrelevant stimulus location and the response 
location (see Figure 3.1). Thus, in the integrated spatial Stroop/Simon task, 
the irrelevant stimulus feature - i.e., the task irrelevant location of the arrows 
- is for both tasks the same. However, it is argued that the type of conflict 
differed. The Spatial Stroop task (i.e., when the arrows appear above or 
below the centre of the screen) is an example of an SSC task, whereas the 
Simon task (i.e., when the arrows appear on the left or the right of the centre 
of the screen) is an SRC task. fMRI data of Liu et al. (2004) demonstrated that 
although both interference effects are caused by different types of conflict, 
common activation in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex was found. These 
authors argued that this dorsolateral activation was due to the fact that both 
tasks require attentional control in order to resolve the interference due to 
the presence of irrelevant stimulus information. But, besides this common 
activation, they found also a clear distinction between both types of conflict. 
Regions associated with response selection and response planning were only 
active in the Simon task (e.g., the ACC and (pre)supplementary motor areas) 
and regions associated with the task-relevant attribute (e.g., inferior parietal 
cortex) were more active in spatial Stroop task. It was suggested by Liu et al. 
(2004) that this difference in activation was determined by the difference in 
the type of conflict.  
 In Experiment 2, this integrated spatial Stroop/Simon task was 
combined with the stop signal task. In both tasks, the same stimuli and 
response mapping are used. A compatibility effect is expected for both tasks 
on CRTs but also on SSRTs. However, given the finding of Liu et al. (2004) 
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that also distinct regions were activated in both tasks, the experiment allows 
us also to compare directly whether the Simon task and the spatial Stroop 
task would influence stopping responses differently. 
 
METHOD 
 
Participants  
 Twenty-six paid volunteers (18 females and 8 males; mean age: 22.0 
years, SD: 2.59) participated. All of them had normal or corrected-to-normal 
vision and all were naive as to the purpose of the experiment. 
 
Apparatus and signals  
 Only changes in comparison with Experiment 1 are discussed. The 
experiment was run on a Toshiba notebook and stimuli were presented on 
an external 17-inch monitor. The stimuli were white arrows presented on a 
black background. The maximum visual angle subtended by an arrow was 
approximately 2° x 1.8°. There were four different locations around the 
centre of the screen where the arrows could appear: Left, right, above and 
below, with a distance of approximately 2° (see Figure 3.1).  
 
 
Figure 3.1: Four possible stimulus locations in Experiment 2. 
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Tasks and Procedure  
 Only the changes in comparison with Experiment 1 are discussed. The 
CRT task was to react to the direction of the arrow which was mapped on 
the left- and right hand. The mapping was counterbalanced across 
participants. The response buttons were aligned horizontally. For one half of 
the participants, upward pointing arrows required a left-handed response 
and downward pointing arrows required a right-handed response. For the 
other half of participants, the reversed mapping was used. This resulted in 
four different conditions: Stimulus-Response Compatible (e.g., in case of 
upward-left mapping, an upward pointing arrow was presented on the left 
of the centre of the screen), Stimulus-Response Incompatible (an upward 
pointing arrow presented on the right of the centre of screen), Stimulus-
Stimulus Compatible (an upward pointing arrow above the centre of the 
screen) and Stimulus-Stimulus Incompatible (an upward pointing arrow below 
the centre of the screen). The four types of stimuli occurred with equal 
probability and were randomized, with the restriction that no response or 
stimulus type appeared more than three times in a row. The course of a trial 
was the same as in Experiment 1. The experiment consisted of two parts, one 
with stop signals and one without. This resulted in 8 blocks with stop signals 
(48 stop signals for each trial type) and two blocks without stop signals.  
  
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
 CRT and error data were subjected to the same within-participant 
trimming procedure as in Experiment 1. This resulted in a data reduction of 
2.0%. Participants made few errors (2.9%), so we did not further analyze the 
error data. Stop signal latencies are also estimated according to the same 
procedures as in Experiment 1.  
 
No-signal trials  
 First, CRT data of the no-signal trials are presented in Table 3.4. They 
were analyzed by means of a 2 (block type: Blocks with vs. without stop 
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signal presentation) x 2 (task: Stroop vs. Simon) x 2 (compatibility) repeated 
measures ANOVA. Main effects were found for block type and 
compatibility. Participants were faster when no stop signals were presented, 
F(1,25) = 39.5, p < .001, and when the trials were compatible, F(1,25) = 159.5, 
p < .001. The interaction between these two main effects was also significant, 
F(1,25) = 14.00, p < .001, indicating that the compatibility effect was larger in 
the condition without stop signals. Unlike the effects of block type and 
compatibility, there was no main effect of task, F(1,25) < 1. The interactions 
between tasks and the effects of block type and compatibility were also not 
significant (both F-values < 1). However, the three-way interaction was 
significant, F(1,25) = 5.73, p < .05., indicating that the difference in 
compatibility effects between the two block types was a bit more 
pronounced in the spatial Stroop task (48 ms vs. 26 ms), compared to the 
Simon task (39 ms vs. 33 ms). But altogether, these analyses demonstrate that 
both types of trials were processed equally fast and that the compatibility 
effect was comparable in the Simon and the Stroop task, replicating the 
finding of (Liu et al, 2004). Post-hoc two tailed t-tests were performed for 
tasks separately. In the condition without stop signals, there was a Stroop 
effect, t(25) = -9.17, p < .001, and a Simon effect, t(25) = -7.49, p < .001. Similar 
results were obtained in the condition with stop signals. Again, a Stroop 
effect was observed, t(25) = -5.70, p < .001, together with a Simon effect, t(25) 
= -7.63, p < .001.  
 
Table 3.4: Reaction times (SDs in parentheses) for both blocks with and without 
stop signals (S-S) in Experiment 2. 
 
 
 Tasks 
 Spatial Stroop Simon 
 Compatible Incompatible Compatible Incompatible 
Without S-S 447 (51) 495 (54) 451 (49) 490 (58) 
With S-S 542 (81) 568 (76) 538 (82) 571 (77) 
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Finally, in the blocks with stop signals the compatibility effects in both tasks 
were also investigated as a function of the previous trial (there were not 
sufficient trials in the blocks without stop signals to perform these sequential 
analyses also in those blocks). For each task separately, the data were 
analyzed by means of a 2 (compatibility of the previous trial) by 2 
(compatibility of the current trial) repeated measures ANOVA. Only the 
interactions are reported. As can be seen in Figure 3.2, the Stroop effect was 
influenced by the compatibility of the previous trial, but only for stimulus-
stimulus compatibility, F(1,25) = 20.63, p < .001. Preceding stimulus-response 
compatibility had no effect on the stimulus-stimulus compatibility effect, F < 
1. Similarly, the Simon effect was influenced by the stimulus-response 
compatibility of the previous trial, F(1,25) = 9.49, p < .01, but not by the 
stimulus-stimulus compatibility of the previous trial, F < 1.  
 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Compatibility effects for RTs in the Stroop and the Simon task 
separately in function of the previous trial (Stimulus-Stimulus Compatible, 
Stimulus-Stimulus Incompatible, Stimulus-Response Compatible, and Stimulus-
Response Incompatible) in Experiment 2 (RTs are in milliseconds).  
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Signal-trials 
 Stopping data are presented in Table 3.5, and were analyzed by means 
of a 2 (task: Stroop vs. Simon) by 2 (compatibility) repeated measures 
ANOVA. For the probability of responding given a stop signal no effects or 
interactions were found (all F-values < 1). There was also no difference 
between the stop signal delays of both tasks, F(1,25) < 1. The SSDs of 
compatible trials tended to be shorter than the SSDs of incompatible trials, 
F(1,25) = 3.98, p = .06. The interaction was not significant, F(1,25) = 1.12, p = 
.30. We found similar results for the SSRTs. There was no difference between 
the SSRTs of the Stroop and Simon task, F(1,25) < 1. However, there was a 
main effect of compatibility, F(1,25) = 7.18, p < .05, indicating that in general, 
stopping was slowed down when trials were incompatible. The interaction 
between compatibility and task was not significant F(1,25) < 1. Two-tailed t-
tests revealed that in both tasks, the compatibility effect was present in 
SSRTs. In the spatial Stroop task, stopping the response in compatible trials 
was faster than incompatible trials, t(25) = -2.38, p < .05. Likewise, in the 
Simon task stopping responses was faster in compatible than in 
incompatible trials, although this effect was only marginally significant, t(25) 
= -1.91, p = .07.  
 
Table 3.5: Stop signal reaction times (SSRTs), probabilities of responding given a 
stop signal (P|resp), stop signal delay (SSD), and observed signal-respond RTs 
(SRT) in Experiment 2.  
 
 
 Tasks 
 Spatial Stroop Simon 
 Compatible Incompatible Compatible Incompatible 
SRT 496 (90) 530 (61) 488 (70) 527 (66) 
SSRT 222 (35) 240 (51) 221 (39) 237 (49) 
P|resp (%) 49 (4.3) 49 (4.6) 49 (3.6) 49 (4.1) 
SSD 326 (85) 334 (97) 323 (92) 339 (91) 
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In this experiment, there are not enough trials to do the extra analysis for 
SSRTs as a function of compatibility of the previous trial. Band et al. (2003) 
demonstrated that at least 40 signal trials are needed to obtain a reliable 
estimation of the SSRT and there are only approximately 24 stop-signal trials 
when the compatibility of the previous trial is taken into account.  
 In general, Experiment 2 showed that both SSC and SRC affect the CRTs 
and SSRTs. Stopping took longer when a trial was SS or SR incompatible. It 
was not possible to investigate the interaction between both effects since a 
trial is only SSC (stimulus above or below fixation cross) or SRC (stimulus 
left or right of fixation cross) and never a combination of both. For CRTs, we 
observed again (as in Experiment 1) that the compatibility effect is 
modulated by the compatibility of the previous trial. An SSC effect was only 
present after SS compatible trials and the Simon effect was only present after 
Simon compatible trials. In contradiction to Experiment 1, there was an 
overall effect of compatibility on SSRT. 
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
 In the present study, we investigated the relation between the Simon 
task and the stop signal task. Previous studies demonstrated that stopping 
responses in the stop signal task was slowed down when a trial was 
stimulus-stimulus incompatible (Kramer et al., 1994; Ridderinkhof et al., 
1999; Verbruggen et al., 2004, in press a). This result was interpreted as 
evidence for the hypothesis that interference control in congruency tasks and 
response inhibition in the stop signal task may rely on the same mechanisms 
(Logan, 1994; Ridderinkhof et al., 1999; Verbruggen et al., 2004, in press a). 
In a congruency task like the flanker task, irrelevant stimulus information 
interferes with the processing of the relevant stimulus features. This 
interference needs to be controlled and an active suppression mechanism is 
proposed to explain the RT cost in case of incompatible trials (Burle et al., 
2002; Ridderinkhof, 2002a) and Ridderinkhof et al. suggested that this 
suppression mechanism interacted with the stopping of responses in the 
stop signal task. Furthermore, Ridderinkhof (2002) proposed a similar 
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explanation for the Simon effect and the compatibility effect in the flanker 
task.  
 Therefore, if the hypothesis of a central inhibitory mechanism as 
suggested by Ridderinkhof (2002) is correct, it is expected that interference 
control in the Simon task would also interact with stopping responses. In 
Experiment 1, we investigated this hypothesis and used two different 
variants of the Simon task. Stimuli were presented on a horizontal or a 
vertical dimension. Response mappings were manipulated according to the 
same dimensions. CRT data for both dimensions were straightforward. 
Although the size of the compatibility effect was influenced by both the 
dimension and the occasional presentation of stop signals, participants 
responded generally faster when the location of the stimulus and the 
response side were the same. When participants responded even though a 
stop signal was presented, we found also a clear Simon effect. However, at 
first sight, there was no effect on stopping responses. However, when the 
trial sequence was taken into account, the compatibility influenced SSRTs.  
 It appeared that stopping was more difficult in stimulus-response 
incompatible trials, but only when the previous trail was stimulus-response 
compatible. A sequential analysis of the no-signal data demonstrated that 
the Simon effect decreased for CRTs when the previous trial was 
incompatible. As can be seen in Table 3.3, the SRC effect was even absent 
after an incompatible trial for the horizontal dimension. Therefore, it seems 
reasonable that after an incompatible trial, no interaction between 
compatibility and response inhibition can be found since no Simon effect is 
present. After all, when there is no conflict present on the current trial, it 
follows that there is no need for an active suppression of the incorrect 
response codes in case of the Simon task. And of course, when there is no 
active suppression in the current trial, there is no interaction with the 
stopping of responses in the stop signal task.  
 Thus, in Experiment 1, it was demonstrated that the Simon effect (an 
SRC-effect) influenced stopping responses, similar to the way the flanker 
effect (an SSC-effect) influenced stopping responses. In Experiment 2, we 
compared directly the effect of SSC in a spatial Stroop task and the Simon 
effect on stopping responses in the stop signal task. Via an integrated spatial 
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Stroop/Simon task, both types of conflict were operationalized within 
blocks. This task was also used by Liu et al. (2004) in an fMRI study. They 
found that both tasks activated the same prefrontal regions. On the other 
hand, the different types of conflict resulted also in exclusive and task-
specific activation of regions for both tasks. Notwithstanding these 
differences, both the analyses of no-signal data and signal data clearly 
demonstrated that both types of conflict were comparable for the different 
measures. First, mean CRTs did not differ and also the effect of compatibility 
was the same in both tasks. Secondly, there was an overall effect of 
compatibility on SSRTs and this effect was also not influenced by the task. 
We suggest that this finding provides further evidence for the hypothesis 
that interference control, by means of active suppression, in different conflict 
tasks is at least highly comparable. Moreover, the finding that stopping 
responses in the stop task is also influenced, seem to suggest that active 
inhibitory mechanisms are needed in both types of tasks and that this 
common need for active mechanisms causes the interaction found in the 
present study.  
 Another possibly interesting finding in Experiment 2 is that the Stroop 
effect disappeared only after a Stroop incompatible trial. This finding could 
not be generalized to all incompatible trials, since there was no interaction 
when the previous trials were Simon incompatible. The reverse pattern was 
observed for the Simon effect. In terms of top-down monitoring, it could be 
argued that due to the different types of conflict, the regions were the post-
conflict adaptations take place, are also different. This would be in line with 
the findings of Liu et al. (2004) who found that the Simon task activated 
response-associated whereas in the spatial Stroop task, regions associated 
with the task-relevant attribute were more active. There was a common 
activation of the prefrontal regions – interpreted as evidence for top-down 
adjustments – but the regions of effect may be different in the spatial Stroop 
task and the Simon task. This could possibly explain why there was no effect 
of the Stroop task on the performance on the Simon task and vice-versa. 
However, top-down explanations for the sequential effects in this 
Experiment 2 (and also Experiment 1) are confounded with stimulus-
response repetitions. Exact stimulus-response repetitions were not possible 
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when participants switched from one type of trial to another type of trial. 
Following the logic of bottom-up explanations (Hommel et al., 2004; Mayr et 
al., 2004; Notebaert et al., 2001), no modulation of the interference effect is 
expected when participants switched from one type of conflict (e.g., Stroop 
incompatible) to another type of conflict (e.g., Simon incompatible). Thus, 
both top-down and bottom-up accounts can explain the present data 
pattern.  
 Which of the two types of accounts (top-down vs. bottom-up) is correct, 
is still heavily debated, especially since the conflict monitoring pattern is 
found even when the design is carefully balanced against repetition effects 
(Wühr, in press) or when repetitions are excluded altogether (Kerns et al., 
2004). However, we cannot control for these repetition effects since the 
experiments were not designed for this purpose. A last remark related to 
this issue is that we assume that there is an active suppression mechanism 
needed to resolve the interference in the current trial. But these adjustments 
are clearly within-trial adjustments to enable us to respond correctly within 
the presence of distracting information. This active form of control does not 
imply that trial-by-trial (or sequential) effects are also due to active 
mechanisms.  
 With regard to the observed interaction between the Simon task and the 
stop signal task, one important question remains. Although stimulus-
response compatibility in the Simon task interacts with stopping responses, 
previous studies could not find an interaction between the suppression of 
spatially incompatible responses and response inhibition (Logan & Irwin, 
2000; van den Wildenberg & van der Molen, 2004). However, there are at 
least two important differences between the SRC effect proper and the SRC 
effect in the Simon task. First of all, in the Simon task, the conflict is due to 
irrelevant stimulus information, whereas in a pure SRC task, the conflict is 
due to the relevant stimulus feature (e.g., press left when the arrow is 
pointing to the right). Note that in the flanker tasks, where also an 
interaction is found with the stop signal task, the conflict is also due to 
irrelevant stimulus features. Verbruggen et al. (2004, in press a) already 
argued that the suppression of irrelevant stimulus information, regardless 
whether this information is response related, caused the interaction with the 
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stop signal task. In the light of this explanation, it seems perfectly plausible 
that stopping is indeed prolonged in Simon incompatible trials. Also, with 
regard to the distinction between both types of SRC effects, this could imply 
that there is no interaction between stopping and the SRC effect proper 
because the interference is due to the relative stimulus feature in a pure SRC 
task. Of course, this response feature cannot be suppressed since a response 
is needed on the same feature. In other words, there is no place for selective 
suppression and thus, no interaction with the stop signal task.  
 Secondly, another possible difference between the two types of conflict 
is the fact that in a pure SRC task the manipulation is between-blocks. In this 
task, the compatibility effect is calculated as the difference between the 
performance in a compatible block and the performance in an incompatible 
block. In such a compatibility task, it was suggested that besides the 
interference in an incompatible trial, an incompatible stimulus-response 
mapping is also assumed to be more difficult since the natural SR mapping 
cannot be applied (Kornblum, et al, 1990). Both the interference and the SR 
mapping are supposed to contribute to the CRT difference in a pure SRC 
task. But in a pure SRC task, in an incompatible block all trials are 
incompatible, resulting in probably less interference. Thus, it might be 
possible that the CRT difference between the compatible and the 
incompatible blocks is mainly caused by a more difficult response selection 
in case of a non-natural SR mapping (e.g., press left when the arrow is 
pointing to the right). This would have important implications for the 
interaction with the stop signal task since Logan, Kantowitz, and Riegler 
(1986) already demonstrated that in a simple stop task, there is no effect 
when the response selection is made more difficult. Inhibiting one out of two 
responses was as difficult as inhibiting one out of four responses (Logan et 
al., 1986). On the other hand, this manipulation of response selection did 
affect the response inhibition in the selective stop signal task. This is also in 
accordance with the finding of van den Wildenberg and van der Molen 
(2004). These authors found that selective stopping was, contrary to simple 
stopping, influenced by the SRC effect proper. Thus it may be that the 
differences in a pure SRC task are mainly due to a more complicated 
response selection, and only to a lesser extent, to interference. Which of the 
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two differences (the type of information that causes the interference and the 
type of block manipulation) caused the interaction, is difficult to say. For 
example, it is possible that both differences between a pure SRC task and the 
Simon task, contribute both to the fact that there is no interaction between a 
pure SRC task and the stop signal task.  
 In conclusion, the present study found an interaction between the 
interference control in the Simon task and response inhibition in the stop 
signal task. This effect is comparable to the effect of stimulus-stimulus 
compatibility on response inhibition, and suggests that stimulus-response 
compatibility influences response inhibition. We argue that these findings 
provide further evidence for the hypothesis that in a congruency tasks or 
compatibility tasks, an active suppression mechanism is needed in order to 
resolve the conflict caused by the distracting irrelevant information (Burle et 
al., 2002; Ridderinkhof, 2002a). Moreover, we hypothesize that it is this 
active mechanism that causes the interaction with the stopping of responses, 
which is also clearly form of an executive act of control (Logan & Cowan, 
1984). 

 
CHAPTER 4 
ON THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN 
RESPONSE INHIBITION AND  
NEGATIVE PRIMING 
 
 In the previous two chapters, we have demonstrated that stop signal 
inhibition is influenced by the concurrently selective suppression of 
irrelevant stimulus features. In the taxonomy of Nigg (2000) both forms of 
inhibition (stop signal inhibition and interference control) lump together as 
‘effortful forms of inhibition’. Note that a third form of effortful inhibition 
(i.e., oculomotor inhibition in the antisaccade task), was also shown to 
interact with stop signal inhibition (Logan & Irwin, 2000). Furthermore, the 
results of Chapters 2 and 3 are in line with the findings of Friedman and 
Miyake (2004), who found that prepotent response inhibition and resistance 
to distractor interference were correlated. All in all, the results of previous 
studies and our studies suggest that there is an overlap between different 
kinds of effortful inhibition. 
 In the present Chapter, we will investigate whether similar results are 
found with a paradigm that is assumed to operationalize a less effortful 
form of inhibition: Negative Priming. The negative priming paradigm stems 
originally from the Stroop literature (Dalrymple-Alford & Budayr, 1966) and 
refers to the finding that participants are slower to respond to a target that 
had to be ignored on the previous trial. Thus, negative priming occurs when 
the irrelevant stimulus information was selectively suppressed on trial n-1. 
When this irrelevant feature becomes the relevant stimulus feature on trial n, 
responses are slowed down. Several explanations have been offered for the 
negative priming effect, which is in a sense an after-effect of the active 
selective suppression that we have investigated in Chapters 2 and 3. 
 In the introduction, it was already mentioned that negative priming is 
considered as an automatic from of cognitive inhibition in the taxonomy of 
Nigg (2000). Friedman and Miyake (2004) also looked at the correlation 
between negative priming and the different forms of inhibition and did not 
find any correlation. Thus, it remains to be investigated whether the effortful 
stop signal inhibition can be influenced by a more automatic form of 
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inhibition like negative priming. Then again, if negative priming is indeed 
due to persisting inhibition of the distractor as suggested by several 
researchers (e.g., Houghton & Tipper, 1994; Tipper, 1985), then it could be 
the case given the findings of Chapters 2 and 3 that stop signal inhibition is 
indeed influenced by negative priming. 
 There is yet another reason to expect some mutual interference between 
stop signal inhibition and negative priming. Kramer, Humphrey, Larish, 
Logan, and Strayer (1992), cited by Logan (1994), observed that participants 
were slower when a stop signal was presented on the previous trial. Rieger 
and Gauggel (1999) further investigated this result and found that the effect 
of stop signal presentation was stronger when (a) the inhibition failed and 
(b) when the primary task properties were repeated. Based on these results, 
it was argued that this ‘post-signal slowing down’ was not only a strategic 
effect, but probably an effect related to negative priming. Consequently, an 
interaction between stop signal inhibition and negative priming can be 
expected. 
 In the study of the present chapter, a stop signal task was integrated in a 
regular negative priming design. There were two main research questions: 
(1) is stop signal inhibition influenced by the negative priming effect and (2) 
is there something in common in the ‘post-signal slowing down’ effect and 
in the negative priming effect, as suggested by Rieger and Gauggel (1999). 
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ON THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN RESPONSE INHIBITION 
AND NEGATIVE PRIMING:  
EVIDENCE FROM SIMPLE AND SELECTIVE 
STOPPING17,18 
 
Negative priming is a commonly observed after-effect in studies concerning 
inhibition. Effects of the preceding trial are also found in other paradigms, like the 
stop signal paradigm. In the present study, stop signals were introduced in a negative 
priming paradigm and the relation between stop signal inhibition and negative 
priming was investigated. In Experiment 1, we used a simple stop signal task. 
Stopping data clearly suggest that stopping performance was not influenced by 
negative priming. Interestingly, on no-signal probes the negative priming effect 
disappeared after successful inhibition of the response on the prime trial. On the 
contrary, when inhibition failed, the negative priming effect remained. In Experiment 
2, we used the selective stop signal task. As in Experiment 1, inhibition of motor 
responses was not influenced by negative priming. The hypothesis that negative 
priming disappeared due to a general nonspecific stop was confirmed in this 
experiment, as a negative priming effect was found after both successful and 
unsuccessful behavioural inhibition. The results of both experiments show that 
response inhibition is not influenced by negative priming, and that negative priming 
is only affected after a successful general stop.  
 
                                                          
17Verbruggen, F., Liefooghe, B., & Vandierendonck, A. (2005). On the difference 
between response inhibition and negative priming: evidence from simple and 
selective stopping. Psychological Research, 69, 262-271. 
18 We would like to thank an anonymous reviewer and Iring Koch for their useful 
comments on a previous version of this manuscript. 
130      CHAPTER 4 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 The stop signal task (Lappin & Eriksen, 1966; Logan, 1994; Logan & 
Cowan, 1984) is one of the most frequently used tasks in the study of 
behavioural inhibition. In this stop signal paradigm (Logan, 1994; Logan & 
Cowan, 1984), participants usually perform a speeded choice reaction time 
task. Occasionally, stop signals are presented to inform the participants to 
withhold their response. On short stop signal delays (SSD; the interval 
between the presentation of the go signal and the stop signal), participants 
can easily suppress their response. By contrast, when the stop signal delay is 
long enough, participants will nearly always execute the response. Logan 
and Cowan (1984) developed the horse race model to explain these results. 
The model assumes a race between two processes: A go process and a stop 
process. If the stop process is completed before the go process, participants 
will inhibit their response (signal-inhibit trials). On the contrary, when the 
go process finishes before the stop process, participants will respond (signal-
respond trials). Based on the assumptions of the horse-race model, it is 
possible to estimate the covert latency of stopping: The Stop Signal Reaction 
Time (SSRT; for reviews see Logan, 1994; Band, van der Molen, and Logan 
2003). The SSRT has already proven its usefulness with different response 
modalities, like hand and foot movements (De Jong, Coles, & Logan, 1995), 
and in different populations such as children with attention deficit and 
hyperactivity disorder (ADHD; Jennings, van der Molen, Pelham, Debski, & 
Hoza, 1997) and older adults (Kramer, Humphrey, Larish, Logan, & Strayer, 
1994).  
 The presentation of stop signals in a given trial also appears to affect 
performance in the subsequent trial. Kramer, Humphrey, Larish, Logan, and 
Strayer (1992), cited by Logan (1994), found that the go signal reaction time 
was slower in trials that followed successful response inhibition than in 
control trials. Rieger and Gauggel (1999) further investigated the effect of the 
presentation of a stop signal in trial n on the responses in trial n + 1 by using 
a simple discrimination task with occasionally a stop signal. They found that 
after the presentation of a stop signal in trial n, participants responded more 
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slowly in trial n + 1, compared with responses that followed on no-signal 
trials. These effects were even stronger when inhibition failed and when the 
primary task properties of trial n and trial n + 1 were the same. Rieger and 
Gauggel (1999) argued that strategic effects could therefore only partially 
explain their results and suggested a specific mechanism that is responsible 
for after-effects in different inhibitory tasks.  
 Nowadays, effects of the preceding trial on the next trial as found by 
Rieger and Gauggel are a common finding in the literature on inhibition. 
Dalrymple-Alford and Budayr (1966) were the first to find that in a Stroop 
task, responses were delayed when the target had previously been 
suppressed. This phenomenon is now called ‘negative priming’. It is a well 
established effect that when people have to ignore a stimulus in one trial (the 
prime trial) the reaction times in the subsequent trial (the probe trial) are 
prolonged (for reviews, see May, Kane, & Hasher, 1995; Fox, 1995). There are 
three main accounts of negative priming. The oldest account relies on a 
forward-acting suppression mechanism (e.g., Tipper & Cranston, 1985). 
According to the selective inhibition account, negative priming arises from 
the active suppression of the distractors of the prime trial. There are two 
main proposals for what actually becomes inhibited. Neill (1977) suggested 
that the mental representation of the distractor becomes suppressed, 
whereas the most frequently used proposal of Tipper and colleagues 
(Houghton & Tipper, 1994; Tipper & Cranston, 1985) suggested that the 
links between the representations and the response mechanisms are 
inhibited. Nonetheless, both proposals assume that when the suppressed 
distractor becomes the target of the next trial (ignored repetition), there is 
still residual inhibition from the prime display. This residual inhibition 
decays passively and causes the negative priming effect.  
 The other explanations of negative priming are memory-based 
accounts, suggesting that negative priming results from the implicit retrieval 
of previously stored information. Logan (1988) proposed in his ‘instance 
theory of automatization’ that each time a task is performed, information 
about the act is stored and later on retrieved from the memory. The episodic 
retrieval account for negative priming (Neill & Valdes, 1992; Neill, Valdes, 
Terry, & Gorfein, 1992) is based on the above assumption. The probe trial is 
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supposed to act as a cue for retrieving information (or the 'episode') of the 
previous trial. Each episode contains information about the identity of the 
stimuli and the response they require ('respond' vs. 'do not respond'). In 
cases of ignored repetition, a conflict arises between the 'do not respond' tag 
of the prime display and the 'respond' tag of the probe display. This conflict 
must be resolved and delays the responding. This delay corresponds to the 
negative priming effect. Finally, the third explanation is the feature 
mismatch theory (Park & Kanwisher, 1994). Park and Kanwisher suggest 
that negative priming is due to differences between the representation of the 
distractor in the prime trial (e.g., a red colored 'H') and the target in the 
probe trial (e.g., a green colored 'H'). This partial mismatch causes 
interference and delays the processing of the target. However, negative 
priming is observed when there is no perceptual mismatch between the 
distractor of the prime and the target of the probe (e.g., Milliken, Tipper, & 
Weaver, 1994), and on the other hand, negative priming was absent when 
there was perceptual mismatching (Baylis, Tipper, & Houghton, 1997). 
  One important difference between the feature mismatch account and 
the episodic retrieval account is that the former localizes the conflict at a 
perceptual level. The episodic retrieval account, on the contrary, states that 
negative priming is caused by interference at the response level. Another 
difference between the two memory-based accounts is that according to the 
feature mismatch account there is no need for conflict in the prime trial. The 
episodic retrieval account and the selective inhibition account assume that 
negative priming is due to a conflict in the previous prime trial. Which of the 
three accounts is most suitable is still heavily debated. Recent results (e.g., 
MacLeod, Chiappe, & Fox, 2002) have been generally more in favor of a 
memory-based account. Note that according to Tipper (2001), differences 
between inhibitory and memory-based accounts lie especially in the 
emphasis on encoding and retrieval processes. Therefore, Tipper suggested 
that both accounts are needed to fully understand and explain negative 
priming.  
 In the present study, the relation between negative priming and 
inhibiting responses in the stop signal task is further investigated by 
introducing a stop signal in the traditional negative priming design. A 
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similar method has already proven useful in investigating the interaction 
between stop signal inhibition and other tasks that are assumed to require 
inhibition like the flanker task and the Stroop task (Ridderinkhof, Band, & 
Logan, 1999; Verbruggen, Liefooghe, & Vandierendonck, 2004). Stopping 
responses appeared to be slowed down by the presentation of categorically 
related distracting information, suggesting that stop signal inhibition and 
interference control in the flanker and Stroop tasks rely on common 
mechanisms. In contrast, several studies found no difference between the 
inhibition of spatially compatible responses and the inhibition of spatially 
incompatible responses (e.g., Logan, 1981). Therefore, it has been argued 
that resolving interference of spatially incompatible responses at response 
level and stopping behaviour do not interact (Logan, 1994).  
 By introducing stop signals in a negative priming paradigm, we would 
be able to investigate the reciprocal relation between stopping responses and 
negative priming. When negative priming and inhibition in the stop signal 
task rely on common mechanisms, an interaction as indicated by SSRT 
differences would be expected. On the one hand, when the link between the 
stimulus representation and response mechanism is already slightly 
suppressed as suggested by Tipper (Houghton & Tipper, 1994; Tipper & 
Cranston, 1985), stopping responses should be easier for ignored repetition 
trials. On the other hand, when the negative priming is due to interference 
from retrieved information as suggested by the memory-based accounts, 
stopping may be slowed down by analogy with the effects found with the 
flanker task and the Stroop task. Especially when the interference is indeed 
situated at a stimulus processing level, as suggested by the feature mismatch 
account, and not at a pure response level, this interaction should be found. 
Finally, finding no interaction demonstrates that different mechanisms are 
engaged in stop signal inhibition and negative priming, by analogy with the 
absence of interaction with spatially incompatible responses and stop signal 
inhibition.  
 Besides the effect of negative priming on stopping responses, after-
effects of the stop signal task are also investigated by the presentation of 
stop signals in the prime trial. When the inhibitory after-effects of the stop 
signal task are similar to negative priming as suggested by Rieger and 
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Gauggel (1999), the presentation of stop signals in the prime trial should 
interact with the negative priming effect, whereas no overlap should result 
in an additivity of both effects. From the perspective of memory-based 
accounts, there are also reasons to expect an effect of stopping on negative 
priming. It seems plausible that the presentation of the stop signal and the 
response inhibition influences the processing and storage, resulting in a 
changed and probably smaller negative priming effect.  
 
EXPERIMENT 1 
 
METHOD  
 
Participants 
 Twenty first-year psychology students at Ghent University (Belgium) 
participated for course requirements and credit. All participants had normal 
or corrected-to-normal vision and all were naive as to the purpose of the 
experiment.  
 
Apparatus and signals 
 The experiment was run on a Pentium PC. Stimuli were presented on a 
17-inch monitor, placed at a distance of 50 cm in front of the participants. 
Stimuli were the letters 'F,' 'H,' 'L,' and 'T.' Each trial consisted of two letters, 
a green target letter and a red distractor letter, presented in central location 
on a black background. The letters appeared on both sides of the diameter of 
an imaginary circle with a radius of 0.5°. The maximum visual angle sub 
tended by a letter was approximately 1° x 1°. Therefore, the letters could 
sometimes partially overlap, with the distractor always superimposed on the 
target. This overlap was only minimal and did not impede the recognition of 
the letters. Responses were collected with a response box connected to the 
game port of the PC. The four black buttons of the box were labeled with 
one of the four letters. All participants placed their index and middle fingers 
from their left and right hands on one of the buttons. Occasionally, a loud 
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and clear auditory stop signal (750 Hz, 70 dB, 50 ms) was presented shortly 
after the stimulus onset in the visual primary task.  
 
Tasks and procedure 
 The primary task required the participant to respond to the green letter 
by pressing the corresponding button on the response box. Participants were 
instructed to respond as quickly and accurately as possible. Each pair of 
trials began with the presentation of a white fixation cross (0.75° x 0.75°) in 
the center of the screen. After 250 ms, the fixation sign was replaced by the 
first pair of letters, which was the prime trial. The prime trial was always 
incompatible, i.e., the target and distractor were different letters. The stimuli 
were presented for 150 ms and required a response within 1,500 ms of onset. 
After this first response, there was a response stimulus interval (RSI) of 350 
ms. Again, the fixation cross reappeared and was replaced after 250 ms by 
the second pair of stimuli, the probe trial (Figure 4.1).  
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Figure 4.1: Trial sequence of a prime-probe pair. Durations are in milliseconds. 
 
Half of the probe trials were control trials; i.e., both target and distractor 
were different from the stimuli of the prime trial. The other half of the probe 
trials were ignored repetitions. The distractor of the ignored repetition probe 
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did not appear in the prime display. Like the prime trials, all probe trials 
were incongruent. The order of the prime/probe pairs was randomized.  
 The experiment consisted of 10 blocks of 48 prime/ probe pairs and 
started with an extra practice block. In a random selection of 25% of the 
trials (i.e., 50% of the prime/probe pairs) a stop signal was presented. The 
signal could occur with equal probability in the prime and in the probe 
trials, with the restriction that there could be only one stop signal within a 
prime/probe pair. Therefore, probe signal trials always followed no-signal 
prime trials and after a signal prime trial, there was always a no-signal probe 
trial. This resulted in 60 stop prime trials followed by a control probe, 60 
stop prime trials followed by an ignored repetition, 60 stop signals on a 
control probe, and finally 60 stop signals on an ignored repetition. The stop 
signal delay was initially set at 250 ms and was continuously adjusted 
according to a staircase tracking algorithm (Levitt 1970) for each type of trial 
to obtain a probability of stopping of 50%. Each time the participant 
responded to the stimulus in the presence of a stop signal, the stop signal 
delay decreased by 50 ms. On the other hand, after successful inhibition, the 
delay increased by 50 ms. This method provides SSRT estimations that are 
derived from the central part of the no-signal RT curve. Logan, Schachar and 
Tannock (1997; see also Band et al., 2003) demonstrated that 'central' 
estimates are relatively insensitive to violations of the horse-race model and 
therefore most reliable. In order to avoid 'waiting' strategies, participants 
were informed about the tracking procedure. They were told that the 
probability of stopping would approximate 50%, irrespective of whether 
they were postponing their response or not.  
 
Stop latency estimation 
 Stop Signal Reaction Times were estimated as proposed by Logan and 
Cowan (1984), based on the horse-race model. According to this model, after 
rank ordering the choice reaction times (CRTs) of no-signal trials, the left, 
fast part of this CRT distribution is assumed to correspond to the 
distribution of CRTs of signal trials in which inhibition failed. By doing this, 
the finishing time of the stop process can be derived. The finishing time of 
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the stop process corresponds to the nth CRT of the no-signal trials, where n 
is the result of multiplying the total number of no-signal trials by the 
probability of responding when a signal is presented, given a certain SSD. 
Since the start of the inhibition process (mean SSD) and the finishing time 
are known, the SSRT can be estimated. The SSRT is obtained by subtracting 
the start time from the finishing time or 'nth CRT minus SSD' (see Logan, 
1994).  
 
RESULTS  
 
 The data of the probe trials were only considered for analysis after 
removal of the trials in which an error was made in the prime or in the probe 
trial. An alpha level of .05 was used for all statistical tests. Participants made 
few errors (mean: 5.6%). Because of missing cells in the data matrix, error 
data are not analyzed. Analysis of CRTs of no-signal probe trials and signal 
probe trials are reported separately. All reported analyses of CRT data are 
repeated measures ANOVA (lowest p value of the sphericity test was p = 
.13) and since ignored repetitions were expected to be slower, all post hoc 
tests were one-tailed t-tests.  
 
No-signal trials 
 There were three types of no-signal probe trials: Probe trials without 
stop signal in the prime trial (no-signal), probe trials that followed a prime 
trial with a stop signal, but where the inhibition failed (signal-respond), and 
probe trials where the inhibition in the prime trials succeeded (signal-
inhibit). Data were analyzed by a 2 (probe trial: Control vs. ignored 
repetition) x 3 (signal property of the prime trial: No-signal, signal-respond, 
signal-inhibit) repeated measures ANOVA. Mean response times are 
presented in Table 4.1. We found significant effects of both factors. The first 
effect corresponds to the negative priming effect, F(1, 19) = 6.49, p < .05, the 
second was the effect of the presentation of a stop signal in the prime trial, 
F(2,38) = 7.36, p < .01. The interaction between both factors was also 
significant, F(2,38) = 9.23, p < .001. As can be seen in Table 4.1, there was a 
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reliable difference between control probe trials and ignored repetitions when 
participants responded to the prime target, regardless of the presentation of 
a stop signal; t(19) = -4.70, p < .001, for no-signal prime trials, and t(19) = -
3.15, p < .01, for signal-respond prime trials. However, when inhibition of 
the response in the prime trial succeeded (i.e., signal-inhibit trials), the 
negative priming effect disappeared, t(19) = 1.50, p = .08.  
 To investigate whether there was an effect of the time between the 
presentation of the stop signal and the presentation of the next trial, we 
performed a median split on SSD. When the SSD of signal-inhibit prime 
trials was small (mean: 422 ms), participants responded faster in the probe 
trial (mean CRT = 709 ms) than in signal-inhibit prime trials with a large 
SSD (mean SSD = 608 ms; mean CRT = 768 ms), F(1,19) = 9.65, p < .01. As in 
the previous analysis, we found no main difference between control probes 
(mean CRT = 744 ms) and ignored repetitions (mean CRT = 733 ms), F(1,19) 
= 1.45, p = .29. The interaction with SSD length was not significant either, F < 
1. We also looked for a general slowing down of the responses after the 
presentation of a stop signal, as found by Rieger and Gauggel (1999). Since 
the negative priming effect disappeared after signal-inhibit primes, we 
compared only the RTs of the control probes. A repeated measures ANOVA 
with stop signal as a within-subjects variable (signal properties of the prime 
trial: No signal, signal-respond, signal-inhibit) revealed no differences, F < 1. 
 
Table 4.1: Reaction times of no-signal probe trials (SDs in parentheses) as a 
function of the presentation of a stop signal on the prime trial in Experiment 1. 
The negative priming effect was computed by subtracting the mean CRT of 
control probes from the mean CRT of ignored repetitions probes (** p < .01). 
 
 Prime trial 
Priming condition No signal Signal-respond Signal-inhibit 
Ignored repetition 767 (102) 793 (99) 726 (109) 
Control 750 (102) 754 (78) 739 (112) 
Negative priming 17 ** 39 ** - 13 
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Signal-trials 
 Half of the stop signals occurred in the probe trials. Stopping data as a 
function of priming were analyzed by a repeated measures ANOVA, with 
probe (control vs. ignored repetition) as a within-subjects variable. Stopping 
data are presented in Table 4.2. Probability to respond given a stop signal 
was .49 for both control and ignored repetition trials, F < 1. As can be seen in 
Table 4.2, neither the SSRTs of control and probe trials nor the SSDs of both 
types of probe trials differed, both Fs < 1. These findings clearly suggest that 
stopping is not influenced by negative priming. Finally, we tested for 
differences between CRTs of control probe and ignored repetitions when a 
stop signal was presented but where the inhibition failed. As in the other 
CRT analysis, we found a difference in signal-respond RT, t(19) = -1.94, p < 
.05.  
 
Table 4.2: SSRTs, probabilities of responding given a stop signal, stop signal 
delay, and signal-respond RT in Experiment 1 (SDs in parentheses). The negative 
priming effect was computed by subtracting the mean CRT of control probes from 
the mean CRT of ignored repetitions probes (* p < .05). 
 
 Priming Condition 
 Ignored repetition Control Negative priming 
Stop signal RT 177 (45) 178 (49) 1 
Response ratio (%) 48.9 (2.9) 49.3 (3.0) 0.4 
Stop signal delay 546 (118) 552 (115) 6 
Signal-respond RT 680 (92) 668 (85) 12 * 
 
DISCUSSION  
 
 The results of this experiment are two-fold. First of all, SSRT analyses 
clearly indicate that stopping performance is not influenced by negative 
priming. The SSRTs for control probe trials and ignored repetitions did not 
differ. Secondly, the presentation of a stop signal in the prime trial does 
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affect performance in the control probes. Unlike Rieger and Gauggel (1999), 
we did not find a general slowing down of the responses after presentation 
of a stop signal in the prime trial. However, we found another after-effect of 
the stop signal inhibition. When inhibition of the response on the prime 
target succeeded, the negative priming effect completely disappeared and 
this did not depend on the time course of the stop signal task, as indicated 
by the split between short and long SSDs.  
 How do these results fit with the different accounts of negative 
priming? First of all, negative priming did not influence stop performance. 
Based on the assumption that negative priming is due to a suppressed link 
between the mental representation and the response mechanism, the 
selective inhibition account would predict a faster response inhibition for 
ignored repetition trials. Therefore, the stopping data are probably not in 
favor of the selective inhibition account as proposed by Tipper and 
colleagues. The stopping data could, however, easily be explained by the 
episodic retrieval account. According to this account, the conflict causing 
negative priming is situated at the response level. By analogy with the 
suppression of spatially incompatible responses, the results of the present 
experiment would indicate that resolving a response conflict in the negative 
priming task, causing the delay, and inhibiting a response in the stop signal 
task, rely on different mechanisms.  
 Secondly, negative priming disappeared after a successful stop. Since 
the memory-based accounts rely on interference by previously stored 
information about the characteristics of the stimuli, the question arises as to 
what is stored when inhibition succeeded. In previous research, it has been 
suggested that stopping in the stop signal task, as used in this experiment, is 
a general, nonspecific way of stopping, canceling all responses and processes 
(De Jong et al., 1995). In other words, stimuli and their characteristics are not 
important for the stop; this implicates that the target and distractor do not 
have to be discriminated from each other. Moreover, since all processes are 
abruptly cancelled, the processing of the distractor would also be cancelled. 
Therefore, we suggest that after a successful stop, the episode no longer 
contains all the stimulus information, such as the specific 'do not respond' 
tag of the distractor. Since not all information is stored, there is no longer a 
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conflict of the ignored repetitions and the negative priming effect 
disappears. Note that when it is assumed that suppression of the distractor 
never happened, due to the canceling of all responses, the inhibition account 
could also explain the results. The hypothesis that nonselective stopping 
causes the disappearance of the negative priming effect is further 
investigated in Experiment 2.  
 
EXPERIMENT 2 
 
 In Experiment 1, stopping performance was not influenced by negative 
priming, but the negative priming effect disappeared after a successful 
nonselective stop. In Experiment 2, we further investigated the relation 
between response inhibition and negative priming by introducing a selective 
stop, which requires a more cognitively controlled stop. A selective stop task 
can be based on a perceptual discrimination by using different tones (e.g., 
only stop when you hear a high tone; e.g., Bedard et al., 2003), or it can be 
based on a motor discrimination. Logan, Kantowitz, and Riegler (1986), cited 
by Logan (1994), used this version of the selective stop task. On presentation 
of the stop signal, participants were required to withhold their response 
with the right hand but to ignore the signal when the response was to be 
made by the left hand. Logan et al. (1986) suggested that in this version of 
the stop task, motor inhibition should be focused on a single response 
instead of canceling all responses as in the simple stop task. In other words, 
stimulus characteristics and the discrimination between target and distractor 
are important for the selective stop process. Based on the memory-based 
accounts for negative priming, this would imply that after a successful 
selective stop-contrary to a nonspecific general stop-the stimulus 
characteristics are stored and later on retrieved. Therefore, a negative 
priming effect should be found after a successful stop, in contrast with the 
findings of Experiment 1.  
 For all these reasons, we used the 'motor version' of selective stopping 
and combined it with negative priming. The predictions were that selective 
stopping was not influenced by negative priming, as could be expected from 
Experiment 1, and that a negative priming effect was observable after 
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successful selective inhibition due to the extended processing of target and 
distractor.  
 
METHOD  
 
Participants 
 Twenty first-year psychology students of Ghent University (Belgium) 
participated for course requirements and credit. All participants had normal 
or corrected-to-normal vision and all were naive as to the purpose of the 
experiment. One participant was excluded from further data analysis 
because of negative SSRTs, indicating that the participant was waiting for 
the occurrence of the stop signal.  
 
Signals, tasks and procedure 
 Apparatus, signals, and the primary task were the same as in the first 
experiment. Only the changes compared with Experiment 1 will be 
mentioned. There were two types of stop signals: Valid and invalid signals. 
The validity of the stop signal was determined by the response to be given to 
the target stimulus. One half of the participants had to stop when they heard 
the tone and when their response was pressing one of the index fingers (i.e., 
the two lower buttons, corresponding to the letters 'F' and 'H'). These were 
the valid stop signals. When these participants heard a tone and the 
response was pressing one of the middle fingers (corresponding to the 
letters 'L' and 'T), they had to ignore the tone (the invalid stop signal). The 
other half of the participants had the complimentary mapping of signal 
validity to fingers. Therefore, the validity of the stop signals was changed 
between participants, but not within. The experiment started with one 
practice block and there were 11 experimental blocks. Each block consisted 
of 56 prime/probe pairs. In a pseudo-random selection of the trials, a stop 
signal was presented. In 32 of the 112 trials (or 28.5%) a tone occurred after 
stimulus onset. Half of the tones were valid stop signals, the other half were 
invalid stop signals. This resulted in 88 signal prime trials (44 valid and 44 
invalid) followed by a control probe, 88 signal trials (44 valid and 44 invalid) 
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followed by an ignored repetition, 44 valid stop signals on a control probe, 
44 invalid stop signals on a control probe and finally, 44 valid and 44 invalid 
stop signals on an ignored repetition. Stop latency was estimated in the same 
way as in Experiment 1. After the presentation of a valid stop signal, the SSD 
was adjusted. For invalid stop signals, we used the same SSD we would use 
for valid stop signals for that specific type of trial. After an invalid stop 
signal, the SSD was not adjusted. Therefore, the SSD of invalid stop signals 
was also variable, but the changes were determined by the valid stop 
signals.  
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION  
 
 The analyses were the same as in Experiment 1. Participants were very 
good at ignoring the invalid stop signals (the amount of false alarms, i.e., 
stop when they had to react, was very low: 6.6% of the trials with an invalid 
stop signal) and made few errors (mean: 3.6%). Therefore, these data were 
not further analyzed.  
 
No-signal trials 
 Besides the three types of no-signal probe trials of Experiment 1 (no-
signal, signal-respond, and signal-inhibit), in this experiment there was a 
fourth type: An invalid stop signal was presented in the prime trial and 
participants had to respond. The analysis was based on a 2 (probe: Control 
vs. ignored repetition) x 4 (signal property of the prime: No-signal, invalid-
stop, signal-respond, signal-inhibit) repeated measures ANOVA (lowest p 
value of the sphericity test was p = .06). Results of the no-signal probe trials 
are presented in Table 4.3. Analyses revealed a main negative priming effect. 
Participants responded slower on ignored repetitions than on the control 
probes, F(1,18) = 24.17, p < .001. We found no main effect of the type of 
prime trial and the interaction between both main effects was also not 
significant, both F’s < 1. One-tailed t-tests revealed a negative priming effect 
when no signal was presented, t(18) = -4.36, p < .001, and when an invalid 
stop signal was presented, t(18) = -2.48, p < .05. When a valid stop signal was 
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presented and participants failed to inhibit their response, we found a 
significant difference between the control probe and the ignored repetition 
probe, t(18) = -2.00, p < .05. Most importantly, when the inhibition in valid 
stop trials succeeded, there was also a reliable negative priming effect, t(18) 
= -2.79, p < .01. To investigate whether the presentation of a stop signal 
delayed the responses in the next trial, we conducted a repeated measures 
ANOVA for the control probe trials. As in Experiment 1, no general slowing 
after the presentation of a stop signal was found, F < 1.  
 To summarize, the results of the no-signal probe trials differ from the 
findings of Experiment 1. The negative priming effect was always present, 
even after a successful selective stop. This suggests that simple and selective 
stopping influence differently the negative priming effect. 
 
Table 4.3: Reaction times of no-signal probe trials (SDs in parentheses) as a 
function of the presentation of a stop signal on the prime trial in Experiment 2. 
The negative priming effect was computed by subtracting the mean CRT of 
control probes from the mean CRT of ignored repetitions probes (* p < .05;  
** p < .01). 
 
Signal-trials 
 All analyses of stopping data were repeated measures ANOVAs with 
probe type (control vs. ignored repetition) as a within-subjects variable. 
Stopping results are presented in Table 4.4. In spite of the insertion of invalid 
stop signals, which made the stop task more complicated, the staircase 
procedure still produced good results. The probability of responding given a 
stop signal approached the obtained .50 (.46 and .47 for control probes and 
 Prime trial 
Priming condition No signal 
Invalid 
signal 
Signal-
respond 
Signal- 
inhibit 
Ignored repetition 764 (70) 769 (83) 772 (95) 756 (110) 
Control 740 (73) 750 (84) 750 (100) 734 (108) 
Negative priming 24 ** 19 * 22 * 22 ** 
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ignored repetitions respectively). There was no difference between the probe 
types, F < 1. As commonly observed (see Logan, 1994) and probably due to 
the higher cognitive demands, the SSRTs of selective stopping were longer 
than the SSRTs of simple stopping. However, there was again no difference 
between control probes and ignored repetitions, for SSRTs and SSDs, both Fs 
< 1. This clearly suggests that, like simple stopping, selective stopping is not 
influenced by negative priming. Finally, CRT data of invalid stop signal 
probes and signal-respond probes were analyzed separately. Like the 
comparisons in the primary task, we performed one-tailed t-tests. A negative 
priming effect was found for both invalid-signal probes and signal-respond 
probes, t(18) = -3.40, p < .01 and t(18) = -2.01, p < .05 respectively. These 
analyses of stopping data are in line with the results of Experiment 1 and 
suggest that inhibition of responses in the probe trial is not influenced by the 
distractors of the prime trial. 
 
Table 4.4: SSRTs, probabilities of responding given a stop signal, stop signal 
delay, signal-respond RT, and RTs of invalid stop trials in Experiment 2 (SDs in 
parentheses). The negative priming effect was computed by subtracting the mean 
CRT of control probes from the mean CRT of ignored repetitions probes  
(* p < .05). 
 
 Priming Condition 
 Ignored repetition Control Negative priming 
Stop signal RT 238 (94) 235 (93) 3 
Response ratio (%) 46.0 (6.1) 46.9 (6.0) - 0.9 
Stop signal delay 480 (114) 489 (117) -9 
Signal-respond RT 774 (77) 751 (84) 23 * 
Invalid signal RT 761 (121) 731 (110) 30 * 
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GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
 In the present study, we introduced stop signals in a negative priming 
design. This allowed us to investigate how negative priming and stop signal 
inhibition influence each other. Two studies (Kramer et al., 1992; Rieger & 
Gauggel, 1999) have found after-effects of the behavioural inhibition in the 
stop signal task and suggested that there could be similarities with the 
negative priming effect. Negative priming is typically found when two 
stimuli are presented and the distractor of the prime trial (n) is the target of 
the probe trial (n+1). In the stop signal task, responses are also slowed down 
when participants have had to suppress a response in the previous trial.  
 The stopping data of Experiment 1 revealed that stopping performance 
in the probe trial is not affected by negative priming. SSRTs of control and 
ignored repetitions did not differ at all, just as no differences between SSDs 
are found. This finding indicates that the negative priming effect and 
stopping responses rely on different mechanisms and also contradicts the 
inhibition account of negative priming. Based on this account, it would be 
expected that stopping responses should be faster on ignored repetition 
probes. Due to the residual inhibition, responses on the probe target are 
already slightly suppressed, which could make the stop signal inhibition 
faster.  
 Contrary to the finding that stopping is not influenced by negative 
priming, the presentation of a stop signal in the prime trial did influence the 
performance in the probe trial, but only when inhibition succeeded. After a 
successful inhibition of the response the negative priming effect completely 
disappeared. Based on the inhibition account, a negative priming effect after 
a signal-inhibit prime would be expected, since both target and distractor 
are suppressed when a stop signal was presented and inhibition succeeded. 
The participants did not know in advance whether a stop signal would be 
presented in the prime trial and the stop signal was on average presented 
500 ms after the stimulus display. Therefore, we assume that participants 
already discriminated the distractor from the target and started ignoring this 
distract or, before the stop signal was presented. The fact that we did not 
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find any effect of the SSD split concerning the negative priming supports 
this assumption. When it is assumed that stopping a response only has 
consequences for response execution, the memory-based accounts likewise 
cannot directly explain the findings. The feature mismatch theory would 
predict that after the presentation of a stop signal, negative priming would 
still be present, because there is still a mismatch of the stimuli. It could be 
argued that due to the absence of the stop signal in the probe trial, the 
mismatch would be smaller. However, this hypothesis implies that after 
signal-respond trials, the negative priming effect would also disappear, 
which was not the case. Secondly, the episodic retrieval account would also 
expect a conflict at the response level due to the 'do not respond' tag of the 
prime and the 'do respond' tag of the probe trial. However, the automatic 
retrieval of previously stored information is crucial in both accounts of 
negative priming. But simple stopping requires no dissociation between 
distractor and target or processing of stimulus characteristics. In this version 
of stopping, all processes and responses are cancelled without further 
discrimination (e.g., De Jong et al., 1995). This would also imply that the 
episode no longer contains all information of the distractor, due to the 
general stop. But without the specific stimulus information, no conflict could 
arise on ignored repetitions and at the end, no negative priming effects are 
found.  
 In Experiment 2, the finding that stopping responses are not influenced 
by negative priming and the hypothesis that a general nonspecific stop was 
responsible for the disappearance of the negative priming was further 
investigated. A selective stop paradigm was introduced, inspired by Logan 
et al. (1986), who suggested that the selective stop task requires a more 
specific way of inhibiting the response, in stead of the general stop in simple 
stopping. Stimulus characteristics are important with this version of the stop 
task. In contrast to signal-inhibit trials of Experiment 1, the distractor must 
be identified, resulting in both suppression of the distractor and storage of 
an episode with specific stimulus information, just as with no-signal trials.  
 The results of Experiment 2 were straightforward. As in Experiment 1, 
stopping data clearly demonstrated that the inhibition of motor responses 
was not affected by negative priming. Therefore, we suggest that the 
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stopping data of both Experiments 1 and 2 are in favor of the memory-based 
accounts. After all, the finding that both simple and selective stopping are 
not influenced by negative priming demonstrates that the mechanism 
causing negative priming is independent of the mechanisms in the stop 
signal task. This contradicts the hypothesis of Tipper (Houghton & Tipper, 
1994; Tipper & Cranston, 1985) that negative priming is due to a residual 
inhibition of the link between stimulus and response mechanism.  
 The second main result of Experiment 2 is that after a successful 
selective stop the negative priming effect was still present. This finding 
clearly suggests that the disappearance of the negative priming effect was 
due to a general nonspecific stop, which not only affects response execution 
but also affects all task-related processes. This has two main implications. 
First of all, when stimulus processing is abruptly stopped without full 
discrimination between distractor and target because such discrimination is 
irrelevant, negative priming does not occur. This is clearly demonstrated by 
the difference between simple and selective stopping. In terms of the 
selective inhibition account, this would mean that the distractor becomes 
selectively inhibited in a late stage. In terms of the memory-based accounts, 
this would implicate that stimulus processing must be almost fulfilled before 
specific stimulus information could be stored. Secondly, the different results 
in Experiments 1 and 2 are further evidence of at least partially different 
mechanisms in simple and selective stopping, as previously suggested 
(Logan, 1994; van den Wildenberg & van der Molen, 2004).  
 In another paradigm, the backward inhibition paradigm (Mayr & Keele, 
2000), similar effects of stopping are found. Mayr and Keele suggested that 
when participants switched from one task to another, the irrelevant task-set 
becomes suppressed, which makes the reactivation of the suppressed set in 
the next trial more difficult. Schuch and Koch (2003) found that after no-go 
signals with a variant of the stop signal paradigm, the backward inhibition 
effect disappeared. It is noteworthy that recently MacLeod, Dodd, Sheard, 
Wilson, and Bibi (2003) suggested a pure memory-based account for 
backward inhibition and task switching in general (see Monsell, 2003, for a 
review), similar to the memory-based accounts of negative priming. Like in 
negative priming, information about previous responses related to the 
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stimulus is retrieved, causing interference when there is a mismatch. The 
disappearance of the backward inhibition effect could then be explained in 
the same way we explained our findings. This also suggests that the findings 
of the present study could be extended to other paradigms, such as task 
switching.  
 Thus, the only after-effect of behavioural inhibition was the 
disappearance of the negative priming effect in Experiment 1. Unlike Rieger 
and Gauggel (1999), in neither of the two experiments did we find a general 
slowing of the responses after a stop signal. Probably, this is due to the 
presentation of the trials in pairs. It was possible that two signals were 
presented after each other, but never within one pair. This could influence 
the strategies of participants. Normally, participants tend to delay their 
responses in a stop signal task. However, due to the fact that a signal probe 
trial never followed a signal prime trial, participants could speed up their 
responses a bit after a signal prime trial. This would explain why we did not 
find a general slowing down of the responses after the presentation of a stop 
signal.  
 To conclude, the results of the present study indicate on the one hand 
that behavioural inhibition is not influenced by the negative priming effect. 
We suggest that this is in favor of the memory-based accounts. On the other 
hand, behavioural inhibition, as operationalized in the simple stop signal 
task, has an effect on negative priming. This finding is possibly due to the 
cancellation of all task-related processes, as a result of which the negative 
priming effect disappeared in the next trial.  
 

 
CHAPTER 5 
STOPPING WHEN SWITCHING:  
IT DOES MATTER 
 
 In the last empirical chapter of this doctoral thesis, the stop signal task is 
combined with cued task switching In Chapters 2 and 3, the stop signal 
experiments revealed something about the nature of selective suppression in 
different interference or conflict tasks. In Chapter 4, our experiments 
demonstrated that the negative priming effect disappeared when there was 
no need to discriminate between distractor and target, whereas response 
execution seemed not necessary to find a negative priming effect on the next 
trial.  
 In the following two studies, we will rely on these latter findings of 
Chapter 4. We already mentioned in the discussion of the study presented in 
Chapter 4 that the results obtained with the negative priming paradigm, 
possibly could be generalized to the task switching paradigm, and this for 
several reasons. First of all, it was suggested that there might be an overlap 
between the typically observed switch cost in task switching and the 
negative priming effect (see e.g., MacLeod, Dodd, Sheard, Wilson, & Bibi, 
2003). Furthermore, in a recent paper of Rothermund, Wentura and De 
Houwer (2005), a new model is presented that explains negative priming in 
terms of the retrieval of stimulus-response associations. Since a similar 
explanation is proposed by Wylie and Allport (2000) to explain the switch 
cost, it seems plausible to assume that our findings with negative priming 
can indeed be generalized to the task switching paradigm. Secondly, Schuch 
and Koch (2003) introduced no-go trials in a typical task switching 
experiment and found that after a no-go trial no switch cost was observed.  
 Thus, in this chapter, we started from our own findings with the 
negative priming paradigm and from the Schuch and Koch paper, and 
looked at the effect of response inhibition on task switching. It was predicted 
that the switch cost would disappear after a signal-inhibit trial. Secondly, the 
stop signal task has, compared to the go/no-go paradigm, the advantage of 
that it allows investigation of the influence of task switching on response 
inhibition. Results of Friedman and Miyake (2004) suggest a relation 
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between prepotent response inhibition and task switching. Also, in a review 
article of Aron, Robbins, and Poldrack (2004) it was suggested that there was 
a close overlap between task switching and response inhibition, since both 
functions consistently activates the inferior parietal cortex.  
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INHIBITING RESPONSES WHEN SWITCHING:  
DOES IT MATTER? 19,20 
 
In the present study, cued task-switching was combined with the stop-signal 
paradigm in order to investigate the interaction between response inhibition and 
task-switching. In line with earlier findings from Schuch and Koch (2003), the results 
show that switch and repetition trials following inhibited responses were processed 
equally fast. This confirms the hypothesis of Schuch and Koch (2003) that after signal-
inhibit trials there is less interference, resulting in a disappearance of the switch cost. 
Furthermore, stopping performance was not affected by task-switching. The 
estimated stop-signal latencies were similar for switch and repetition trials, while the 
stop-signal delays were longer for switch compared to repetition trials. This result 
suggests that response inhibition and the inhibition processes in cued task-switching 
are not relying upon a common mechanism.  
 
                                                          
19 Verbruggen, F., Liefooghe, B., Szmalec, A., & Vandierendonck, A. (2005). Inhibiting 
responses when switching: Does it matter? Experimental Psychology, 52, 125-130. 
20 We would like to thank Iring Koch and Ulrich Mayr for their useful comments on a 
previous version of this manuscript. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 It is a well-replicated finding that switching between tasks is associated 
with a cost in performance which is indicated by longer latencies and higher 
error rates. In the last decade, a substantial body of research attempted to 
clarify this switch-cost by identifying the different component processes and 
patterns of interference that are present during task-switching (see Monsell, 
2003 for a review). Over the years, two main approaches to task-switching 
can be distinguished. On the one hand, Rogers and Monsell (1995) suggested 
that switch-costs reflect an active reconfiguration of the parameters 
associated with each task (i.e., the task-set). Switching would take more time 
compared to repetition because it involves the additional process of 
changing the task-set. On the other hand, Allport, Styles, and Hsieh (1994) 
proposed that the switch-cost reflects a kind of proactive interference from 
one trial to another. Within this account, a switch trial is harder because 
some residual activation from a previous trial, involving a different task, 
causes carryover effects. Later on, Wylie and Allport (2000) suggested that 
during task-switching stimulus-response associations are constantly 
modified. When a stimulus is presented, previous response related 
information of that stimulus is retrieved. In case of inconsistent information, 
there is interference that slows down the response selection. 
 Recently, a number of attempts have been made to integrate task-
switching within the broader framework of working memory. Within this 
vein, a fruitful proposal was made by Mayr (Mayr and Keele, 2000; Mayr 
and Kliegl, 2000). It was suggested that, when switching from one task to 
another, the irrelevant task-set must be inhibited or even displaced from 
working memory and the alternative task-set must be retrieved from long-
term memory. This position was refined by Schuch and Koch (2003) who 
presented compelling evidence that the suppression of the irrelevant task-set 
takes place in the response selection stage. They combined cued task-
switching with a go/no-go paradigm. On 25% of the trials (the no-go trials), a 
low tone was presented simultaneously with the stimulus indicating that 
participants did not have to react to that stimulus. Schuch and Koch (2003) 
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found that switch and repetition trials were processed equally fast when 
they followed no-go trials. In a subsequent experiment, they demonstrated 
that response selection and not response execution was the mediating factor. 
Therefore, Schuch and Koch (2003) explained those results by suggesting 
that after a no-go trial less residual activation interfered with the upcoming 
response selection. They consider response selection as a modifying agent 
during task-switching: When a response selection is made, the relevant 
response selection rules are activated and the irrelevant response translation 
rules are inhibited. This implies that the rules that were relevant on the 
previous trial are activated to some degree until the next response selection 
is done. Note that these ideas of Schuch and Koch (2003) are consistent with 
the proposals of Wylie and Allport (2000) since they all stress the fact that at 
least part of the switch cost is due to interference of the previous trial(s).  
 The aim of the present study is to further investigate the account of 
Schuch and Koch (2003) by extending their results with another inhibitory 
task: The stop signal task. Instead of fixed go/no-go signals, variable stop-
signals are used in order to explore the nature of the inhibitory process that 
Schuch and Koch (2003) assume to be present in task-switching.  
 In the stop-signal paradigm, participants usually have to execute a 
speeded choice reaction time task (Lappin & Eriksen, 1966; Logan, 1994; 
Logan & Cowan, 1984). Occasionally, a stop-signal is presented. The stop-
signal tells the participants to suppress their response. On short stop-signal 
delays (SSD; the interval between the presentation of the go signal and the 
stop-signal), participants can easily suppress their response. By contrast, 
when the stop-signal delay is long enough, participants will nearly always 
execute the response. Therefore, the important difference with go/no-go 
paradigms, like the one used by Schuch and Koch (2003), lays in the fact that 
the stop-signal is always presented after the stimulus onset and with a 
variable delay.  
 To explain the results found with the stop-signal paradigm, Logan and 
Cowan (1984) propose a race between two processes: A go process and a 
stop process. According to their horse-race model, if the stop process is 
completed before the go process, participants will inhibit their response 
(signal-inhibit trials). On the contrary, when the go process finishes before 
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the stop-process, participants will respond (signal-respond trials). Based on 
the assumptions of the horse-race model, it is possible to estimate the covert 
latency of stopping: The Stop-Signal Reaction Time (SSRT). The stop-signal 
paradigm has been used with different response modalities and different 
populations, and it is clear that it provides a useful instrument for 
measuring behavioural inhibition (for reviews see Logan, 1994, and Band, 
van der Molen & Logan, 2003).  
 Moreover, the combination of the stop-signal task with other paradigms 
has shown to be promising for investigation of the relation between different 
kinds of inhibition. On the one hand, Logan (1981) found that stopping 
spatially incompatible responses did not differ from suppressing spatially 
compatible responses. This finding led to the conclusion that resolving 
interference of spatially incompatible responses (Kornblum, Hasbroucq & 
Osman, 1990) and stopping of behaviour do not interact. On the other hand, 
several authors found that stopping motor responses was influenced by 
distracting information in flanker and Stroop tasks (e.g., Ridderinkhof, Band, 
& Logan, 1999; Verbruggen, Liefooghe, & Vandierendonck, 2004), indicating 
that there are common mechanisms in the suppression of the distractors in 
conflict tasks and response inhibition. This conclusion is based on the 
assumption that an interaction, indicated by longer stopping latencies, 
suggests a common mechanism, while additive effects should be found 
when the stop-signal task and the inquired paradigm call upon different 
resources. Therefore, in the present study we will also investigate whether 
the inhibitory process involved in cued task-switching is relying upon the 
same construct as response inhibition. 
 In summary, the present study aims to replicate the results of Schuch 
and Koch (2003) with a different inhibitory task, the stop-signal task, which 
can provide us some insights about the origin of the switch cost and the 
nature of the inhibitory process involved in cued task-switching.  
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EXPERIMENT 
 
METHOD 
 
Participants  
 Twenty-five undergraduate students in Psychology at Ghent University 
participated for course requirements and credit. All participants had normal 
or corrected-to-normal vision, were right-handed, and all were naive as to 
the purpose of the experiment. One participant was excluded from further 
data-analysis because of an error percentage of 32%. 
 
Materials 
 The experiment was run on a Pentium PC. Stimuli were presented on a 
17-inch monitor, placed at a distance of 50 cm in front of the participants. In 
the centre of the screen a white 2 by 2 grid (approximately 4° x 4°) was 
present during the entire experiment. On each trial a white circle with a 
radius of 1° was presented in the grid and participants had to decide 
whether it was located in the upper or lower part of the grid for the first task 
and if it was on the left or the right for the second task. For responding, both 
tasks were mapped onto the ‘7’ and ‘3’ keys of the numeric keypad. 
Depending on the task ‘7’ meant up or left, while ‘3’ meant down or right. 
The up-down task was indicated by two vertically opposing arrows (1.3° in 
length and 0.4° in height) and two horizontally opposing arrows indicated 
the left-right task. Occasionally a loud and clear auditory stop-signal (750 
Hz, 70dB, 50 ms) was presented shortly after the stimulus onset in the visual 
primary task. 
 
Procedure 
 The participants were tested individually. One block of 80 practice trials 
was followed by 8 blocks of 80 test trials with a small break after each block. 
Each trial started with the relevant arrows being displayed until the 
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response was given. A fore period of 300 ms elapsed and the circle was 
presented and required a response within 2,000 ms after its onset. When a 
response was given, the target disappeared and the 1,250 ms inter-trial 
interval started. On a pseudo-random selection of 25% of the trials, a stop-
signal was presented. This resulted in 80 repetition stop trials and 80 switch 
stop trials. The stop-signal delay was initially set at 250 ms and was 
continuously adjusted according to a staircase tracking algorithm (Levitt, 
1970) for each type of trial to obtain a probability of stopping of 50%. This 
method provides SSRT estimations that are derived from the central part of 
the no-signal RT distribution curve. Logan, Schachar and Tannock (1997; see 
also Band et al., 2003) demonstrated that ‘central’ estimates are relatively 
insensitive to violations of the horse-race model and therefore most reliable. 
In order to obtain an approximate probability of 50%, each time the subject 
responded to the stimulus in the presence of a stop-signal, the stop-signal 
delay decreased with 50 ms. Conversely, after a successful inhibition, the 
delay increased with 50 ms. In order to avoid ‘waiting’ strategies, 
participants were informed about the tracking procedure and about the fact 
that the probability of stopping will approximate 50%, irrespective of 
whether they were postponing their response or not. At the end of each 
block, feedback about their mean performance was presented: The mean 
CRT of no-signal trials and the percentage of suppressed trials. 
 
Stop latency estimation 
 SSRTs were estimated as proposed by Logan and Cowan (1984), based 
on the horse-race model. According to this model, after rank ordering the 
CRTs of no-signal trials, the left, fast part of this CRT-distribution is 
assumed to correspond to the distribution of CRTs of signal trials on which 
inhibition failed. The finishing time of the stop process corresponds to the 
nth CRT of the no-signal trials, where n is the result of multiplying the total 
number of no-signal trials by the probability of responding when a signal is 
presented, given a certain SSD. As the start of the inhibition process (mean 
SSD) and the finishing time are known, the SSRT can be estimated. The SSRT 
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is the result of the subtraction ‘finishing time minus start’ or ‘nth CRT minus 
SSD’ (see Logan, 1994).  
 
RESULTS 
 
 CRT and error data were subjected to a within-participant trimming 
procedure. Mean CRTs of correct trials and error percentages were 
calculated after removal of outlying CRTs; i.e., CRTs longer than 2 standard 
deviations above the mean were discarded from data analysis. This resulted 
in a data reduction of 4.6%. Since switch trials are expected to be slower, all 
post hoc tests were one-tailed t-tests. 
 
No-signal trials 
 The means of no-signal trials are presented in Table 5.1. We conducted a 
2 x 3 repeated measures ANOVA (p-value sphericity = .23), with properties 
of trial n (repetition vs. switch) and signal properties of trial n-1 (no-signal, 
signal-respond, signal-inhibit) as within-subjects variables. Repetition trials 
were generally faster than switch trials, F(1,23) = 13.72, p < .01, and there 
was also a main effect of trial n-1, F(2,46) = 14.06, p < .001. The interaction 
between both main effects was also significant, F(2,46) = 3.34, p < .05. Next, 
one-tailed t-tests showed that a switch cost was found when no signal was 
presented or when the inhibition failed the previous trial, t(23) = -3.41, p < 
.001 and t(23) = -2.50, p < .01, respectively. On the contrary, when inhibition 
succeeded, there was no longer a switch cost, t(23) = 0.23, p = .41.  
 Error analysis revealed no significant effect of the previous trial, F < 1. 
There was only a marginal significant switch cost, F(1,23) = 3.54, p = .07. 
However, the interaction was significant, F(2,46) = 4.97, p < .05. One-tailed t-
tests revealed a switch cost after no-signal trials, t(23) = -3.72, p < .001, and 
after signal-respond trials, t(23) = -2.23, p < .05. Like in the CRT-analysis, no 
switch cost was found after signal-inhibit trials, t(23) = 1.21, p = .12.  
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Table 5.1: Reaction times and error percentages of no-signal trials (SDs in 
parentheses) as a function of the presentation of a stop-signal on the previous trial. 
 
 Trial n-1 
Trial n No-signal Signal-inhibit Signal-respond 
 CRT Errors CRT Errors CRT Errors 
Repetition 
465   
(88) 
4.4   
(3.7) 
486 
(102) 
6.2   
(8.1) 
509 
(110) 
4.8   
(5.8) 
Switch 
498 
(126) 
6.5    
(5.5) 
484 
(107) 
4.9   
(6.6) 
535 
(115) 
6.5   
(6.7) 
Switch Cost 33 2.1 -2 -1.2 26 1.7 
 
Signal trials 
 All analyses are repeated measures ANOVAs with ‘repetition vs. 
switch’ as within-subjects variable. The probabilities of responding given a 
stop-signal approached the obtained .50 (.51 for repetition trials and .50 for 
switch trials, F(1,23) = 5.1, p < .05). As can be seen in Table 5.2, the mean SSD 
of repetition trials was significantly lower than the SSD of switch trials, 
F(1,23) = 4.99, p < .05. On the contrary, the SSRTs did not differ, F < 1. 
Finally, when the participant responded in spite of a stop-signal, again a 
switch cost was found, F(1,23) = 4.58, p < .05.  
 
Table 5.2: SSRTs, probabilities of responding given a stop-signal, stop-signal 
delay, and signal-respond RT (SDs in parentheses). 
 
 Priming Condition 
 Repetition Switch 
Stop-signal RT 207 (74) 206 (83) 
Response ratio (%) 51.4 (3.8) 50.3 (3.2) 
Stop-signal delay 253 (60) 273 (76) 
Signal-respond RT 419 (82) 442 (102) 
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DISCUSSION 
 
 The present study aimed to further investigate the account of Schuch 
and Koch (2003) by replicating their findings with different tasks. In analogy 
with previous research, our results confirm that switch and repetition trials 
subsequent to successfully inhibited responses are processed equally fast. 
This result generalizes the findings of Schuch and Koch (2003) since we 
combined a different cueing paradigm with another inhibitory task, the 
stop-signal task, suggesting that when there is no interference due to the 
previous trial, the switch cost disappears. However, an alternative 
explanation for the findings of Schuch and Koch (2003) and possibly for the 
present results has been made by Kleinsorge and Gajewski (2004). They 
suggested that participants are less willing to engage in advance task-set 
reconfiguration, which results in the disappearance of the switch cost. But 
contrary to the studies of both Schuch and Koch (2003) and Kleinsorge and 
Gajewski (2004) where a no-go paradigm was used, the use of a stop signal 
paradigm allows to investigate what happens after signal-respond trials. 
Based on the motivational explanation of Kleinsorge and Gajewski (2004), 
one would expect that after signal-respond trials no switch cost is 
observable, especially since the inhibition failed. However, the analysis 
clearly showed that notwithstanding participants responded slower on 
signal-respond trials, a switch cost was still observable. Therefore, we 
suggest that the motivational account of Kleinsorge and Gajewski (2004) 
cannot explain the present data pattern. 
 The use of the stop signal paradigm has also another implication, since 
the crucial manipulation was not restricted to the response selection stage, 
compared to Schuch and Koch (2003). After all, in the stop signal paradigm, 
responses can be inhibited even after the response selection has been made, 
as demonstrated by electrophysiological measures such as the lateralized 
readiness potential and electromyogram (De Jong, Coles, & Logan, 1995). 
Therefore, we suggest that response inhibition directly influences the 
activation of the stimulus-response rules. When the inhibition succeeds, the 
activation level of the stimulus response rules drops, with as a result a 
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disappearance of the switch cost because of a lower level of interference at 
the time of response selection of the next trial. 
 The present finding also converges with the results of a recent study on 
negative priming by Verbruggen, Liefooghe, and Vandierendonck (2005b). It 
was found that response inhibition on prime trials did abolish the ignored 
repetition effect on the probe trials. In case of no-signal primes or signal-
respond primes, a negative priming effect was found on the probe trial. The 
authors suggested that response inhibition in its simplest form cancels all 
processing, as a result of which no negative priming is found after a 
successful stop.  
 A further important result of the present experiment is the observed 
additivity between task-switching and response inhibition. First of all, the 
SSRTs of repetition trials and switch trials are almost equal, which suggests 
that the ease of response inhibition is the same for both types of trials. 
Secondly, the SSDs differ significantly from each other. Based on the 
assumptions of the horse race model, this SSD difference is also evidence for 
the independence of two mechanisms. After all, the tracking procedure used 
in the present experiment takes both inter-individual and intra-individual 
differences and also task difficulties into account. When two tasks, or in this 
experiment two types of trials (repetition vs. switch trials), differ from each 
other, the normally distributed CRT curves of no-signal trials are not 
completely overlapping. The curve of the more difficult task is situated more 
to the right. In relation to the stop process, this would imply that the SSD of 
the more difficult task is longer (see Logan, 1994, for an extensive discussion 
of this issue), provided that stopping performance and the primary task do 
not call upon the same mechanisms or are functionally independent. Note 
that functional dependency does not undermine the assumptions of the 
horse race model (see the simulations of Band et al., 2003). Taken together, 
the equal signal-respond ratios, equal SSRTs but different SSDs, suggest an 
additivity of processes involved in task-switching and stop-signal inhibition. 
In conclusion, response inhibition and the inhibitory processes involved in 
task-switching do not seem to rely upon a common mechanism. 
 Although this interaction was never directly tested, the present 
additivity is not surprising. Mayr and Keele (2000, p. 22) suggested that the 
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inhibitory process involved in task-switching may be ‘relatively 
impenetrable for higher-level control’ and prefer the notion of some lateral 
inhibition above the concept of a more active form of self inhibition. In a 
similar vein, results of Hübner, Dreisbach, Haider and Kluwe (2003) are in 
favour of an automatically triggered kind of inhibition again in analogy with 
the concept of lateral inhibition. However, the stop signal task is only found 
to interact with other inhibitory tasks that require active suppression of 
responses such as the antisaccade task (Logan & Irwin, 2000) and the flanker 
and Stroop task (Ridderinkhof et al., 1999; Verbruggen et al., 2004). 
Therefore, it seems reasonable that the presumed lateral inhibition in task 
switching does not interact with response inhibition. In summary, the 
present results offer some indirect additional evidence that the inhibitory 
process involved in task-switching is quite automatic and lateral in nature, 
although we cannot exclude an active form of inhibition. There are also 
reasons to believe that the found additivity is specific to the cued task 
switching paradigm that was used in the present study. First of all, we used 
a task where the relation between stimulus and response is very 
straightforward (e.g., Lu & Proctor, 2001). This implies that the demands on 
response selection and the related functions, such as inhibition, are probably 
restricted. The short latencies and small switch costs are in support for this 
hypothesis. Secondly, there is evidence from neuroimaging and lesion 
studies that both response inhibition and task switching consistently 
activates the inferior parietal cortex (Aron, Robbins, & Poldrack, 2004), 
suggesting a close functional overlap between both functions. Therefore, it is 
possible that by using tasks with higher demands on response selection or 
by using three tasks like in a backward inhibition paradigm (e.g., Mayr and 
Keele, 2000), response inhibition will be influenced by task switching.  
 Taken together, the present study offers a twofold extension of Schuch 
and Koch’s (2003) results. Firstly, the present results show that the activation 
ratio between the different response rules is important during task-
switching. Response inhibition modifies this ratio which leads to equal 
performances on subsequent switch and repetition trials. Secondly, there 
seems no common mechanism underlying response inhibition and inhibition 
in task-switching. Further research is however needed to clarify the 
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relationship between response inhibition and task switching in order to 
generalize the present findings. 
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SELECTIVE STOPPING IN TASK SWITCHING: 
 THE ROLE OF RESPONSE SELECTION AND  
RESPONSE EXECUTION21,22 
 
Recently, several studies stressed the role of response selection in cued task 
switching. The present study tried to investigate directly the hypothesis that no 
switch cost can be found when there was no response selection. In two experiments, 
we combined a cued task switching paradigm with the selective stopping paradigm. 
Results of the experiments demonstrated that a switch cost was found when 
participants selected a response, even without response execution. Alternatively, 
when the response was inhibited without the need of response selection, no switch 
cost was found. These results provide direct evidence for the distinct role of response 
selection in cued task switching and suggest that response execution is not a 
necessary factor to obtain a switch cost. 
 
                                                          
21 Verbruggen, F.,Liefooghe, B.,& Vandierendonck, A.(in press). Selective stopping in 
task switching: The role of response selection and response execution. Experimental 
Psychology. 
22 We would like to thank Thomas Kleinsorge and Ulrich Mayr for their useful 
comments on a previous version of this manuscript. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 It is a common finding that switching between two different tasks is 
associated with a cost in reaction times and accuracy (see Morsel, 2003, for a 
review). Different proposals have been made to explain this switch cost and 
it seems that at least two different kinds of processes contribute to the switch 
cost. Firstly, each task is assumed to be associated with internal constraints 
(i.e., the task set), enabling a correct performance of the task. Switching 
would take more time compared to repetition because it involves the 
additional active reconfiguration process of changing the task set (e.g., 
Rogers & Monsell, 1995). Secondly, Allport suggested that at least part of the 
switch cost is due to carry-over effects of the previous trial (Allport, Styles, & 
Hsieh, 1994). Later on, Wylie (Wylie & Allport, 2000; Wylie, Javitt, Fox, 2004) 
hypothesized that the retrieval of previous stimulus-response associations 
causes between-task interference on the current trial due to the response 
requirements of the task. This between-task interference delays the 
responding on the current trial and explains why there is still a switch cost 
present even when participants have sufficient time to prepare the task 
before the stimuli are presented. 
 Recently, also much interest has arisen in the role of response selection 
in the establishment of the switch cost. The first study that directly 
addressed the role of response selection in task switching was the paper of 
Schuch and Koch (2003). These authors suggested that in task switching 
there are overlapping stimulus-response rules of the different tasks. 
However, at the stage of response selection the irrelevant stimulus-response 
rules are inhibited. This inhibition of the task set is still observable on the 
next trial, causing a delay when participants have to switch to the task that 
was previously inhibited.  
 Schuch and Koch (2003) demonstrated the importance of response 
selection by integrating a go/no-go task with the cued task switching 
paradigm and the backward inhibition paradigm. They found that both the 
switch cost and the backward inhibition effect were absent after a no-go trial 
and suggested that this resulted from the absence of a response selection in a 
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no-go trial. No response selection means also that there is no application of 
the relevant task set. For that reason, there was also no inhibition of the 
irrelevant task set. In other words, there is no residual inhibition after a no-
go trial. Later on, Verbruggen, Liefooghe, Szmalec and Vandierendonck 
(2005a) replicated this finding with the simple stop signal task (see Logan, 
1994, for a review). Unlike a go/no-go task, the stop signal is always 
presented after the stimulus presentation. Basically, these authors found the 
same results as Schuch and Koch (2003). When participants could correctly 
inhibit their response on the previous trial (signal-inhibit trial), no switch cost 
was found. However, when participants responded in spite of a stop signal 
(signal-respond trial), there was still a switch cost. Verbruggen et al. (2005a) 
also suggested that these results are in favor of an account that stresses the 
role of response selection in task switching.  
 However, contrary to the explanation of Schuch and Koch (2003), 
Kleinsorge and Gajewski (2004) hypothesized that participants were less 
willing to engage in advance task set reconfiguration when occasionally no-
go trials were presented. Furthermore, they suggested that this lack of 
advanced preparation resulted in the disappearance of the switch cost. 
Although it is not exactly clear what can be expected after a signal-respond 
trial based on the motivational account of Kleinsorge and Gajewski (2004), 
one could assume that there would be no difference between trials that 
followed a signal-respond trial compared to trials that followed a signal-
inhibit trial. In both types of trials, there was a stop signal presented and 
Kleinsorge and Gajewski (2004) argued that the motivational aspect was 
context (or block) based. Thus, the important difference is that in signal-
respond trials, the inhibition failed and participants responded whereas on 
signal-inhibit trials there was no response. Therefore, Verbruggen et al. 
(2005a) suggested that their results obtained with the stop signal task were 
best explained by the hypothesis that response selection, or task set 
application, is an important and mediating factor in task switching.  
 In the present study, we wanted to further investigate the hypothesis 
that response selection and task set application is indeed a mediating factor 
in task switching, by means of two different selective stop signal tasks. 
Verbruggen et al. (2005a) used a simple stop task in which all responses had 
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to be inhibited when an auditory stop signal occurred. However, a selective 
stop task requires that the stop is controlled. A selective stop task can be 
based on a perceptual discrimination by using different tones (e.g., only stop 
when you hear a high tone; e.g., Bedard et al., 2003), or it can be based on a 
motor discrimination. Logan, Kantowitz and Riegler (1986), cited by Logan 
(1994), used this motor version of the selective stop task. On presentation of 
the stop signal, participants were required to withhold their response with 
the right hand but to ignore the signal when the response was to be made by 
the left hand. Logan et al. (1986) suggested that in this version of the stop 
task, motor inhibition should be focused on a single response instead of 
cancelling all responses as in the simple stop task. Unlike the perceptual 
variant of the selective stop signal task, the motor variant of the selective 
stop task implies a response selection in the primary task before the 
response inhibition since only half of the responses (e.g., only left-handed 
responses) should be inhibited.  
 For an investigation of the mediating role of response selection, the 
present study used cued task switching combined with selective stopping 
based on the response selection of the primary task in Experiment 1 and 
with selective stopping based on a perceptual discrimination in Experiment 
2. This procedure has two important advantages in comparison with 
previous studies. First of all, Schuch and Koch (2003) found a general 
increase of choice reaction times (CRTs) after a no-go trial and suggested 
that this increase was due to a switch from a no-go trial to a go trial. Only 
when this switch was made (i.e., deciding whether they had to respond or 
inhibit), participants would proceed processing the stimulus and the 
appropriate response. But this implied, as they pointed out (Schuch & Koch, 
2003, p.96), that the go/no-go switch and the task switch should have 
additive effects in order to preserve their hypothesis that the absence of 
response selection in a no-go trial caused the disappearance of the switch 
cost on the next trial. By using the different forms of selective stopping, we 
avoided this problem since after different forms of stopping the same switch 
had to be made. Secondly, in both the studies of Schuch and Koch (2003) and 
Verbruggen et al. (2005a) response selection and response execution were 
confounded in the sense that the absence of response selection was always 
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associated with an absence of response execution. Schuch and Koch (2003) 
tackled this problem indirectly in their Experiment 3 and 4 by demonstrating 
that response execution without response selection did not cause a switch 
cost on the next trial. However, one could argue that their manipulation 
(‘tap both response buttons’) influenced also other processes besides 
response selection.  
 In Experiment 1 of the present study, there was a direct test of the 
suggestion that response selection without response execution is a sufficient 
factor in the establishment of the switch cost. If the response selection 
hypothesis is correct, one would expect a switch cost after a correctly 
inhibited trial in the selective stop signal task based on response selection. In 
order to be sure that participants could not base their decision about the 
validity of the stop signal on stimulus features, we used eight different digits 
in two different tasks: A parity task and a magnitude task. We predicted that 
in Experiment 1 a switch cost should be present after a correctly inhibited 
trial (i.e., a signal-inhibit trial) when response selection in the primary task is 
a mediating factor in the establishment of the switch cost on the next trial. 
 
EXPERIMENT 1 
 
METHOD 
 
Participants 
 Twenty first-year psychology students (18 females and 2 males) at 
Ghent University (Belgium) participated for course requirements and 
credits. All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, were 
right-handed, and all were naive as to the purpose of the experiment. 
 
Materials 
 The experiment was run on a Pentium 4 PC running Tscope (Stevens, 
Lammertyn, Verbruggen, & Vandierendonck, in press) and the stimuli were 
presented on a 17-inch monitor. We used the digits 1-9 (0.6 x 0.3 cm), 
excluding 5. The white digits always appeared in the centre of the screen on 
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a black background (see Figure 5.1). The task cues were presented on the left 
and the right of the digit. The letters ‘On’ (for ‘oneven’, meaning odd) and 
‘Ev’ (for ‘even’, meaning even) indicated the parity task; the letters ‘Kl’ (for 
‘kleiner’, meaning smaller) and ‘Gr’ (for ‘groter’, meaning larger) indicated 
the magnitude task. The position of the cues always corresponded to the 
relevant response mapping. For example, ‘On’ was always presented on the 
left of the digit whereas ‘Ev’ was always presented on the right of the digit. 
Responses were collected via a response box connected to the parallel port of 
the PC. Occasionally (one third of the trials), an auditory stop signal (750Hz, 
50 dB, 75 ms) was presented through closed headphones (Sennheiser HD 
265-1) shortly after the stimulus onset in the primary task. The validity of the 
stop signal was presented at the center of the top and bottom of the screen. 
For example, when participants had to stop their responses with the left 
hand and ignore the stop signal in case of right-handed responses, we 
presented ‘LEFT = STOP’ in Dutch (‘LINKS = STOPPEN’) at the top and 
bottom of the screen (see Figure 5.1). This information remained on the 
screen during the whole experiment. 
 
Task and procedure 
 There were two different tasks and the same two response buttons were 
used for both tasks. In the parity task, odd was mapped on the index finger 
of the left hand and even was mapped on the index finger of the right hand. 
‘Smaller than five’ was mapped on the left finger and ‘larger than five’ was 
mapped on the right finger. The validity of the stop signal was dependent 
on the response hand. One half of the participants had to ignore the stop 
signal when the response was with the right hand and had to inhibit left 
handed responses. This mapping was reversed for the other half of the 
participants. Each trial started with the presentation of the task cue. After 
300 ms, the digit appeared in the middle of the screen and required a 
response within 2,000 ms in case of no-signal trials or invalid signal trials. 
Both the cue and the stimulus remained on the screen until the response was 
given, after which the trial ended. When a valid stop signal was presented, 
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the trial ended after 1,500 ms unless participants had responded. The 
intertrial interval was 1,250 ms.  
 Participants received oral instructions. The experiment consisted of one 
practice phase and one experimental phase. Firstly, there was one practice 
block of 20 trials without stop signals. In a second practice block of 48 trials, 
stop signals could occur. During the practice phase, participants received 
immediate feedback. The word ‘FOUT’ (meaning wrong) appeared in the 
centre of the screen for 500 ms when participants made an error. When 
participants incorrectly suppressed a response on an invalid stop signal, the 
word ‘REAGEER’ (meaning react) was presented. Finally, when the 
inhibition failed, the word ‘STOP’ appeared. The experimental phase 
consisted of eight blocks of 96 trials. On a random selection of one third of 
the trials, a stop signal was presented. Half of the stop signals was valid, half 
of the stop signals was invalid. This resulted in 64 valid and 64 invalid stop 
signals for repetition trials and 64 valid and 64 invalid stop trials for the 
switch trials. During the experiment, participants received feedback at the 
end of each block only: The number of errors made during the block, the 
mean reaction times (CRT), the amount of false alarms (i.e., no response 
when an invalid stop signal was presented) and the mean probability of 
stopping were presented.  
 The stop signal delay was initially set at 250 ms and continuously 
adjusted according to separately staircase tracking procedures for repetition 
and switch trials to obtain a probability of stopping of .50. In order to avoid 
‘waiting’ strategies, participants were informed about the tracking 
procedure and about the fact that the probability of stopping will 
approximate 50%, irrespective of whether they were postponing their 
response or not. Each time a participant responded to the stimulus in the 
presence of a valid stop signal, the stop signal delay decreased with 50 ms. 
When inhibition succeeded after a valid stop signal, the stop signal delay 
increased with 50 ms. After an invalid stop signal, the stop signal delay was 
not adjusted. Based on the assumptions of the horse-race model, SSRT can 
be calculated by simply subtracting ‘mean SSD’ from ‘mean CRT’ (Logan, 
1994).  
 
172     CHAPTER 5 
Figure 5.1: Example of the display of the screen during the experiment. 
 
RESULTS 
 
 CRT data were subjected to a within-participant trimming procedure. 
Mean CRTs of correct trials were calculated after removal of outlying CRTs 
(3 standard deviations above the mean). This resulted in a data reduction of 
0.8%. Since there were few false alarms (1.6%; i.e., no response when an 
invalid stop signal was presented), these data were not further analyzed. All 
reported F-values are approximations to Wilks’ lambda. 
 
No-signal data 
 No-signal data are presented in Table 5.3. CRTs were analyzed by 
means of a 2 (trial n: Repetition vs. switch) by 4 (trial n-1: No-signal, invalid 
signal, signal-respond, signal-inhibit) repeated measures MANOVA. Firstly, 
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for CRTs there was a general switch cost on trial n, F(1,19) = 67.28, p < .001. 
The signal properties of trial n-1 also affected the CRTs on the trial n, F(3,17) 
= 76.40, p < .001. Both main effects interacted significantly, F(3,17) = 39.64, p 
< .001. Secondly, two-tailed t-tests were performed as a function of the signal 
properties of trial n-1. After all types of trials, we found a switch cost. There 
was a switch cost after a no-signal trial, t(19) = -3.85, p < .005, or when an 
invalid stop signal was presented on trial n-1, t(19) = -11.74, p < .001. We 
found also a switch cost when after both a signal-respond trial, t(19) = -5.17, 
p < .001, and after a signal-inhibit trial, t(19) = -7.05, p < .001. 
 A similar pattern was observed for the error data. A 2 (trial n: Repetition 
vs. switch) by 4 (trial n-1: No-signal, invalid signal, signal-respond, signal-
inhibit) repeated measures MANOVA revealed a main effect of trial n, 
F(1,19) = 24.94, p < .001, and trial n-1, F(3,17) = 168.6, p < .001. The interaction 
was also significant, F(3,17) = 4.48, p < .05. A switch cost was observed after 
a no-signal trial, t(19) = -3.50, p < .005, and after a signal-inhibit trial, t(19) = -
4.30, p < .001. However, after an invalid stop signal and after a signal-
respond trial, the switch cost disappeared, t(19) = 1.12, p = .23 and t(19) = -
1.11, p = .28, respectively.  
 
Table 5.3: Choice reaction times (CRT) and error percentages (E%) in Experiment 1 
(SDs in parentheses) of repetition trials and switch trials as a function of the signal 
properties of trial n-1. The switch cost was computed by subtraction the means of 
repetition trials of the means of the switch trials (* p < .005; ** p < 001). 
 
 Trial n-1 
 No-signal Invalid signal Signal-respond Signal-inhibit 
 CRT E% CRT E% CRT E% CRT E% 
Repetition 
trial  
717 
(119) 
2.8 
(1.8) 
760 
(31) 
4.8 
(0.8) 
812 
(36) 
4.4 
(1.4) 
852 
(52) 
2.1 
(1.0) 
Switch  
trial  
754 
(144) 
4.6 
(2.6) 
836 
(50) 
4.3 
(1.5) 
888 
(81) 
5.1 
(1.4) 
868 
(52) 
3.0 
(0.5) 
Switch 
cost 
37* 1.8* 76** -0.5 76** 0.7 16** 0.9** 
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Signal-data 
 Although the stop signal inhibition was complex, the staircase tracking 
procedure still produced relatively good results (probability of responding 
given a stop signal was .47). Thus, SSRTs could be reliably estimated. As can 
be seen in Table 5.4, response inhibition in the selective stop task was 
influenced by task switching, indicated by longer SSRTs for switch trials 
than for repetition trials, t(19) = -6.17, p < .001. When a stop signal was 
presented but participants responded (i.e., valid signal-respond trials), a 
switch cost was observed, t(19) = -4.96, p < .001. Also, when an invalid stop 
signal was presented and participants correctly ignored the signal (i.e., 
invalid stop trials), there was also a switch cost, t(19) = -3.81, p < .005.  
 
Table 5.4: Stop signal reaction times (SSRT), signal-respond RTs (V-SRT) and RTs 
of invalid stop trials (IV-SRT) in Experiment 1 (SDs in parentheses; * p < .005;  
** p < 001).  
 
 SSRT V-SRT IV-SRT 
Repetition trial 254 (107) 694 (131) 656 (118) 
Switch trial 303 (108) 761 (158) 725 (155) 
Switch cost 49** 67** 69* 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
 In Experiment 1, we hypothesized that if response selection is indeed 
the mediating factor in task switching, as suggested by Schuch and Koch 
(2003), a switch cost should be present, after a signal-inhibit trial since 
participants had to make a response selection before they knew the validity 
of the stop signal. The results of Experiment 1 provided direct evidence for 
this hypothesis since the switch cost was present after all types of trials, even 
after a correctly inhibited response. Although this cost was smaller, it was 
still significant. This finding clearly indicates that response selection is a 
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mediating, sufficient factor in task switching, without the execution of the 
response.  
 A second important the finding is that response inhibition in the 
selective stop task and task switching do interact. This is different from the 
findings with the simple stop task. Verbruggen et al. (2005a) found that the 
SSRTs of switch trials were comparable to the SSRTs of repetition trials. 
However, in Experiment 1, they did differ significantly. We will get round to 
this finding in the general discussion. 
 
EXPERIMENT 2 
 
 In Experiment 1, a switch cost was observed when the inhibition on the 
previous trial succeeded. In other words, there was no response execution 
on the previous trial. We argued that this finding was due to the fact that 
participants had to make a response selection before they knew whether 
they had to stop or not. However, another possibility would be that the 
different findings in Experiment 1 and the study of Verbruggen et al. (2005a) 
are due to the more complex form of selective stopping – in comparison with 
simple stopping – in Experiment 1, unrelated to the response selection. 
Therefore, in Experiment 2, cued task switching was combined with a 
selective stopping based on a perceptual discrimination by using different 
tones (e.g., Bedard et al., 2003). This form of selective stopping does not 
require a response selection in the primary task. If the findings of 
Experiment 1 were indeed due to the response selection in the selective stop 
task, no switch cost should be present after a signal-inhibit trial in case of 
selective stopping based on a perceptual discrimination.  
 
METHOD 
 
Participants 
 Nineteen first-year psychology students (17 females and 2 males) at 
Ghent University (Belgium) participated for course requirements and 
credits. None of the participants participated in Experiment 1. All 
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participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, were right-handed, 
and all were naive as to the purpose of the experiment. 
 
Materials, task and procedure 
 The only difference in comparison with Experiment 1 is related to the 
stop signals. The validity of the stop signal was no longer dependent on the 
response hand. Instead, we used a perceptual variant of the selective stop 
signal task; i.e., the pitch of a tone determined whether participants had to 
stop or not. One half of the participants had to ignore a low tone (250Hz) 
and suppress their response when a high tone (750Hz) occurred. This 
mapping was reversed for the other half of the participants. Information 
about the validity remained on the screen during the experiment. For 
example, when a high pitched stop signal was valid, ‘HIGH = STOP’ was 
presented in Dutch (‘HOOG = STOPPEN’) at the top and bottom of the 
screen. There were no other changes in comparison with Experiment 1. 
 
RESULTS 
 
 We used the same trimming procedure as in Experiment 1. This resulted 
in a data-loss of 1.6%. The percentage of false alarms was again very low 
(1.3%) and was not further analyzed. All reported F-values are 
approximations to Wilks’ lambda. 
 
No-signal data 
 Like in Experiment 1, CRTs were analyzed by means of a 2 (trial n: 
Repetition vs. switch) by 4 (trial n-1: No-signal, invalid signal, signal-
respond, signal-inhibit) repeated measures MANOVA. Results are presented 
in Table 5.5. There was a switch cost on trial n, F(1,18) = 42.41, p < .001, and 
an effect of trial n-1, F(3,16) = 129.33, p < .001. Both main effects interacted 
significantly, F(3,16) = 13.33, p < .001. There was a switch cost when the 
previous trial was a no-signal trial, t(18) = -3.54, p < .005. We also found a 
switch cost when an invalid stop signal was presented on trial n-1, t(18) = -
7.16, p < .001, or when participants responded when a valid stop signal was 
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presented, t(18) = -6.22, p < .001. However, there was no switch cost after a 
signal-inhibit trial, t(18) = 1.40, p = .18. 
 For the error data, the 2 (trial n: Repetition vs. switch) by 4 (trial n-1: No-
signal, invalid signal, signal-respond, signal-inhibit) repeated measures 
MANOVA, revealed a main effect of trial n-1, F(3,16) = 61.33, p < .001. There 
was no main effect of task switching, F < 1. The interaction tended to be 
marginally significant, F(3,16) = 3.03, p = .06. We found only a switch cost 
after a no-signal trial, t(19) = -2.61, p < .05. There was no switch cost after an 
invalid stop signal, t(18) = .77, p = .25, after a signal-respond trial, t(18) = 
1.40, p = .18, or after a valid stop signal, t(18) = .50, p = .62.  
 
Table 5.5: Choice reaction times (CRT) and error percentages (E%) in Experiment 2 
(SDs in parentheses) of repetition trials and switch trials as a function of the signal 
properties of trial n-1. The switch cost was computed by subtraction the means of 
repetition trials of the means of the switch trials († p < .05, * p < .005; ** p < 001). 
 
 Trial n-1 
 No-signal Invalid signal Signal-respond Signal-inhibit 
 CRT E% CRT E% CRT E% CRT E% 
Repetition 
trial 
616 
(90) 
4.1 
(4.2) 
656 
(21) 
4.7 
(1.1) 
719 
(26) 
4.1 
(2.5) 
702 
(19) 
3.0 
(0.7) 
Switch  
trial 
668 
(110) 
5.8 
(5.5) 
714 
(48) 
4.5 
(0.5) 
763 
(47) 
3.5 
(1.9) 
699 
(19) 
2.8 
(1.7) 
Switch 
cost 
52* 1.7† 58** -0.2 44** -0.6 -3 -0.2 
 
Signal-data 
 Signal-data are presented in Table 5.6. Again, the staircase tracking 
procedure produced good results (probability of responding given a stop 
signal was .51). Response inhibition in the selective stop task at a perceptual 
level was also influenced by task switching, t(19) = -2.73, p < .05. When a 
valid stop signal occurred but participants responded, a switch cost was 
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observed, t(19) = -3.93, p < .001. This was also the case when an invalid stop 
signal was presented, t(19) = -2.80, p < .05.  
 
Table 5.6: Stop signal reaction times (SSRT), signal-respond RTs (V-SRT) and RTs 
of invalid stop trials (IV-SRT) in Experiment 4 (SDs in parentheses; * p < .05; ** p < 
005).  
 
 SSRT V-SRT IV-SRT 
Repetition trial 277 (108) 575 (71) 758 (119) 
Switch trial 306 (116) 632 (90) 814 (107) 
Switch cost 29* 57** 56* 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
 The results of Experiment 2 are straightforward. First of all, we 
replicated the interaction of Experiment 1 between response inhibition and 
task switching, indicating that there are indeed common mechanisms or 
shared resources in both types of tasks. Secondly, we predicted no switch 
cost after a signal-inhibit trial because no response selection had to be made 
in the primary task. This hypothesis was confirmed. These results are in line 
with the findings of Verbruggen et al. (2005a) and suggest that the finding of 
Experiment 1 that a switch cost was present after a signal-inhibit trial was 
not simply due to the fact that a selective stop task was used. However, 
there remains another mediating factor that can have contributed to the 
present results.23 After all, there are no response repetitions after a signal-
inhibit trial and it is a common finding in the literature about task switching 
that the switch cost is smaller for a response alternation (see e.g., Rogers & 
Monsell, 1995; Meiran, 2000). Thus, if the effects of task switching in 
Experiment 2 are only due to response repetition trials, no switch cost is 
expected after a signal-inhibit trial, regardless of whether participants had to 
make a response selection or not. Therefore, in order to exclude this 
                                                          
23 We would like to thank Ulrich Mayr for this suggestion. 
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possibility, we performed post-hoc analyses for both experiments and 
looked what the influence of response alternations was in our study. 
 
EXPERIMENT 1 AND 2:  
RESPONSE REPETITIONS VS. RESPONSE ALTERNATIONS 
 
 For no-signal trials in both experiments, we analyzed the effect of 
response repetitions vs. response alternations on the switch cost by means of 
a 2 (response: Repetition vs. alternation) by 2 (task: Repetition vs. 
alternation) repeated measures ANOVA. In Experiment 1, there were main 
effects of response alternation, F(1,19) = 45.01, p < .001, and task alternation, 
F(1,19) = 38.38, p < .001. As can be seen in Table 5.7, both main effects 
interacted, F(1,19) = 16.49, p < .001. Post-hoc two-tailed t-tests revealed that 
the switch cost was significant for both response repetitions, t(19) = -6.55, p < 
.001, and response alternations, t(19) = -2.48, p < .05. Thus, although the 
switch cost was significantly smaller for a response alternation, the switch 
cost was still significant. Interestingly, the switch cost for a response 
alternation, was statistically not different from the switch cost found after a 
signal-inhibit trial (21 ms vs. 16 ms), F(1,19) < 1.  
 In Experiment 2, similar results were found. There was a marginally 
significant main effect of the response alternation, F(1,18) = 3.63, p = .07, and 
a significant effect of task alternation, F(1,19) = 15.17, p < .001. The 
interaction between both main effects was again significant, F(1,19) = 8.54, p 
< .01. Two-tailed t-tests revealed that the switch cost was significant for both 
response repetitions, t(18) = -3.81, p < .01, and response alternations, t(18) = -
3.54, p < .01. 
 In sum, the fact that there are no response repetitions after a signal-
inhibit trial cannot explain why there is no switch cost observed after this 
type of trial in Experiment 2. On the other hand, it can explain why the 
switch cost is smaller after a signal-inhibit trial compared to the trial that 
followed a no-signal trial in Experiment 1. When we looked only at trials 
that followed a no-signal trial but where the response alternated, there was 
no longer a difference in switch cost. This can also be seen as extra evidence 
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for the fact that response selection, or task application, and not response 
execution is the crucial factor in task switching. 
 
Table 5.7: Choice reaction times (CRT) in both experiments (SDs in parentheses) of 
repetition trials and switch trials for both response repetitions and response 
alternations. The switch cost was computed by subtraction the means of repetition 
trials of the means of the switch trials († p < .05, * p < .005; ** p < 001). 
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
 In the present study, we further investigated the role of response 
selection in task switching. Schuch and Koch (2003) demonstrated that after 
a no-go trial without response selection, no switch cost was observed. They 
interpreted these findings as evidence for the hypothesis that response 
selection on the previous trial is necessary to observe a switch cost on the 
current trial. A similar data pattern was observed by Verbruggen et al. 
(2005a) who used a simple stop task. By using two different selective stop 
signal tasks in the present study, the hypotheses that the response selection 
is the mediating factor, was further investigated. We used selective stopping 
requiring a response selection in the primary task in Experiment 1 and 
selective stopping requiring a perceptual discrimination in the selective stop 
task in Experiment 2. In the first type of the task, participants had to select 
the (correct) response in the primary task before they knew the validity of 
the stop signal. In perceptual version of the stop task, the validity of the stop 
 Experiment 1 Experiment 2 
 
Response 
repetition 
Response 
alternation 
Response 
repetition 
Response 
alternation 
Task 
repetition 
674 (106) 772 (148) 617 (101) 647 (88) 
Task 
alternation 
746 (135) 793 (154) 682 (112) 679 (101) 
Switch cost 72** 21† 65* 32* 
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signal was determined by the pitch of the tone, and this could be done 
independent of the primary task.  
 Results of both experiments are straightforward. In both experiments, 
we found a switch cost after a no-signal trial and after an invalid stop signal, 
which is of course not surprising. But the most important comparison 
between both experiments was what happened after a valid stop signal. 
Both experiments had in common that participants slowed down their 
responses when a stop signal was presented on the previous trial, 
irrespective of the validity of the stop signal. This post-signal adaptation is a 
common finding in the literature about the stop signal task (see Logan, 1994) 
and suggests that strategic factors come into play. However, besides this 
common post-signal adaptation, there was an important difference between 
both experiments regarding what happened after a signal-inhibit trial. In 
Experiment 1, there was a switch cost both after a signal-respond and after a 
signal-inhibit trial. In Experiment 2, this was not the case: Only after signal-
respond trials, the switch cost was present. Therefore, this experiment also 
dissociates neatly between the effect of stop signal presentation (i.e., go vs. 
no-go trials in terms of the go/no-go paradigm) and the effect of stopping 
itself: Successful inhibition and not signal presentation cause the 
disappearance of the switch cost. 
 This difference between the two forms of selective stopping has some 
important implications. First of all, in both experiments, after a signal-inhibit 
trial a switch occurred from a signal trial to a no-signal trial. Thus the 
problem of additivity of Schuch and Koch (2003) is absent since we 
dissociated between the two forms of selective stopping. Secondly, the 
presence of a switch cost after a signal-inhibit trial in Experiment 1 is indeed 
in line with the hypothesis that response selection is a mediating factor in 
task switching. This was previously suggested by Schuch and Koch (2003) 
and Verbruggen et al. (2005a). Participants had to apply the task set and 
make a response selection before they knew whether they had to stop or not 
and we argue that this caused the switch cost after a signal-inhibit trial in 
Experiment 1.  
 Additionally, Experiment 1 demonstrated beyond doubt that response 
execution was not necessary to obtain a switch cost. At first sight, the switch 
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cost after a signal-inhibit trial was smaller than after a no-signal trial [37 ms 
vs. 16 ms; F(1,19) = 4.77, p < .05]. However, post-hoc analyses revealed that 
this difference is probably due to the difference between response 
repetitions and response alternations. The switch cost was significantly 
higher for a response repetition, which is a common finding in the literature 
about task switching (see e.g., Rogers & Monsell, 1995; Meiran, 2000) and 
after a signal-inhibit trial, there are no response repetitions, simply because 
no response was executed. Therefore, in Experiment 1 we compared the 
switch cost found after a signal-inhibit trial with the switch cost found for 
response alternations. Interestingly, there was no longer a difference in the 
switch cost. This finding can be interpreted as extra evidence that response 
selection is an important mediating factor in task switching and that 
response execution is clearly not necessary to observe a switch cost on the 
next trial.  
 We mentioned already in the introduction that there is also an 
alternative account for the findings of Schuch and Koch (2003). Kleinsorge 
and Gajewski (2004) suggested that in a go/no-go paradigm, participants 
are less willing to prepare the task in advance because they know that a no-
go trial may occur. This motivational account, proposed for the go/no-go 
paradigm, can also easily explain the data of Experiment 1. Participants 
knew in this experiment that whether they had to stop or not, the stimuli 
had to be processed and a response selection had to be made. Thus, 
preparation in advance would be beneficial. This could indeed explain why 
we found a switch cost in Experiment 1. However, due to the differences in 
the go/no-go paradigm and the selective stop paradigm that was used in 
Experiment 2, it is more complicated and therefore, probably harder to 
explain the data pattern of this experiment in terms of the motivational 
account of Kleinsorge and Gajewski. In a go/no-go paradigm, the effect of 
motivation is dependent on the context (Kleinsorge & Gajewski, 2004). 
Alternatively, it was suggested by several authors that strategic adjustments 
in the stop signal task are based on the properties of the previous trail (e.g., 
Logan, 1994). For example, after signal-respond trials, participants tend to 
make strategic adjustments, and are more cautious to respond compared to 
no-signal trials. The CRT data of Experiment 1 and 2 demonstrated that 
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participants were indeed more cautious and that they tended to slow down 
their responses after signal-respond trials, compared to no-signal trials. 
These findings are in favour of some kind of trial-based strategic adjustment. 
But even though adjustments were made after signal-respond trials, there 
was still a switch cost in both experiments. Thus, this seems to suggest that 
these motivational/strategic differences induced to the failure of response 
inhibition in the stop task, cannot fully explain the present data pattern and 
previous results of Verbruggen et al. (2005a). On the other hand, given the 
above mentioned differences between the go/no-go paradigm and the stop 
signal paradigm, one has to be careful in generalizing the results of the 
present study. Also, as pointed out by T. Kleinsorge (personal 
communication), these differences between paradigms make it rather 
difficult to formulate, based on the Kleinsorge and Gajewski account, 
specific predictions about the motivational consequences of the selective 
stop task. All in all, the results of the present paper do not necessarily 
contradict the results of Kleinsorge and Gajewski (2004), but seem to suggest 
that there are at least differences in motivational effects of the go/no-go task 
and the stop signal task.  
 Another inevitable question is what actually becomes inhibited when a 
stop signal is presented. Mostly, it is assumed that stop signal inhibition is 
targeted on the inhibition of the response execution (see e.g., Band & Van 
Boxtel, 1999, for a neuroanatomical model). Although the present study does 
not allow any strong conclusions, one could also hypothesize that under 
certain conditions, not only the response execution becomes inhibited, but 
probably also the whole task set. In Experiment 1, the task sets have to be 
activated and applied. This allows a response selection and based on the 
result of this response selection, a response is selectively inhibited or 
executed. In other words, the task set may not be inhibited because the task 
set is needed to perform correctly the response inhibition. This is in line with 
Logan et al. (1986), who suggested also that in a simple stop task, all 
responses become inhibited whereas in the selective stop task used in 
Experiment 1, inhibition is focused on a single response. This picture could 
change in Experiment 2. Here, response selection and task set application in 
the primary task are no longer needed when a stop signal is presented. 
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Under these conditions, one could hypothesize that not only the response 
execution becomes inhibited, but also the whole task set. If the task set is 
also inhibited when a stop signal is presented, one expects no longer a 
difference after a signal-inhibit trial between task repetitions and task 
alternations. This is because for both types of trials, the task set was 
inhibited on the previous trial, and as a consequence, task repetition would 
no longer be beneficial. Note that this explanation does not contradict the 
hypothesis that response selection is necessary in task switching. After all, 
we argue that response selection is an important mediating factor, but not a 
causing factor.  
 The results of the present study can also be related to the proposal of 
Wylie and Allport (2000), who suggested that part of the switch cost is due 
to interference caused by the retrieval of stimulus-response associations. The 
possibility that stimulus-response associations are differentially influenced 
by simple and selective stopping is also supported by another paradigm. 
Verbruggen, Liefooghe and Vandierendonck (2005b) found that the negative 
priming effect (i.e., slower reactions when the target was previously 
ignored) disappeared after a signal-inhibit trial in the simple stop task, but 
not in a selective stop task similar to the one used in Experiment 1 of the 
present study. Recently, Rothermund, Wentura and De Houwer (2005) 
suggested that negative priming is also due to the retrieval of stimulus-
response associations. Given the similarity of both designs, we therefore 
suggest that in both studies stimulus-response associations are established 
after a valid stop signal in the selective stop task at response level, even 
without the actual response execution.  
 Besides the fact that we demonstrated that response selection without 
response execution is sufficient for the establishment of a switch cost, there 
was still another important finding in both experiments. Both forms of 
selective stopping interacted with task switching. Verbruggen et al. (2005a) 
did not find such an interaction with simple stopping. However, it is not 
surprising to find such an interaction. First of all, Logan, Kantowitz, and 
Riegler, (1986) already demonstrated that the selective stop task was more 
susceptible for manipulations in task difficulty, probably due to the higher 
cognitive demands – indicated by larger SSRTs in selective stopping 
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compared with simple stopping. These authors demonstrated that inhibiting 
one out of four responses was more difficult than inhibiting one out of two 
responses in the selective stop task. Secondly, neuroimaging data 
demonstrated that there is at least a neuroanatomical overlap between 
response inhibition and task switching. More precisely, Aron, Robbins, and 
Poldrack (2004) suggested on the basis of a meta-analytical study that the 
right-inferior cortex is strongly activated in both the stop signal task and the 
task switching paradigm, suggesting the right inferior cortex might play an 
important role in inhibition processes in different types of tasks.  
 Based on the findings of the present study and the study of Aron et al. 
(2004), we can hypothesize that the same inhibitory processes work in the 
selective stop task and in the cued task switching paradigm. However, it 
might also be the case that it is not necessarily the inhibition in task 
switching that interacts with the response inhibition in the selective stop 
signal task. First of all, several authors suggested that the inhibition of task 
switching is a more lateral kind of inhibition (e.g., Schuch & Koch, 2003). 
Mayr and Keele (2000, p. 22) also suggested that the inhibitory process 
involved in task-switching may be ‘relatively impenetrable for higher-level 
control’ and preferred the notion of lateral inhibition above the concept of a 
more active form of self inhibition. Secondly, in a recent paper, Derrfuss, 
Brass and von Cramon (2004) found evidence for cognitive control in the 
posterior frontal cortex. This region was commonly activated in task 
switching, an interference task (these authors used the Stroop task), and an 
n-back working memory task. Based on these results, they suggested that 
the common activation is due to the amount of cognitive control in those 
different tasks. Given the fact that selective stopping requires a more 
cognitive controlled stop, it seems plausible to assume that the interaction 
between task switching and response inhibition in the selective stop task is 
not necessarily due to common inhibitory mechanisms. Instead, the 
interaction may be due to the higher cognitively control in both paradigms.  
 In sum, the present study demonstrated that response selection, even 
without response execution, is indeed an important factor in task switching. 
In other words, only when the task set is applied, a switch cost is observed 
on the next trial. This finding is in accordance with the accounts of Schuch 
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and Koch (2003) and Wylie and Allport (2000). Moreover, although it is still 
unclear where the overlap is precisely situated, the present data pattern also 
suggests that task switching and response inhibition in the selective stop 
task seem to rely on common structures or mechanisms.  
 
 
CHAPTER 6 
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
 
 In this final chapter, I will briefly summarize the results of the empirical 
studies and attempt to integrate these findings in the present theories and 
models. The overview and discussion will fall apart in four different 
subsections: (a) results of Chapters 2 & 3 and the implications for selective 
suppression in conflict tasks; (b) results of Chapters 4 & 5 and the role of 
response selection in the establishment of stimulus-response associations 
and the interference effect; (c) some comments on the underlying processes 
in the stop signal paradigm; and finally, (d) some general remarks on the 
concept of ‘inhibition’. Hence, the first subsection is exclusively related to 
Chapters 2 & 3 whereas the second subsection deals with the findings of 
Chapters 4 & 5. After those two sections, we will focus on the implications 
for the stop signal paradigm and the relation between different kinds of 
inhibition based on the results of all four chapters. In a final part, some 
directions for future research on inhibition are provided.  
 
RESEARCH OVERVIEW AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
 This doctoral thesis fits in with the vast amount of studies that 
investigate the concept of inhibition and interference.  For the main part, we 
focused on the relation between different kinds of inhibition. Previous 
research suggested important differences between different forms or kinds 
of inhibition while others pointed out that there might also be some overlap 
or commonalities (Dempster, 1993; Harnishfeger, 1995; Nigg, 2000). In the 
four empirical chapters, we focused on (a) the relation between stop signal 
inhibition and other kinds of inhibition or interference control, and (b) on 
the influence of stop signal inhibition on the establishment of interference. In 
this context, ‘interference’ refers to what causes the need for within-trial 
adjustments and we use ‘interference control’ to label these adjustments. 
 Our research was largely based on the proposition that these within-
trial adjustments are performed by an active suppression of the features that 
caused the interference in the first place (e.g., Burle, Possamaï, Vidal, Bonnet 
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& Hasbroucq, 2002; Eriksen & Schultz, 1979; Ridderinkhof, 2002a).  And 
what is more, in regard to this distinction between interference and 
interference control, the four empirical chapters can be grouped into two 
parts. In the first two chapters, we investigated selective suppression and its 
relation with response inhibition in the stop signal task, whereas in the other 
two chapters, we focused on the effect of response inhibition on interference 
on the next trial as well.  
 
SELECTIVE SUPPRESSION AND THE RELATION  
WITH RESPONSE INHIBITION  
 
 A great advantage of the stop signal paradigm (Lappin & Eriksen, 1966; 
Logan & Cowan, 1984; Logan, 1994) is that the primary task can nearly be 
any reaction time task. One of the primary tasks that has been used, is the 
flanker task. The difference between the flanker task and a standard choice 
reaction time task is that in the flanker task the target is flanked by 
distracting information. One of the emerging findings was that stop signal 
reaction times were prolonged in flanker incongruent trials (Kramer, 
Humphrey, Larish, Logan & Strayer, 1994). Later on, this was replicated by 
Ridderinkhof, Band and Logan (1999). These latter authors suggested that 
this effect of flanker congruency on response inhibition was due to the need 
for selective suppression in the flanker task in case of an incongruent trial. 
Because of the fact that selective suppression of the irrelevant response and 
stop signal inhibition rely on common mechanisms and compete with each 
other, the SSRTs were longer on incongruent trials.  
 In Chapter 2, we started from this ‘common mechanism’ hypothesis of 
Ridderinkhof et al. (1999) and our purpose was twofold: (a) replicating the 
findings of Kramer et al. (1994) and Ridderinkhof et al. (1999) with other 
interference or conflict tasks; and (b) investigating the nature of selective 
suppression in these different conflict tasks and the relation with stop signal 
inhibition. In the first study of this chapter, we used a flanker task and 
Stroop task in which we introduced distractors that were not part of the 
response set but that were categorically related to the responses 
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(Verbruggen, Liefooghe, & Vandierendonck, 2004). In this study, the conflict 
is assumed to be situated at an intermediate processing stage, concerning the 
semantic attributes of a stimulus. In the second study of this chapter 
(Verbruggen, Liefooghe, & Vandierendonck, in press), we focused on a 
perceptual conflict which was situated at an early processing level. For this 
purpose, we used a global/local task and a modified version of the flanker 
task with stimulus incongruent flankers. In real terms, the difference 
between the first and the second study of Chapter 2 is that in the first study, 
the distractors that were not part of the response set could never become the 
target (e.g., participants never had to respond to an upward pointing arrow, 
although this arrow could flank leftward or rightward pointing arrows). In 
the second study, the distractors were part of the response set. For instance, 
stimulus incongruent distractors used in the flanker task of the second study 
were mapped onto the same response as the target, but were physically 
different. Although this distinction between processing levels may be subject 
to discussion, the main point is that unlike the study of Ridderinkhof et al. 
(1999), these different types of conflict are not situated at a response-related 
processing stage. 
 By analogy with this latter study, we combined the stop signal task with 
various conflict tasks and looked at the effect of the distinct types of conflict 
on response inhibition. The main observation was that in a variety of conflict 
tasks, similar effects of congruency were observed. The different types of 
stimulus-stimulus congruency –the term that we will use to describe the 
interference effects of interest in Chapter 2– all interacted with response 
inhibition in the stop signal task. In all four experiments, this was indicated 
by longer SSRTs for stimulus incongruent trials compared to SSRTs of 
congruent or neutral trials. Moreover, in Chapter 3, we ran an experiment 
with a spatial Stroop/Simon task that is assumed to operationalize stimulus 
and response conflict independently (Liu, Banich, Jacobson & Tanabe, 2004). 
Results of that experiment demonstrated that the effects of both types of 
conflict were highly comparable.  
 These findings obtained with the combined congruency/stop signal 
task, have two important implications. First, we replicated in different 
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paradigms the results of Kramer et al. (1994) and Ridderinkhof et al. (1999) 
and observed once more an interaction between interference control in 
various conflict tasks and response inhibition in the stop signal task.  We 
argue that this provides additional evidence for common underlying 
mechanisms, as initially proposed by Logan (1994) and Ridderinkhof et al. 
(1999). This common mechanism is responsible for both the suppression of 
irrelevant stimulus features that cause the interference, and the inhibition of 
motor responses in the stop signal task. A second important finding of the 
stop signal experiments of Chapters 2 & 3 was that conflict or interference 
did not have to be situated at a response-related processing stage in order to 
involve suppression mechanisms. Based on the logic of Ridderinkhof et al. 
(1999) and Logan (1994), the observed interaction of stimulus interference 
and stop signal inhibition indicates that both forms of inhibition have 
something in common. As a consequence, these experiments in which an 
interaction was found tell us something about the nature of selective 
suppression itself. We argue that our results demonstrate that there is 
suppression of irrelevant stimulus features, independent of the processing 
level, and that this form of selective suppression interferes with inhibition at 
a motor level.  
 To substantiate the claim about interference control at different 
processing stages, we performed a study without the stop signal task and 
focused entirely on the nature of stimulus interference. We hypothesized 
that if the same within-trial adjustments are made for stimulus- and 
response-related interference, it should be possible to observe similar 
between trial-adjustments. Gratton, Coles, and Donchin (1992) observed in a 
flanker task that after an incongruent trial, the flanker effect became smaller 
on the next trial. This finding has been replicated frequently (e.g., Botvinick, 
Nystrom, Fissell, Carter, & Cohen, 1999; see also Botvinick et al., 2001). It 
was argued that the smaller congruency effect on a trial following an 
incongruent trial was due to top-down adjustments to resolve a conflict 
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situation.24 Not everybody agreed with the notion of top-down adjustments 
after conflict trials and explained the Gratton effect by means of stimulus-
response repetition effects (e.g., Hommel, Proctor & Vu, 2004; Mayr, Awh, & 
Laurey, 2003; Notebaert, Soetens, & Melis, 2001). Nevertheless, it seems that 
when one controls for those repetition effects, there is still evidence for a top-
down explanation (Kerns et al., 2004; Notebaert, Gevers, Verbruggen & 
Liefooghe, in press; Wuhr, in press). Therefore, we used the conflict 
adaptation pattern as a marker for behavioural adjustments after 
incongruent trials and looked at the influence of the type of congruency. If 
stimulus conflict and response conflict are similar in nature, we expected 
that the stimulus conflict would be absent or at least become smaller after 
stimulus incongruent trials, similar to the conflict-adaptation pattern after 
response incongruent trials. And in fact, that was what we observed in the 
third study of Chapter 2: The stimulus congruency effect was absent after 
stimulus and response incongruent trials (Verbruggen, Notebaert, 
Liefooghe, & Vandierendonck, in press). Contrary to our expectations, the 
mere response congruency effect did not change. Future research is probably 
needed here to resolve this issue. 
 
THE ACTIVATION-SUPPRESSION HYPOTHESIS EXTENDED 
 
 We started from the hypothesis that selective inhibition is needed to 
control for the interference. This hypothesis was formalized by 
Ridderinkhof: The activation-suppression hypothesis (2002a). Since the 
activation-suppression hypothesis clearly situates conflict at a response-
related stage, the results of the first two chapters have some implications for 
the activation-suppression hypothesis. In this section, we will propose an 
extended version of the activation-suppression hypothesis by incorporating 
stimulus conflict.  
                                                          
24 Since the effect of these adjustments is only observable on the subsequent trial, we 
talk about between-trial adjustments. 
192      CHAPTER 6 
 Ridderinkhof (2002a) started from a dual-route model (De Jong, Liang, 
& Lauber, 1994; Kornblum, Hasbroucq, & Osman, 1990; Ridderinkhof, 1997; 
Ridderinkhof, van der Molen, & Bashore, 1995), assuming that irrelevant 
distracting information (e.g., the flankers) is processed automatically along a 
direct route. As a consequence, a response is activated. Meanwhile, the 
relevant information (e.g., the target in a flanker task) is processed via an 
attentive processing route with a target selection and a stimulus-response 
translation, and the response associated with the target becomes activated. 
This implies that on incongruent trials, there will be two responses active at 
a certain point in the processing stream. These two activated responses will 
interfere with each other and to resolve this conflict, it is hypothesized that 
the response associated with the irrelevant stimulus information will be 
suppressed by a super-imposed inhibitory mechanism (Ridderinkhof, 
2002a).  
 However, the selective suppression of incorrect responses cannot 
explain our results obtained with conflict tasks in which the conflict was not 
necessarily situated at a response-related stage. As an answer, we suggest 
that selective suppression of irrelevant features can occur at any level in the 
processing stream, from stimulus perception to response execution. Conflict 
is here defined as ‘at a certain processing stage common activation of two or 
more stimulus features that compete for activation and only one of them is 
associated with the relevant stimulus attribute’. As a consequence, there is 
not only a need for selective suppression of incorrect and irrelevant 
responses, but there is also need for selective suppression of any stimulus 
feature that becomes concurrently activated at any point in the processing 
stream. The extended activation-suppression hypothesis is depicted in 
Figure 6.1.  
 A key feature in our model is the incorporation of different processing 
stages. This distinction between different processing stages is not new. 
Sternberg (1969) proposed that there are four different stages of processing: 
Stimulus encoding, serial comparison, binary decision and response 
organization. More or less in accordance with the proposal of Sternberg, our 
model assumes a processing stream with different stages: (a) a perceptual 
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stage with regard to specific items and at which the relevant attribute or 
stimulus feature is selected; (b) a more intermediate or central stage, for 
example concerning the relevant abstract attribute; and (c) a response stage 
where the correct response should be selected and subsequently, executed 
(adapted from Liu, Banich, Jacobson, & Tanabe, 2004, p. 1097). Note that we 
do not make any statements concerning the serial or parallel nature of these 
processing stages. For example, Sternberg (1969) suggested that processing 
should be completed before one could move on to the next stage, whereas 
Eriksen and Schultz (1979) suggested that during processing there is a 
continuous accumulation of information. However, whether our model is 
discrete or continue, is in our opinion of minor importance at this point.  
 
  
 
Figure 6.1: The activation-suppression hypothesis extended 
 
By incorporation of a stage-like theory about information processing in the 
activation-suppression hypothesis of Ridderinkhof (2002a) we get a model 
that can account for the results of Chapter 2. Conflict can occur at the 
different processing stages, this conflict needs to be resolved and this is done 
by an inhibitory mechanism. As a result, response inhibition in the stop 
signal task will be more difficult in stimulus incongruent trials because of 
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the interaction between selective suppression and stop signal inhibition.  
Moreover, assuming that conflict can be situated at different processing 
levels can also explain why we were able to demonstrate that conflict at not-
response-related processing levels has consequences for the performance on 
the next trial. Apparently, behavioural adjustments are made when a 
stimulus conflict was detected on the previous trial. Thus, both within-trial 
and between-trial adjustments are made after a conflict situation, regardless 
of the processing stage at which the conflict occurred. 
 To conclude, we suggest that the results obtained in Chapters 2 & 3 
provide some nice evidence for this suggestion of control mechanisms at 
different stages in the processing stream. This resulted in the extended 
activation-suppression hypothesis, although the proposed ideas are not 
entirely new.  For example Logan and Cowan (1984) hypothesized in their 
‘executive act of control’ model that cognitive control could operate at any 
point from stimulus perception to response execution. Our proposal is also 
in line with several neuroimaging studies. Several studies demonstrated that 
brain regions, such as the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex that are assumed to 
be in control in case of response conflict, are also active for other types of 
conflict (Liu, Banich, Jacobson, & Tanabe, 2004; Milham, et al., 2001; Van 
Veen, Cohen, Botvinick, Stenger & Carter, 2001). In other words, there is 
converging evidence that the same, or at least highly similar, top-down 
mechanisms can operate in different types of conflict tasks.  
 
AFTER-EFFECTS OF RESPONSE INHIBITION 
 
 In the first two empirical chapters of this doctoral thesis, we focused 
entirely on selective suppression in conflict tasks and the relation with 
response inhibition. In line with Chapters 2 and 3, we investigated in 
Chapters 4 and 5 the influence of different kinds of inhibition on the stop 
signal task. Based on the taxonomy of Nigg (2000), one could argue that in 
Chapters 2 and 3 we have found interactions between different kinds of 
effortful inhibition. In Chapters 4 and 5, we wanted to investigate whether 
the same results are found with less effortful kinds of inhibition, like 
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negative priming (Nigg, 2000). In addition, we also focused in Chapters 4 & 
5 on the effects of response inhibition on the subsequent trial.  
 In Chapter 4, we combined the negative priming paradigm (for reviews, 
see May, Kane, & Hasher, 1995; Fox, 1995) with the stop signal paradigm 
and this for two distinctive reasons. First of all, it was hypothesized by 
Rieger and Gauggel (1999) that after-effects in the stop signal task (referring 
to the observation that participants were slower when on the previous trial a 
stop signal was presented) were related to negative priming. Secondly, in 
the first two chapters we focused on the interaction between selective 
suppression and response inhibition. Whereas in the taxonomy of Nigg 
(2000) these two kinds of inhibition are considered as effortful, negative 
priming is considered as an automatic form of cognitive inhibition. 
Therefore, the negative priming paradigm seemed suitable to investigate 
similarities between after-effects and whether or not stop signal inhibition 
was influenced by less effortful forms of inhibition.   
 In regard to the first research question, the results of our negative 
priming study were very straightforward. Nor for simple stopping, nor for 
selective stopping any effect of negative priming on stop signal inhibition 
was found: The SSRTs on ignored repetition trials and control trials did not 
differ from each other. This seems to suggest that whatever causes the 
negative priming effect on the probe trial, it is not related to response 
inhibition. According to the inhibition account (e.g., Tipper & Cranston, 
1985), negative priming results from persisting inhibition from the previous 
trial. Especially when this persisting inhibition is response-related, as 
previously suggested by some researchers (e.g., Houghton & Tipper, 1994), 
one would expect an effect of negative priming on stop signal inhibition. On 
the other hand, several researchers argued that negative priming is due to 
interference because of the retrieval of information related to the prime trial 
(Neill & Valdes, 1992; Neill, Valdes, Terry, & Gorfein, 1992; Rothermund, 
Wentura, De Houwer, 2005). If the latter is indeed the case, then this 
interference is resolved by a mechanism that is not related to stop signal 
inhibition, since stopping performance is preserved on ignored repetition 
trials.  
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 Of course, we believe that the suppression mechanism does contribute 
to the establishment of the negative priming effect on trial n-1, since the 
distractor that becomes the target was actively inhibited on the previous 
trial. However, this has no consequences for response inhibition on the 
subsequent trial. For response inhibition, on the contrary, the opposite 
pattern was found: The negative priming effect disappeared completely 
when participants inhibited their response on the previous trial in the simple 
stop task. In this version of the stop task, all responses should be inhibited 
when a stop signal is presented. But when the participants had to select and 
process the target in order to know whether they had to stop or not, a 
negative priming effect was observed on the subsequent trial. This 
distinction between simple and selective stopping has at least two important 
consequences for the research on negative priming. First of all, our results 
demonstrate that response execution is not necessary to observe a negative 
priming effect on the subsequent trial. Secondly, our results indicate that 
participants have to discriminate between target and distractor in order to 
find a negative priming effect. Another way to put this is that the distinction 
between target and distractor should be relevant. We should make this 
qualification because it is difficult to know whether participants did or did 
not discriminate between target and distractor in the simple stop task. There 
are in fact only two things that we know for sure: (1) in the selective stop 
task, participants were obliged to discriminate between target and distractor 
when a stop signal was presented; and (2) when the stop signal is presented 
in the simple stop task the distinction between target and distractor is no 
longer relevant. Since it is difficult (or even impossible) to know whether or 
not participants discriminated between the target and distractor on signal-
inhibit trials, it could be the case that not the target/distractor distinction is 
of importance, but rather the relevance for the correct performance in the 
current task.  
 In a next step, we investigated whether the effect of response inhibition 
on the subsequent trial in a negative priming design could be generalized to 
another paradigm, namely the task switching paradigm (Chapter 5). The 
negative priming paradigm and the task switching paradigm have in 
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common that performance on the current trial is influenced by the properties 
of the previous trial. Besides, Schuch and Koch (2003) reported a study in 
which they introduced go/no-go trials in cued task switching. These authors 
found that there was no switch cost when the previous trial was a no-go 
trial. Thus, based on the findings of Chapter 4 and based on the Schuch and 
Koch paper (2003), we expected that the switch cost would also be absent 
after signal-inhibit trials. Moreover, unlike Schuch and Koch (2003), we 
could also look at the effect of task switching on response inhibition.   
 We replicated the results of the negative priming study and the results 
of Schuch and Koch (2003). There was no switch cost after a successfully 
inhibited response in the simple stop task. On the other hand, when 
participants had to make a response selection to know the validity of the 
stop signal in a selective stop task, and as a consequence, before the response 
could be inhibited, a switch cost was observed on the next trial. We 
concluded therefore in Chapter 5 that response selection is a mediating 
factor in the establishment of the switch cost whereas response execution 
was apparently of minor importance. However, Wylie, Javitt and Foxe (2004) 
performed a similar experiment and they obtained different results. Wylie et 
al. introduced no-go trials in a task switching paradigm and subjects only 
responded on the letter trials if the stimulus contained a vowel and on the 
number trials if the stimulus contained an even number. In all cases, they 
responded with their right index finger. In other words, participants also 
had to process the stimulus to know whether the trial was a go trial or a no-
go trial. But even though they had to process the stimulus of the primary 
task, there was no switch cost observed after a no-go trial. This seems to 
contradict our results. A possible explanation for these different findings is 
that in our study, there were always two different responses (a left-handed 
response and a right-handed response), whereas there was only one possible 
response in the study of Wylie et al. (2004). Given the importance of the 
response selection, it seems plausible that this difference in response 
selection demands could have contributed to the discrepancy between our 
study and the study of Wylie et al. (2004).  
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 Anyway, our results are in accordance with the hypothesis of Koch and 
colleagues (Koch & Phillip, in press; Schuch & Koch, 2003) that response 
selection is a mediating factor in the establishment of the switch cost. In the 
Schuch and Koch paper, it was proposed that at the level of response 
selection, the relevant task-specific category-response rule is applied and the 
irrelevant rule becomes inhibited. As a result, application of the previously 
inhibited category-response rule will result in a task-switching cost: The 
residual switch cost. In a follow-up study of Koch and Phillip (in press) in 
which the same methodology of the Schuch and Koch study was used, Koch 
and Phillip pointed out that there might also be a task-repetition benefit: 
Activation of the category-response rule will result in a benefit on the next 
trial when the same rule can be applied. Obviously, this benefit could only 
occur after a go-trial, and it appeared that this benefit largely predicted the 
results obtained in their follow-up study. Note that, as pointed out by Koch 
and Phillip (in press), both accounts do not exclude each other. 
 Besides the effect of stop signal inhibition on the next trial in the task 
switching experiments, we were also interested in the effects of task 
switching on response inhibition. Contrary to what could be expected on the 
basis of the hypothesis that there is an overlap between response inhibition 
and task switching (Aron et al., 2004), we did not find any effect of task 
switching on response inhibition. SSRTs of task-repetition trials were not 
different from SSRTs of task-alternation trials. On the other hand, selective 
stopping was more difficult in task-alternation trials. We will come back 
later to this discrepancy between simple and selective stopping. But apart 
from this effect of task switching on selective stopping, we think that it is 
safe to conclude that after-effects of inhibition like the negative priming 
effect and possibly also the task switch cost do not interfere with response 
inhibition in the stop task, at least not in the simple stop task. 
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RESPONSE INHIBITION, RESPONSE SELECTION,  
AND CARRY-OVER EFFECTS 
 
 Results of the negative priming study and the task switching studies 
demonstrated that successful response inhibition influenced carry-over 
effects or after-effects of inhibition, even though there was a difference in 
what was inhibited on the previous trial. In the negative priming task a 
stimulus is inhibited, whereas category-response rules are probably 
suppressed in a task switching paradigm. Despite this difference, stop signal 
inhibition on the previous trial resulted in a disappearance of the negative 
priming effect and the switch cost. 
 In the previous section, we explained the results of the task switching 
studies in the light of the response selection account of Koch and colleagues. 
But our results are also in accordance with theories that assume that the 
switch cost is at least partly due to persisting interference and carry-over 
effects (e.g., Wylie & Allport, 2000; Hsieh & Liu, 2005).25 A common 
explanation for the negative priming effect and the switch cost is the concept 
of ‘stimulus-response associations’. This concept is used in a variety of 
paradigms, and is based on the assumption that when participants respond 
to a target, the stimulus and response are automatically linked. On the next 
trial, this information is automatically retrieved, causing interference. Wylie 
and Allport (2000) argued that the switch cost was partly due to such 
persisting interference. Because of the retrieval of previously learned 
associations between stimulus and response representations (i.e., stimulus-
response bindings), participants are slower to respond when they have to 
switch between two different tasks (Wylie & Allport, 2000). Similarly, 
                                                          
25 The switch cost is probably influenced by voluntary preparation (i.e., ‘endogenous’ 
control) and involuntary carry-over effects of inhibition and stimulus-response 
bindings from the previous trial (i.e., ‘exogenous’ influences) (Goschke, 2000; 
Monsell, 2003). In light of this distinction, we argue that stop signal inhibition has 
primarily consequences for the exogenous influences. 
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Rothermund, Wentura and De Houwer (2005) suggested that the negative 
priming effect was due to the automatic retrieval of stimulus-response 
associations. In the prime trial, the distractor becomes associated with the 
response given to the target. When the distractor of the prime trial becomes 
the target of the probe trial, the previously learned association is retrieved, 
causing interference. Note that this ‘stimulus-response association’ 
hypothesis of Rothermund et al. (2005) is not that different from the episodic 
retrieval account of Neill (Neill et al., 1992). But where Neill suggested that 
the ‘do not respond’ information becomes associated with the distractor, 
Rothermund et al. (2005) hypothesized that the response to the target will be 
associated with the distractor.  
 All in all, several researchers suggested that both in the domain of 
negative priming and task switching, automatic retrieval of information 
related to the previous trial will interfere with the processing in the current 
trial and therefore result in slower responses. Now in regard to the 
‘stimulus-response associations’ or ‘episodes’, dependent on the theory, our 
results suggest that these associations or episodes can already exist when a 
response selection has taken place without response execution. The task 
switching studies provided direct evidence for this hypothesis: When 
participants had to make a response selection to know the signal validity, a 
switch cost was found after a signal-inhibit trial. In addition, the results of 
the negative priming experiment can be explained in a similar way: 
Participants had to suppress the upper two responses or the lower two 
responses. So, it seems reasonable o assume that they also made a response 
selection to know the validity of the stop signal. However, this could also be 
done by identifying the identity of the target, without actually selecting the 
response. Unfortunately, the selective stop task used in the negative priming 
study was in the first place not designed to investigate the role of response 
selection in negative priming, so it does not allow a discrimination between 
the two possibilities. But given the results of the task switching study and 
given the similarities of the results, we argue that response selection could 
indeed play an important role in the establishment of stimulus-response 
associations. In other words, a stimulus can become associated with a 
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response at the moment this response is selected and without the need for 
response execution.   
 Until now, we focused primarily on the cost of response selection on the 
previous trial. But we already mentioned that a part of the effect of stop 
signal inhibition could also be due to the fact that there is no response 
selection benefit as suggested by Koch and Philipp (in press). However, the 
data of the negative priming study and the task switching studies suggest 
that the disappearance after a signal-inhibit trial of the negative priming 
effect and the switch cost was largely due to faster ignored repetition trials 
and switch trials respectively. Furthermore, this also goes against the 
interpretation that our results could be due to the fact that there are no task 
repetition trials after a signal-inhibit trial. One could argue that participants 
got the impression that they were performing a different task on the 
previous trial. But if this would be the case, then one would expect that task-
repetition trials that followed a signal trial were slower than repetition trials 
that followed a no-signal trial. Results of the study with simple stopping and 
cued task switching indicated that this was not the case. Therefore, we 
suggest that the absence of response selection will lead to a disappearance of 
the cost observed in paradigms like the negative priming paradigm and the 
task switching paradigm.  
 
THE STOP SIGNAL PARADIGM AND ITS VARIANTS:  
RESPONSE INHIBITION AND BEYOND 
 
 The stop signal paradigm was the ‘leitmotiv’ of this doctoral thesis. 
Initially, we used the paradigm primarily for investigating the relation 
between response inhibition and other kinds of inhibition, such as 
interference control. By conducting the experiments, it turned out that the 
paradigm also offers a very useful method for investigating underlying 
processes in the primary tasks. We already discussed the findings in regard 
to what the stop signal experiments learned us about some primary task 
properties. But what are the consequences for the stop signal paradigm 
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itself? In this section, we will focus more on the stop signal task itself and the 
underlying processes in different variants of the stop task.  
 To start with, there are two ‘minor’ remarks. First of all, in the 
experiments of Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, blocks without stop signals were 
included to control for the effect of occasional presentation of stop signals on 
conflict in the primary task. This inclusion of control blocks led to two main 
findings. It appeared that knowing that stop signals could occur in a number 
of trials resulted in a more cautious response strategy of the participants. In 
the blocks with stop signals, reaction times were slowed down in all 
experiments and in two experiments (Experiment 1 of the first and second 
study of Chapter 2), participants also made fewer errors. However, in none 
of the experiments of Chapter 2 the congruency effect (i.e., the difference 
between congruent and incongruent trials) was influenced by the inclusion 
of stop signals. This can be of importance for the independence assumptions 
of the stop signal paradigm. In the past, the difference between observed 
and predicted signal-respond RTs was used to test the independence 
assumption. The simulations by Band et al. (2003) showed that this is 
probably not the best way of testing the assumptions. As a consequence, 
there are presently no direct techniques or methods for testing the 
assumptions. Therefore, we suggest that it might be fruitful to add a control 
block without stop signals, whenever the experimental design allows it. 
Another consequence is that we are able to generalize our results to 
congruency tasks without stop signal presentation, since it appeared that 
dealing with the conflict was the same for both types of blocks. The question 
remains why in Chapter 3 we did find a smaller compatibility effect in the 
blocks with stop signals. Probably, this has something to do with the time-
course in the Simon task. In this task, it is a common finding that with 
increasing RT, the Simon effect decreases (e.g., Hommel, 1993, 1997), in 
contrast to the observation that longer reaction times in congruency tasks 
like the flanker task, Stroop task and global/local task do not result in 
smaller congruency effects (e.g., Hommel, 1997).  
 A second ‘minor’ remark concerns the finding that there was a large 
variability in the SSRTs through the different studies. Logan (1994) reported 
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that the average SSRT for adults was around 200 ms. When we compare the 
SSRTs in our experiments, stopping latencies of non-conflict trials in 
different experiments ranged from 144ms (in the flanker task with a 4-to-2 
mapping) to 223ms (in the manual Stroop task). Of course, this is a between-
experiments comparison, and one needs to be careful with such a 
comparison. On the other hand, it can be quite interesting, although we 
cannot offer an airtight explanation at the moment. As we see it, there can be 
several possibilities for this variability, such as individual differences, 
primary task properties, the way stop signals are presented (e.g., through 
headphones or not). Unfortunately, the experiments were not designed for 
this purpose, so we can only guess. We think that in the future it could be 
interesting to further investigate which –at the moment still unknown– 
factors contribute to stop signal performance in healthy subjects. In the end, 
this can tell us something more about the underlying processes in the stop 
signal paradigm, helping us to understand differences between groups and 
conditions.  
 This brings us to the main point of this section: What can the 
experiments we performed tell us about the underlying processes in the stop 
signal paradigm and its variants. For this we take as a starting point the 
suggestion of Aron and Poldrack (2005). They suggested that there are four 
different components or functions in the stop signal task: (1) maintaining and 
successfully executing the task rules; (2) maintaining alertness/vigilance for the 
unpredictable occurrence of the stop signal; (3) processing the stop signal, which 
requires detecting it as the target for a different action/non-action and which may 
require shifting attention from the visual to the auditory domain; and (4) the 
response inhibition itself (Aron & Poldrack, 2005, p.1289).  In addition, in the 
selective stop task, there is need for an extra process to know the validity of 
the stop signal. This process that helps to determine the stop signal validity 
can be considered as a part of the third component suggested by Aron and 
Poldrack (2005). 
 In regard to this distinction between different components or functions, 
the comparison of different selective stop tasks and the simple stop task is 
most revealing since the SSRT differences in the task switching studies can 
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tell us something more about the underlying processes. Hsieh and Liu (2005) 
recorded the EEGs during task switching. Based on the inspection of among 
other things the LRP-component, they argued that task switching mainly 
influences the duration of the response selection stage which would be due 
to a carry-over effect. Furthermore, this effect can not be overcome by 
advance reconfiguration, such as task cueing (Hsieh & Liu, 2005). This is in 
line with what for example Allport and colleagues suggested (cfr. supra). All 
in all, it seems that the response selection process is more difficult on switch 
trials than on repetition trials. Now it could be the case that this difference in 
difficulty of response selection can explain why there are differences 
between response inhibition in the simple stop task and in the selective stop 
tasks, and that in the end can tell us something more about the underlying 
processes.  
 In the motor variant of the selective stop task a response selection has to 
be made before the response inhibition process can ‘start’ when a stop signal 
is presented. Now it seems reasonable to assume that this will also influence 
the estimation of the stopping latency. For the estimation of the SSRTs, we 
need to know two things: (1) when does the stop process start and (2) when 
does the stop process finish. In Chapter 1, we explained that both points in 
time are known. The starting point of the stop process corresponds to the 
moment a stop signal is presented. According to the horse race model, the 
race between the stop process and the go process starts (Logan & Cowan, 
1984). But in the selective stop task, it is more complicated since there is an 
extra process: Participants have to decide whether they have to stop or not. 
The duration of this process is probably also incorporated in the SSRT. As a 
result SSRTs of switch trials will be longer compared to SSRTs of repetition 
trials, since the response selection that determines the validity of the stop 
signals, is prolonged on switch trials. Thus, it might be the case that 
differences between the SSRTs in the motor variant of the selective stop task 
are not only reflecting differences in duration of the response inhibition 
process itself but also differences in the process that is needed to determine 
the validity of the stop signal.  
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 Similarly, it could be the case that the longer SSRTs for switch trials in 
the perceptual variant of the selective stop task are not entirely due to 
response inhibition. In the perceptual selective stop task, participants had to 
discriminate between a high and low tone: They had to identify the stimulus 
and decide whether they had to stop or not. In other words, there is an 
additional process and compared to the motor variant of the selective stop 
task, this process is independent of the processing in the primary task. In a 
sense, this results in some kind of dual-tasking since participants have to 
categorize the stop signal and meanwhile process the stimulus of the 
primary task. Note that in the motor variant of the selective stop task the 
stimulus that determines the validity of the stop signal is processed anyway. 
Now one could hypothesize that dual-task interference or PRP-like 
interference arises when a stop signal is presented.26 The reason for this 
interference would be that response selection in the primary task interferes 
with the stop signal categorization (which determines the validity of the stop 
signal) of the selective stop task. Response selection takes longer on switch 
trials, and as a consequence, when a stop signal is presented the 
categorization process will be prolonged on these trials. We argued above 
that the duration of the process that determines the validity of the stop 
signal is probably also incorporated in the SSRT estimation. Thus, it could be 
the case that SSRT differences in the perceptual variant of the selective stop 
task are not really reflecting differences in response inhibition, but merely 
differences in stop signal processing. 
 Aron and Poldrack (2005) already suggested that the processing of the 
stop signal, which requires detection and may require an attentional shift, 
occurs probably also in the simple stop task. Now one could wonder 
whether the ‘stop signal processing hypothesis’ also holds for the simple 
stop task, explaining the SSRT differences found in various experiments. We 
have several reasons to believe why this is not the case. For a start, we did 
                                                          
26 The psychological refractory period refers to a kind of dual-task interference when 
participants have to respond to two signals presented in rapid succession (see 
Pashler, 1994, for an overview). 
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not find any effect of task switching on simple stopping. Although this 
reasoning might be a bit circular, it seems that if task switching can result in 
dual-task interference or PRP-like interference, this does not influence stop 
signal processing in the simple stop task. Secondly, we think that the stop 
signal processing demands are higher in the selective stop tasks than in the 
simple stop task (at least for normal, healthy subjects). In the simple stop 
task, a stop signal is relatively easily detected and the stop process can start 
racing against the go-process, without any further discrimination or 
selection process that is needed in the selective stop tasks. Without this extra 
discrimination process, there is no reason to expect dual-task interference. 
We already mentioned in Chapter 1 that it was demonstrated that stop 
signal inhibition –at least the inhibition of not-yet executed actions– does not 
suffer from PRP-like effects. Logan and Burkell (1986) argued that there is 
very little interference when the second signal causing the PRP-effect is a 
stop signal. Later on, this was replicated by Horstmann (2003), who also 
found that in contrast to action termination the inhibition of a not-yet 
executed action did not suffer from PRP interference. Unlike selective 
stopping, we think that the results of those two PRP-studies provide 
evidence for our argument that the differences in SSRTs in the simple stop 
task can probably not be explained by assuming that the processing of the 
stop signal is more difficult in for example incongruent trials. 
 In sum, when we go back to the four different ‘components’ of the stop 
signal task proposed by Aron et al. (2005), we can look at which level the 
observed interactions between different kinds of inhibition occur. For a start, 
all our studies used a within-block manipulation, so this excludes the 
possibility that maintaining the task rules and maintaining alertness or 
vigilance can explain why stopping is prolonged in some kinds of trials.27 
                                                          
27 Note that maintaining the task rules and maintaining the alertness also did not 
influence the congruency effects much (cfr. the first remark of this section). One can 
expect that the demands are higher when stop signals could occur during the 
experiment, and therefore, that maintaining would influence the congruency effect. 
Apparently, this was not the case. 
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After all, it seems safe to expect that these functions or processes are the 
same for all types of trials. The third component proposed by Aron et al. 
(2005) refers to the processing of the stop signal. We argued above that this 
stop signal processing could be influenced in case of selective stopping, but 
it seems less likely that this could explain the results of the experiments with 
simple stopping. Thus, based on deletion of other possibilities, we suggest 
that the longer SSRTs in conflict trials are largely due to the response 
inhibition process itself. This is in line with the hypothesis that response 
inhibition in the stop signal task will interfere with other effortful kinds of 
inhibition because those types of inhibition rely on common underlying 
mechanisms. The implication of this hypothesis will be discussed below.  
 
THE RELATION BETWEEN DIFFERENT INHIBITORY FUNCTIONS 
 
 So far we discussed the implications of our results for selective 
suppression mechanisms, inhibitory after-effects and carry-over effects, and 
made a few remarks about the nature of underlying processes in different 
variants of the stop signal task. But the most important topic of this doctoral 
thesis is without doubt the relation between different kinds of inhibitory 
functions. ‘Inhibition’ is no longer considered as a unitary function, but 
more as a family of different functions or constructs (Dempster, 1993; 
Harnishfeger, 1995; Nigg, 2000). In this thesis, we started from the taxonomy 
of Nigg (2000) and a latent variable analysis of Friedman and Miyake (2004). 
In both papers, it was pointed out that there were differences between 
various forms of inhibition while there might also be some correlations. We 
tried to find further behavioural evidence for the hypothesis that there might 
be a certain overlap between at least a subset of inhibitory functions. In the 
paper of Nigg, the proposed taxonomy was not directly tested and the latent 
variable analysis of Friedman and Miyake is arbitrary in a sense that the 
three different inhibitory functions they used in their confirmatory factor 
analysis are arbitrary. Hence, our experiments can be considered as an 
extension of those two studies. 
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 Our results with the stop signal task, and more specifically, the SSRT 
differences between conflict and non-conflict trials, largely mirrored the 
findings of Friedman and Miyake (2004). One of the main findings of 
Friedman and Miyake (2004) was that prepotent response inhibition and 
resistance to distractor interference were closely correlated. In Table 6.1, the 
tasks used by Friedman and Miyake are presented again; with in bold the 
tasks that we used.  
 
Table 6.1: Three inhibition-related functions according to Friedman and Miyake28 
(2004), with the three tasks these authors used for each function (the tasks in bold 
are used in our studies) 
 
Prepotent Response Inhibition 
 Antisaccade task (Hallet, 1978) 
 Stop signal task (Lappin & Eriksen, 1966; Logan & Cowan,1984)  
 Stroop task (Stroop, 1935) 
Resistance to Distractor Interference 
 Eriksen flanker task (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974) 
 Word naming (Kane, Hasher, Stoltzfus, Zacks, & Connelly, 1994) 
 Shape matching (DeSchepper & Treisman, 1996) 
Resistance to Proactive Interference 
 Brown-Peterson variant (Kane & Engle, 2000) 
 AB-AC-AD (Rosen & Engle, 1998) 
 Cued recall (Tolan & Tehan, 1999) 
                                                          
28 Note that Friedman and Miyake (2004) used the Stroop task to assess prepotent 
response inhibition, whereas the flanker task was used as an interference task. 
Although the Stroop effect is indeed due to an automatic reading tendency (and 
therefore prepotent), one could argue that the Stroop effect has more in common 
with the flanker task than with the antisaccade task or the stop signal task. For 
example, in the review article of MacLeod (1991), the flanker task was considered as 
a variant of the Stroop task, because of the fact that in both tasks, irrelevant 
distracting stimulus features interfere with the processing of the relevant feature. 
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Given the correlation between the flanker task and the stop signal task in the 
Friedman and Miyake study, it is not surprising that we found in our 
experiments that the stopping latencies in the stop task were influenced by 
the congruency of the trials in the flanker task. 
 However, Friedman and Miyake (2004) interpreted the correlation 
between prepotent response inhibition and resistance to distractor 
interference in terms of a shared mechanism responsible for the active 
maintenance of task goals in the face of distracting information of 
inappropriate response. Alternatively, we suggest that their findings can 
also be interpreted as evidence for a common inhibitory mechanism that 
selectively suppresses the distracting information or inappropriate 
responses. We already mentioned that performance in the stop signal task is 
also influenced by the antisaccade task which was also used by Friedman 
and Miyake (Logan & Irwin, 2000). Thus, despite this difference in 
theoretical explanations for the relation between inhibitory functions, using 
different methodologies (latent variable analysis and stop signal 
performance) led to similar results.  
 Furthermore, we did not only replicate the findings of Friedman and 
Miyake (2004) with regard to the relation between Prepotent Response 
Inhibition and Resistance to Distractor Interference. These authors also 
looked at the relation between those two inhibitory functions and other 
inhibitory paradigms or tasks such as the random number generation task, 
the negative priming paradigm, task switching ability and the reading span 
task. Here, we will only focus on the tasks that we used in our studies, 
namely negative priming and task switching. Friedman and Miyake (2004) 
found that Response-Distractor inhibition (the combination of prepotent 
response inhibition and resistance to distractor interference) was not 
correlated with negative priming whereas it did correlate with task 
switching ability. Again, this is also largely mirrored in our data. We did not 
find any effect of negative priming on response inhibition and at least for 
selective stopping, there was an effect of task switching for the SSRTs. 
 To summarize, the findings in our studies are to a large extent in line 
with the findings of Friedman and Miyake (2004) and with the proposals of 
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Nigg (2000). Our studies also fit in with recent findings in the domain of 
neurology and neuropsychology. Several neuroimaging studies 
demonstrated that also at a neuroanatomical level there might be an overlap 
between different inhibitory functions. It appears that certain brain regions 
are activated in different inhibitory tasks. Before we continue interpreting 
these findings, it is important to note that commonly activated brain regions 
can have at least three distinct reasons: (a) the different tasks might share 
cognitive operations in which the common region might be involved (the 
‘sharing view’), (b) the different tasks activate different subdivions of the 
same region (the ‘subdivision view’) and (c) a particular brain region can be 
involved in different tasks but this does not necessarily mean that it does 
compute the same cognitive operation in both tasks (the ‘network view’; 
Cabeza and Nyberg, 2002, cited in Derrfuss, Brass & von Cramon, 2004) 
 In other words, interpreting overlap of brain regions should be done 
with some caution. However, it can be very useful when it is done in 
combination with behavioural studies that also provide evidence for 
common or shared mechanisms. In fact, that is what we tried to do in our 
behavioural experiments and studies, and therefore, our results can be 
compared with neuroanatomical findings. Several brain imaging studies 
pointed out that there are certain brain regions that are activated in a whole 
range of inhibitory tasks, especially frontal regions. We already mentioned 
the study of Aron, Robbins and Poldrack (2004) in which it was stated, based 
on both imaging data and lesion studies, that the right inferior frontal cortex 
plays a key role in a variety of inhibitory tasks. For example, it was found 
that the amount of damage to the right inferior cortex correlated strongly 
with the SSRT in the stop signal task: More damage resulted in longer SSRTs 
(Aron, Fletcher, Bullmore, Sahakian & Robbins, 2003). Interestingly, the 
inferior frontal cortex is also activated in other tasks that we used in our 
studies like the flanker task (e.g., Bunge et al., 2002; Hazeltine, Poldrack, & 
Gabrieli, 2000) and the Stroop and Simon task (e.g., Peterson et al., 2002). 
Hence, our findings can be fitted in with what is previously found in 
neuroimaging studies.  
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 Even though the right inferior cortex is considered to be the key region 
for inhibition, it is probably part of a broader network of prefrontal regions. 
As argued by Aron et al. (2004), the reason the same set of regions is 
activated (consisting of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, the anterior 
cingulate cortex and the inferior frontal cortex), is that all these regions 
contribute to optimal performance in a whole range of different cognitive 
tasks. Aron et al. (2004) hypothesized that that the left-lateral prefrontal 
cortex maintains task goals and task sets, the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) 
detects conflict when the stimulus does not match those goals, and right IFC 
suppresses the irrelevant response. Of course, this is only a subset of regions 
that contribute to optimal task performance in different inhibitory tasks. For 
example, we know that the ACC is only activated in case of response conflict 
and not in case of stimulus conflict (Milham et al., 2001; Van Veen, Cohen, 
Botvinick, Stenger, & Carter, 2001). Nonetheless, we have demonstrated that 
conflict detection also occurs in case of stimulus conflict. Another example is 
the important role of the basal ganglia in the stop signal task (e.g., Band & 
van Boxtel, 1999; Rieger, Gauggel, & Burmeister, 2003; van den Wildenberg 
et al., in press). In other words, although the right inferior cortex appears to 
be very important, this region is probably only part of a broader network 
responsible for various kinds of inhibition. 
 This brings us to the last point of this discussion: The implementation of 
inhibition in the broader domain of cognitive control and executive 
functioning. The last years a vast amount of neuroimaging and behavioural 
studies investigated the concept of cognitive control. Several theories were 
proposed in which inhibition is often considered as a fundamental and 
important function within the domain of cognitive control. For example, 
Miyake et al. (2000) argued that inhibition was one of the three ‘core’ 
executive functions (‘shifting’, ‘updating’ and ‘inhibition’). These authors 
used a confirmatory factor analysis, and found moderate correlations 
between the three proposed executive functions. In a neuroimaging context, 
different inhibitory tasks like the Stroop task and the flanker task are often 
used to assess cognitive control (for a review, see Aron et al., 2004; 
Ridderinkhof, van den Wildenberg, Segalowitz, & Carter, 2004). In this 
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context, researchers are mainly interested in the role of different brain areas 
responsible for cognitive control, and use inhibition as a marker for 
cognitive control. Nonetheless, in those neuroimaging studies, the key 
assumption is that cognitive control involved in decision making can be 
considered as a aggregation of different processes, such as goal-directed 
action selection, response activation and inhibition, performance monitoring, 
and reward-based learning (Ridderinkhof, van den Wildenberg, et al., 2004).  
 Actually, we can conclude this discussion with (a part of) the citation 
that we used at the beginning of this doctoral thesis: ‘The ability to suppress 
(…) is essential for normal thinking processes and, ultimately, for successful living 
(Garavan, Ross, & Stein, 1999)’.  
  
UNRESOLVED ISSUES AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS  
 
 In the final part of this chapter we will present some directions for 
further research. In this doctoral thesis, we stressed the fact that inhibition 
should be regarded as a family of inhibitory functions. Some of these 
functions are correlated with other functions, others are probably not 
correlated. We think that there are at least three different issues that deserve 
further research: (a) what determines the correlation between different 
inhibitory functions; (b) is there a link between within-trials and between-
trial adjustments; and (c) how is stimulus conflict related to response 
conflict? 
 
UNITY AND DIVERSITY: DETERMINANTS OF THE CORRELATION 
 
 Our studies fit in with the research that investigates the correlation 
between different inhibitory constructs. We focused on what different 
functions had in common. Conversely, there are also differences between 
different tasks and functions, suggesting diversity. In developmental and 
individual differences studies, it was demonstrated that behavioural 
inhibition and cognitive inhibition might be different psychological 
constructs (see Harnishfeger, 1995). For example, in the above mentioned 
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study of Kramer et al. (1994), not only the flanker task and the stop signal 
task were used, but a whole battery of inhibitory tasks. Actually, Kramer et 
al. were mainly interested in age-related differences in inhibitory tasks and 
they showed impairments for some of these tasks (e.g., the stop signal task) 
and not for other tasks (e.g., a flanker task).  
 Several explanations have already been offered for this pattern of non-
correlations between different inhibitory tasks. Friedman and Miyake (2004) 
pointed out that problems with task purity, task reliability and construct 
validity made it difficult to interpret low or zero correlations. They argued 
that latent variable analysis alleviated these problems. But even when latent 
variable analysis was used, it appeared that Prepotent Response Inhibition 
and Resistance to Distractor Interference were not correlated with Resistance 
to PI. Friedman and Miyake (2004) suggested that this non-correlation in 
their study might be caused by two different factors. First of all, it could be 
the case that Resistance to PI is not an effortful form of inhibition. Secondly, 
the source of interference could be different. In the Response-Distractor 
inhibition tasks, the interference is due to external stimuli in the 
environment, which is not the case for Resistance to PI (Friedman & Miyake, 
2004). In Chapter 3, it was also hypothesized that the source of interference 
might be of importance when we tried to explain why response inhibition is 
not influenced by the compatibility of the stimulus in a pure stimulus-
response compatibility task. We argued that this was also possibly due to 
the source of the compatibility effect. In addition, in the negative priming 
study, we did not find any effect of negative priming on response inhibition. 
Since it was argued that in negative priming the source of interference is due 
to internal stimuli (mental representations and stimulus-response 
associations), it is not surprising that we did not find an interaction.  
 Therefore, we think that the source of the interference or conflict might 
indeed be an important factor in explaining the relation between different 
inhibitory functions. In a sense, this can be related to the distinction between 
the agents and the sites of inhibition (Band & van der Molen, 1999), and to 
the suggestion that a broader network of brain regions is responsible for 
cognitive control, and therefore inhibition (e.g., Aron et al., 2004; 
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Ridderinkhof, van den Wildenberg, et al., 2004). Future research will have to 
investigate whether this can explain why for example not all inhibitory 
functions correlate in the same way with each other and explain for example 
age differences. One hypothesis could be that most of the underlying 
inhibitory mechanisms in inhibitory tasks develop in the same way but that 
the implementation in the broader network differs.  
 
COGNITIVE CONTROL AND INHIBITION:  
WITHIN- AND BETWEEN-TRIALS ADJUSTMENTS 
 
 A second issue concerns the relation between the within-trial and 
between-trial adjustments, and is probably the most difficult one to tackle. 
We already mentioned in the discussion of the second study of Chapter 2 
that in fact, it could be the case that not conflict resolution but rather conflict 
detection interferes with stop signal inhibition. Performance monitoring is 
most likely present in both conflict trials and stop signal trials. As a result, it 
could be possible that the act of monitoring instead of the response to the 
monitoring signal (i.e., selective suppression or stop signal inhibition) is 
responsible for the found interactions. The problem here is that it is unclear 
at the moment how performance monitoring as suggested in for example the 
conflict monitoring theory (Botvinick et al., 2001; Botvinick, Cohen, & Carter, 
in press), can be implemented on a within-trial basis and whether or not the 
signal can be used to resolve response conflicts (Ridderinkhof, Ullsperger, et 
al., 2004). As pointed out by Ridderinkhof, it is difficult to disentangle the 
monitoring signal and the answer to this signal. Furthermore, the fact that 
the answer to a conflict situation happens at both a within-trial level (e.g., 
selective suppression of the irrelevant stimulus feature) and at a between-
trial level (e.g., strategic adjustments), does not make it much easier. In fact, 
it could be the case that both types of adjustments are not that dissimilar. In 
general, between-trial adjustments concern the optimizing of pathways and 
the processing of the target-relevant information (Milham et al., 2001). But 
others added that the indirect route becomes suppressed after the detection 
of a (response) conflict. For example, Stoffels (1996) hypothesized a preset 
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suppression of the indirect route after an incompatible trial. Alternatively, 
Stürmer, Leuthold, Soetens, Schröter and Sommer (2002) argued that 
following a response conflict the transmission of the output of the indirect 
route to the motor execution system is blocked. Although this blocking 
hypothesis is still debated, it could be an interesting starting point for 
further investigation of the relation between within-trail and between-trial 
adjustments in conflict situations. To go even further, one could focus on 
how these adjustments are related to the concept of inhibition as assessed in 
a whole range of different tasks. 
 
STIMULUS AND RESPONSE CONFLICT: MORE OF THE SAME? 
 
 One of the most important findings besides the interaction between 
response inhibition and selective suppression is that our results suggested 
that there is a close similarity between stimulus and response conflict. At the 
moment, little is known about stimulus conflict. Most researchers focused on 
response conflict and often, stimulus conflict is only included in the 
experiments to point out the differences with response conflict (like in the 
studies that focused on the contribution of the ACC in conflict detection). 
But more and more studies demonstrated that there might be an important 
similarity between stimulus conflict and response conflict (e.g., Liu et al., 
2004). Our results with the stop signal paradigm suggest that the 
suppression mechanism that helps to resolve the response conflict could also 
help to resolve the stimulus conflict. In addition, we were able to 
demonstrate in the absence of stimulus-response repetitions that the 
stimulus conflict disappeared after a stimulus incongruent trial in a flanker 
task, suggesting top-down adjustments after the detection of stimulus 
conflict. On the one hand, it seems that the conflict detection is different for 
stimulus and response conflict. On the other hand, it is unknown whether 
the conflict resolution or conflict adaptation on a within-trial and between-
trial basis (e.g., by means of selective suppression of the distracting stimulus 
feature) is similar or not. In the extended activation-suppression mechanism 
that we proposed, we argued that selective suppression could occur at any 
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processing stage from stimulus perception to response execution. However, 
the nature of selective suppression is still unclear. Again, this leads us back 
to the distinction between the agent and the site of inhibition: Is the agent of 
selective suppression in case of a stimulus conflict the same as the agent of 
selective suppression in case of a response conflict?  
 
 All in all, there is room for more research on what was once called at a 
lecture at our department ‘the worst nightmare of cognitive psychologists’ 
(someone who probably wishes to remain anonymous). 
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